We, Europe and the Rest: EU discourse(s) at work in environmental politics by Birkel, K.M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/82947
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
We, Europe and the rest 
EU discourse(s) at work in environmental politics
Een w etenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de M anagementwetenschappen
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann, volgens besluit van het
college van decanen
in het openbaarte verdedigen op vrijdag 15 januari 2010 om 10.30 uur precies
door
Kathrin Maria Birkel 
geboren op 19 April 1980 te Forchheim, Duitsland
Promotores:
Leroy, prof. dr. P.
Arts, prof. dr. B.J.M. (W ageningen University)
Copromotor:
Liefferink, dr. J.D.
M anuscriptcomm issie:
Oberthür, prof. dr. S. (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) 
Torfing, prof. J. (Roskilde University)
Verbeek, prof. dr. J.A.
Copyright © 2009 by Kathrin Maria Birkel 
Cover design by Eit Hasker
Printed by Ipskamp Drukkers B.V., Enschede, The Netherlands 
ISBN 978-90-9024836-3
I m et Ferdinand De Saussure  
on a night like this 
on love he said, I'm not so sure  
I even know  what it is 
no understanding, no closure  
it is a nemesis 
y o u  can't use a bulldozer to study orchids
(The M agnetic Fields, 'The Death o f  Ferdinand de Saussure')
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Prologue
On April 23, 2008 the European Union (EU) overstepped its mark. Before that date, 
Europeans had tolerated the many outrageous policies that 'Eurocrats' had imposed 
upon them. They had endured newspaper headlines informing them  that 'THE 
RIDICULOUS EU W ANT TO BAN BARMAIDS FROM W EARING REVEALING TOPS' 
(News of the W orld from August 7th, 2005, see N.N., 2008), that the 'EU W ANTS TO 
BAN M ILLIONAIRE' (Uhlig, 2003), and that 'LUDICROUS EU OFFICIALS [are] READY 
TO BAN YO GHURT' (Carey, 2003).
On April 23, 2008, however, 'Brussels' went beyond the limits of what was acceptable. 
On this day, the media uncovered the 'EU's secret plot to abolish Britain' (Hall, 2008) -  
a plan that intended no less than 'to carve up Britain into a United States of Europe' 
(Hartley, 2008)1.
In this book, it is not my intention to discuss these newspaper headlines. I do not 
intend to speculate whether we can really expect the United Kingdom (UK) to 
'disappear altogether as a recognised nation' (Hall, 2008). Nor do I want to reflect on 
the general quality of the media in the UK, the EU, or elsewhere. Rather, by citing 
these headlines I would like to illustrate how we have come to think about the EU: as 
an entity whose main occupations are imposing m easures that 'w e' do not want to 
follow and seizing M ember State powers that 'w e' do not want to relinquish.
We encounter this way of thinking in our everyday lives, in discussions with our friends 
and our neighbours. More importantly, h o w e v e r-w e  also encounter it in wide parts 
of what is com m only called the field of European Integration Studies (EIS).
To be certain, EIS is a vast field and is composed of different approaches and schools 
of thought. The common denom inator of EIS research is m erely its object, the 
European Union in the widest sense. Yet, when considering the overall diversity of the 
field, it is puzzling to find that many EIS publications share certain 'conventional' 
assum ptions about the EU's 'inner life'. These assum ptions revolve around the notion 
that EU M ember States, on the one hand, and EU institutions (such as the European 
Comm ission or the European Parliament), on the other hand, naturally conflict. The 
general impression that has been conveyed is that, throughout the past decades of
1 For a background, see http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/euromyths/mythl67_en.htm.
European integration, EU M ember States and EU institutions have incessantly fought 
over -  to put it in the words of Harold Dwight Lasswell -  'who gets what, when, how' 
(Lasswell, 1936). The distribution of com petences between the actors is depicted as a 
continuous bone of contention, opposing EU institutions (which strive to gain a 
m aximum of power) and M ember States (which try to defend their sovereignty).
Although this is a view that is widespread in EIS, it triggers several questions. When 
scholars, for instance, interpret something as a com petence struggle between 
'Brussels' and the M em ber States -  where does this interpretation derive from? To 
what extent is it an interpretation shared by policym akers involved in the conflict? In 
what term s should they depict what is transpiring?
The answers to these questions are highly relevant, regardless of their material 
outcome. If policym akers join scientific literature in depicting policy-making in the EU 
as a com petence struggle -  that is, if this is the dom inant pattern o f'm eaning making'
-  this would in fact force us to re-consider the 'European project'. W hy should 
Europeans still want to engage in something that is obviously a source of great 
frustration? If, however, there is a discrepancy between the interpretations that 
scientists have and the interpretations of those whose actions they analyse, then we 
as scientists m ay need to rethink our presuppositions and be open to alternative ways 
of meaning making in the context of EU politics.
The book you have before you seeks to analyse to what extent the intrinsic 
conflictuality between EU M em ber States and EU institutions is indeed part of the 
lifeworld of EU policymakers. Against this backdrop, it is driven by an eagerness to 
give a possible answer to the questions raised above. To do so, the basic and very 
simple idea is to trace the patterns of meaning making and identity formation of 
policym akers involved in EU decision-making. These patterns will be compared to the 
patterns of interpretation suggested by 'conventional' EIS, i.e. those parts of EIS 
which presuppose an intrinsic conflict between EU institutions and EU M ember States 
and regard this conflict as all-pervasive in EU politics.
As EU policy-making is too extensive to be analysed in its entirety for these purposes,
I have limited my research to EU environmental politics and specifically to two cases: 
climate change politics and green biotechnology politics. W hat predisposes EU 
environm ental politics as a field, and climate change and green biotechnology as 
cases, is that they are 'normal, yet salient'. Environmental politics is an everyday field
of EU politics. The attention it has so far attracted has varied over time (Sbragia, 
2000: 294). It belongs to the large bulk of fields in which what has become the 
'norm al' mode of EU decision-making (co-decision2) applies. Environmental politics 
has not stopped at the EU borders; instead, the EU has become party to the myriad of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreem ents (MEAs) that exist on the international level. 
On both levels and in both cases, issues have at tim es been highly neuralgic, and 
fierce controversies have resulted. To what extent do these controversies fit into the 
pattern depicted by conventional EIS? W hat other patterns can be detected? 
Furtherm ore, as EU environmental politics is no longer restricted to its 'hom e base' 
we might wonder w hether patterns of interaction vary as we advance from one level 
to the other.
To answer these questions, interviews have been conducted with policym akers who 
have been central in either climate change or green biotechnology politics during the 
past 25 years, which is when both fields emerged in EU politics. To trace the patterns 
of meaning making and identity formation, these interviews have been the object of 
discourse analysis.
During this analysis, alternative patterns of meaning making and identity formation 
have indeed emerged for both cases. On the EU level, loyalties and identities have 
often formed across EU institutions and Member States. Internationally, a collective 
European identity has developed in both cases. Thinking and acting in term s of 
'Brussels' vs. 'the M ember States' still exists, but it is by no means the dom inant way 
of meaning making and identity formation.
This book follows a very simple outline. Chapter 1 aims to give a more precise notion 
of'con ven tio nal' EIS, highlighting its presuppositions. Chapter 2 introduces discourse 
theory as a fram ework for analysing the patterns of meaning making and identity 
formation of key policym akers in either of the cases selected, whereas chapter 3 
explains the methodological choices that have been made in the context of this 
research. Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 7 give an account of the analyses per case and per level. 
Chapters 4 and 5 analyse EU climate change politics on both the international and the 
EU level; chapters 6 and 7 sim ilarly examine EU politics in the field of green
2 In the co-decision procedure, 'the EP and the Council have equal power in the adoption of... pieces of 
EU legislation' (Caramani, 2008: 590). Today, approximately fifty per cent of the legal acts that the EU 
adopts per year previously passed a co-decision procedure (for more details, see Caramani, 2008: 590f).
biotechnology. Chapter 8 contains both a sum m ary as well as a com parison of the 
findings. The book closes with a short epilogue.
PART I Theoretical and methodological framework 
1. THE EUROPEAN UNION ACCORDING TO 'CONVENTIONAL EIS'
In the prologue, the claim is made that many researchers in the field of EIS have 
proceeded on the same assum ptions up until now. They have presupposed a 
com petence conflict between M em ber States and EU institutions and, in this context, 
they have equated formal-institutional com petences with more abstract notions such 
as power or authority. Hence, researchers have often seen a 'loss' of com petences as a 
'loss' of sovereignty. EU M em ber States have been presented as an entity ('the' 
M em ber States), as has been any of the institutions ('the' European Parliament). 
These monolithic entities have, in turn, been linked to monolithic preferences. EU 
institutions have been deemed eager to enhance their powers by pushing EU 
integration. M ember States, in turn, have been regarded as trying to defend their 
sovereignty against th e 'a ttack s'fro m  EU institutions.
To be certain, not all scientific output in EIS emanates from research that has adopted 
these assum ptions, with num erous books and articles taking a more nuanced stance. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the pervasiveness of this conglom erate of assum ptions -  in 
its integrity or in singular pieces -  begs the question w hether or to what extent these 
assum ptions have restrained the scope of how the EU is or how the EU can be 
conceived within EIS.
This chapter highlights different dim ensions of conventional EIS. To start with, an 
overview is given of its historic developm ent. Subsequently, its individual 
assum ptions and their interrelations are scrutinised. This is followed by a section 
which traces the success and the pervasiveness that this way of seeing the EU has 
attained in EIS o verthe years. In a further step, exam ples are provided of the criticism 
conventional EIS attracted from within EIS, before the chapter ends with remarks on 
the status and relevance of conventional EIS for this research.
The historical development of'conventional EIS'
The tendency to reduce EU policy-making to a struggle between EU institutions and 
EU M em ber States can be related to early developm ents within the field of EIS.
During its first few decades as a scientific domain, EIS was largely structured by the 
theoretical rivalry between neo-functionalism  and intergovernmentalism. Despite the 
various nuances that had been inherent in the first versions of these approaches, neo­
functionalism  and intergovernm entalism  were subsequently cut up into small portions 
that were more easily digestible. For instance, M ark Pollack asked in his 1997 article 
w hether the EU was
characterized by continued Member State dominance or by a runaway Commission 
and an activist Court progressively chipping away at this dominance? These questions 
have divided the two traditional schools of thought in regional integration, with neo­
functionalists generally asserting, and intergovernmentalists generally denying, any 
important causal role for supranational institutions in the integration process. 
(Pollack, 1997: 99)
Originally, however, the basic question posed by neo-functionalists and 
intergovernm entalists had m erely been whether EU institutions had an autonom ous 
causal role in the process of EU integration. This means that, in his account, Mark 
Pollack added a twist to the approaches which, previously, had not been there. Firstly, 
he depicted playing such an autonom ous causal role as a strategic intention of EU 
institutions. Secondly, he depicted such an autonom ous role as synonym ously 
detrim ental fo rth e  M ember States as a group or entity.
This 'distortion' of neo-functionalism and intergovernm entalism  has been a recurrent 
feature in EIS and it has had a palpable impact on later generations of theoretical 
approaches in EIS. Even when neo-functionalism  and intergovernm entalism  were no 
longer fashionable in EIS, the controversial reading that had gradually been 
associated with them  persisted. Nowadays, multi-level governance (MLG) is seen to 
have taken over the role of neo-functionalism  (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996), 
whereas 'state-centric' approaches such as Andrew M oravcsik's liberal 
intergovernm entalism  (See Moravcsik, 1998) are regarded as legitim ate successors of 
previous versions of intergovernm entalism . Again, these approaches are depicted as 
opposing each other on the issue of whether supranational institutions have managed 
to loosen the grip that M ember States allegedly had on them , and whether they have 
managed to seize M em ber State competences. Hence, the assumption that an 
intrinsic conflict exists between the EU institutions and the M em ber States has defied 
the ravages of time.
6
The allocation of roles in 'conventional EIS'
Although state centric and MLG approaches are com m only seen as contenders, their 
basic texts rely on the same m etaphor for portraying relations within the EU. They 
depict Member States and EU institutions as engaged in a principal-agent (PA) 
relationship. For both approaches, the allocation of roles in this relationship is self- 
evident:
[T]he EU Member States are naturally regarded as principals, and the key question is 
to what extent supranational agents may take advantage of their discretionary 
powers to pursue their own policy preferences and promote integration against the 
wishes of national governments -  an issue which, as is known, occupies a central 
place in European integration literature
What the principals fear most is the emergence of a variant of'political drift', in which 
agencies are somehow 'captured' by one of their institutional rivals in the leadership 
contest. Thus, as a rule, even where national governments accept the necessity of 
enhancing European cooperation, they tend to oppose the granting of more 
significant powers to the Commission. (Dehousse, 2008: 791, 796)
According to this depiction, EU institutions, especially the Comm ission, have a 
'natural' tendency to exploit their advantage. They satisfy their hunger for more 
power by pushing for more integration:
Supranational actors, particularly the European Commission, have an institutional 
self-interest in driving integration forward, which may come into conflict with the 
institutional self-interests of the national bureaucracies emphasized in 
intergovernmentalist explanations ... . The Commission's intrinsic interest in 
regulation at a high level is related to its self-interest in achieving a profile as a 
political actor... the pursuit of a more active political role favours innovative forms of 
regulation which go beyond the Member States' traditional approaches, as well as 
extensions of Community authority into new regulatory areas such as consumer 
protection, environmental protection and occupational health. At the same time, this 
strategy will also satisfy institutional self-interest in maximizing the Commission's 
authority and resources. (Eichener, 1997: 598, 599)
The Commission not only executes the Member States' will on the international 
scene, it also works independently towards increasing its external competences. 
(Woll, 2006: 53)
In addition to the Com mission, scholars have repeatedly suspected the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) of agency slippage3. In fact, a whole branch of literature has 
dedicated itself to the 'activist court', as it has been referred to in one of the citations 
mentioned earlier. To give some examples, 'Burley and Mattli (1993), Mattli and 
Slaughter (1998), and Stone Sweet and Caporaso (1998) all relied on a 
neofunctionalist argument, suggesting that the court systematically, through its 
decisions, pushes for further integration' (Hug, 2003: 54).
Not only have the Commission and the ECJ been accused of exploiting their 
advantage independently from one another; frequently, scholars have also asserted 
that the two institutions conspire for their mutual interests:
Studies of telecommunications ... argue that the Commission took the initiative and 
persuaded or obliged national governments to accept its role; it did so by applying its 
legal weaponry, in alliance with the ECJ. (Thatcher, 2001: 559)
The Commission is a "purposeful opportunist" ... which works in collaboration with 
other maximalist actors such as the ECJ to clear bottlenecks in the policy process and 
extend the scope of EU competence to new domains. (Jordan, 1998:14)
The powers that the Union is able to exercise were either delegated by the 
governments of the Member States, or were usurped by the Commission and the 
Court through interpretations of Treaty provisions which exceeded the original intent 
ofthe contracting governments. (Scharpf, 2001: 5)
According to Burley and Mattli, the Court has been able to promote European 
integration throughout its existence by insisting that it is only implementing the law, 
as opposed to playing politics ... . They also consider the Commission to be an 
important partner for the Court when it comes to furthering European legal 
integration. (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001: 362)
The European Parliam ent (EP) has less frequently been mentioned as the 
Com m ission's partner in crime, and has usually been less exposed to accusations of 
slippage. Nevertheless, for sub-fields such as environm ental politics, it has repeatedly 
been depicted as the Com m ission's 'natural ally' (Straby-Jensen, 2006: 93). Moreover, 
one could assume that the EP has a 'natural' inclination for competence expansion
3 In cases of 'agency slippage', agents follow their own preferences, which diverge from those of its 
principal.
sim ilar to that of the ECJ and Comm ission. Indeed, in their 2005 article, Michael 
Kaeding and Thorsten Selck claim that '[t]he Commission and the European 
Parliam ent are much more favorably disposed towards increased integration than the 
Council m embers are' (Kaeding & Selck, 2005: 271).
Just as scholarly literature mostly describes EU institutions as agents who try to 
expand their com petences through agency slippage, M em ber States are normally 
ascribed the role of principals who attem pt to defend their upper hand. These 
principals are menaced by the agents' aggression or, to put it in other words, the 
'nation-states of Europe are threatened ... by the rise of supranational authorities' 
(Alesina & Wacziarg, 1999:1).
Many scholars do not only deem M em ber State com petences to be at stake in these 
struggles. Rather, they assert that the attacks from 'Brussels' hit what is seen to be 
the M em ber States' marrow of existence: their sovereignty. Bob Jessop, for instance, 
states that we witness
[a] gradual loss of the de jure  sovereignty of national states in certain respects as rule- 
and/or decision-making powers are transferred upward to supranational bodies and 
the resulting rules and decisions are held to bind national states. (Jessop, 2004: 64)
M em ber States, however, are fighting back, defending their 'territory':
[N]ational states seek to control what powers of competencies go up, down, or 
sideways and to exercise this control so as to enhance their capacities to realize 
current state projects; and they also seek ... to retain the competence to revoke such 
transfers of powers and/or to implement them in ways that do least damage to their 
capacity to secure institutional integration and social cohesion with their 
corresponding territories. (Jessop, 2004: 64)
With different control mechanisms, in particular over the Commission, governments 
take care that delegated competencies cannot easily be used against their own 
interest. (Schmidt, 2000: 41)
The scholars cited so far all display a shared conviction of how relations between EU 
institutions and M ember States are structured. They depict an ongoing struggle 
within the EU -  a struggle in which Member States have to defend them selves, and 
their sovereignty, against the threat of EU institutions to expand their realms of 
com petence. This conflict is portrayed as echoing institutional affiliation, or, more
precisely, as echoing the dividing line between being a state and not being a state. 
After all, (M em ber) states have to repel attacks that are launched by non-states. 
Given the fixed and clashing preferences of both states and non-states, these 
contentions cannot be pre-empted. It therefore seem s that the EU is intrinsically and 
necessarily conflictual.
The success story of'conventional EIS'
Gradually, com petence conflicts between EU M ember States and EU institutions 
became a true topos of EIS, as many scholars conceived them  to be all-pervasive and 
dom inant even in the fields of everyday politics. This enabled the developm ent of a 
new branch of research, in which the question of whether EU Mem ber States or EU 
institutions had 'w on' in a particular instance of policy-making became central.
In the domain of environmental politics, the packaging waste directive was taken as a 
testing field to find out whether 'EC integration strengthens the state, or rather 
empowers supranational institutions at the expense of national sovereignty' (Golub, 
2002: 217).
In the same vein, Nigel Haigh depicted the participation of EU M em ber States and the 
Comm ission in international climate change conventions as leading to quarrels about 
the legal arrangem ents that apply. According to him, these conflicts 'can be seen as 
an aspect of the continuing power struggle between the EC institutions and the 
M em ber States' (Haigh, 1996:155). Haigh claimed that, in the context of international 
climate change negotiations, '[t]he question of loss of national sovereignty is a 
concern of all M em ber States though some express the concern more openly than 
others' (Haigh, 1996:177).
For the field of biodiversity, Jenny Fairbrass and Andrew Jordan asserted that
[t]he Commission was particularly assiduous in its efforts to expand the EU's 
competence in this policy sphere .... National and international environmental groups 
have served as the Commission's "eyes and ears" at the national level, by identifying 
implementation failures. It was these failures that allowed the courts (national and 
European) to become involved. The ECJ's rulings maintained and, on occasions, even 
expanded the acquis. Despite the best efforts of Member States to recapture control 
over policy ... the emerging case law continues to place constraints on their autonomy
and Member States have been unable to monopolize policy development in the EU. 
(Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001: 513O
Other policy fields also served as a fecund source for examples of inner-European 
conflict. According to Ian Bache, regional policy
provided a particularly good example of the conflict between Commission 
preferences and those of national governments. The Commission has pushed for 
control over a policy with significant redistributive effects, while national 
governments have resisted Commission autonomy and sought to control the 
redistributive impact. (Bache, 1999: 8)
This study does not want to dismiss such statements and claims prim a facie. They 
might match the perception of policym akers who were involved in the specific cases 
of decision-making. However, researchers who asserted the existence of a conflict 
between the EU institutions and the EU M em ber States in the past often did not refer 
to reports of policymakers. Instead, they simply presupposed that such conflicts 
dominated policy-making in general. (Hug, 2003: 48, see also following section)
It can be argued that such presuppositions overshadowed alternative interpretations 
and propelled EIS research in one particular direction. Instead of treating meaning 
making and identity formation in EU politics as an object of research, scholars 
assumed that EU actors thought and acted according to a standard pattern.
Critique
This has been criticised within the field of EIS in the past. Mark Thatcher, for instance, 
stated that his experiences in the field of EU telecom m unications did not match the 
conventional presuppositions of his peers:
As in any partnership there were disagreements and debates between the 
Commission and governments. However, those over the substance of EC legislative 
proposals were limited: they were not concerned with its central principles but rather 
the speed of change and the extent of EC liberalization and re-regulation. Moreover, 
conflicts were not between the Commission on the one side and national 
governments on the other. Instead there were divisions among Member States, with 
the same countries favouring greater EC action on some subjects (for instance,
'liberal' states on competition) but seeking to restrict it on others (notably in re­
regulation). (Thatcher, 2001: 573)
Thatcher concluded that he still believed that applying principal-agent fram eworks in 
EIS made sense, but that 'such fram eworks should not assume that conflict between 
the Commission and national governments is a necessary feature of EC decision­
m aking' (Thatcher, 2001: 577).
Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon were equally dissatisfied with how PA had been 
applied up until then:
The assumption that either Member States or supranational institutions are unitary 
actors is extremely questionable. The level of analysis selected by the authors 
discussed may make this assumption attractive, but even as a convenient fiction it is 
problematic. Moreover, the focus on Member State control of process and 
institutions ... precludes from the outset the possibility of trans-institutional alliances, 
such as the coalitions constructed with the Commission by Member States that are 
keen to multilateralize their national policy preferences. (Kassim & Menon, 2003:133)
Kassim and Menon explicitly linked this lacuna to the theoretical dynam ics in EIS, 
arguing that both intergovernm entalists and neo-functionalists
will construe the relationship between Member States and supranational institutions 
in conflictual terms -  a view that neglects the policy dimension and asserts the 
transfer of sovereignty is always the central issue (Menon 2002) and disregards the 
image of EU decision-making, increasingly championed by scholars and practitioners, 
as co-operative (Wessels 1996; Lewis 1998, 1999) and consensual (Mazey and 
Richardson 1995). (Kassim & Menon, 2003:133)
Not only assum ptions on the unity of actors or the EU's intrinsic conflictuality 
attracted criticism; Simon Hug found additional fault in how preferences were simply 
postulated:
Few, if any, authors deal directly with the endogenous nature of preferences of 
supranational actors. Much more common are implicit or explicit assumptions about 
the integrationist preferences of the ECJ ... the Commission ... and the EP (e.g., 
Crombez, 1996; Tsebelis, 1994). These important assumptions, subscribed to in many 
studies of European integration, are hardly substantiated in empirical work, which in 
addition is rather scarce. With the notable exception of work on the EP using survey
data, roll call votes, or expert surveys, we know very little about the preferences that 
supranational actors might have over policies. (Hug, 2003: 48)
Hug thus asserted that assum ptions that belonged to the core convictions of 
conventional EIS did simply not bear any scientific proof.
Conclusion
The assum ptions on which 'conventional' EIS is based are by no means exclusive to 
the scientific realm. They are ubiquitous in 'the real world', and as such confront us in 
the media just as in parliamentary debates or everyday conversations with neighbours 
and friends. Conventional EIS has not only adopted presuppositions about an 
inherently conflictual EU in a rather uncritical manner, but it has also emboldened 
them  by turning them into scientific arguments.
Over time, these presuppositions have led to a certain tunnel view in parts of EIS. In 
many cases, policy fields have been used as testing sites for 'who won and who lost' in 
the seem ingly eternal fight between EU institutions and EU M em ber States. It can be 
argued that in conventional EIS alternative interpretations have played a secondary 
role or have not even been considered.
This overview has not been written in order to debunk a large proportion of what 
constitutes EIS. Rather it helps to convey a clearer notion of my own research project 
and of the main question it seeks to address. Given the pervasiveness that 
conventional readings of the EU and of EU policy-making have attained, to what 
extent can we say that they also serve as an interpretative screen for those who are 
actually involved in EU policy-making processes?
This means that, in the context of EU policy-making, I will need to re-problem atise 
'the existence of subjects them selves, their positioning vis-à-vis one another, and the 
“ reality" that made certain structures and meanings possible' (Doty, 1993: 305). For all 
of these dimensions, the interpretations dom inant in conventional EIS are just some 
among many conceivable possibilities of meaning making and identity formation. To 
what extent 'conventional' interpretations have also been dom inant among 
policym akers, and to what extent these interpretations have shaped the
policym akers' attitude and behaviour, needs to be investigated. To this end, I will 
make use of discourse theory and discourse analysis.
2. SEEING THINGS DIFFERENTLY: DISCOURSE THEORY AND 
ANALYSIS
When exactly did discourse theory arrive in EIS, or if it has even arrived at all, is hard 
to say. Ten years ago, the authors of a special issue of the Journal of European Public 
Policy did not think it had. They asserted that there was not very much 'reflectivist' 
research on European integration, i.e. research employing discourse theory or other 
approaches with a non-rationalist meta-theory (T. Christiansen, Jorgensen, & Wiener, 
1999: 532).4
Today, such a statem ent seem s slightly dated as we are confronted with a new 
academ ic 'reality' of discourse theory (DT). First, discourse theory has become a 
buzzword in both EIS and its neighbouring disciplines, although in many instances, 
DT's post-structuralist baggage has been left behind. Second, a substantial num ber of 
current EIS works are based on DT (see Thom as Diez, 2001; Howarth & Torfing, 2005; 
W aever, 2004). Finally and equally important, DT in EIS has grown sufficiently to 
generate different strands. Thomas Diez, for example, considers DT an integral part 
of both the 'Copenhagen School' and the 'Governance School' (Thom as Diez, 2001:
That said, EIS still seems slightly uneasy with DT's appearance. Much of this 
discom fort has seem ingly been taken over from the neighbouring field of 
International Relations (IR), where DT earlier appeared and aroused academic 
suspicion. Both in EIS and IR, scholars have often m eticulously distinguished social 
constructivism  from discourse theory and other kinds o f'reflectivism '. They asserted 
that social constructivism  disagreed strongly with these approaches on questions of 
epistemology, as social constructivism  in IR and EIS retains 'an epistemological 
com m itm ent to truth-seeking, and the belief that causal generalization in the form of 
middle range theories ... is possible' (Risse & Wiener, 1999: 776).
Social constructivists such as Alexander W endt distanced them selves from 
approaches which, like discourse theory, qualified as 'som e exotic (presum ably 
Parisian) social theory' (W endt as cited in Smith, 1999: 884). Emmanuel Adler 
explicitly warned that his peers needed 'to distinguish between the claims of
4 At the time, EIS scholars in search for 'new' approaches seemed to prefer 'lighter' versions of social 
constructivist research (T. Christiansen et al., 1999: 532).
constructivism  and those raised by more radical interpretivists' (Adler, 1997: 320). 
Both in IR and EIS, discourse theory, in particular, and post-structuralism , in general, 
became 'established as a 'school' with extrem e views' (Waever, 2004:197).
As discourse theory still ranks among the more disputed approaches in EIS and its 
neighbouring fields, it is arguably under more pressure to justify  and to legitimate 
itself than other approaches. This is exacerbated by the fact that EIS mainstream has 
continuously striven for EIS to become what is com m only called a 'norm al' science by 
emulating 'hard science' objectives and standards. Discourse theory, hence, appears 
to em body everything that the discipline has sought to overcome, especially as DT 
seem ingly follows an overarching and all-penetrating 'anything goes' maxim.
Although, admittedly, much 'goes' in discourse theory, DT-inspired works are not 
necessarily arbitrary. Discourse theory stim ulates research that is more self-reflecting 
in its approach, more open about the choices it makes, and less authoritarian in its 
statement(s). In this spirit, this chapter aims to be as transparent as possible about the 
theoretical positioning of this work. To this end, the first section of this chapter will 
provide an overview of the different strands of discourse theory, and argues for the 
choice of the post-structuralist variant from the many discourse theoretical options. 
The following section concentrates on the ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings of this variant. The reader is then introduced to its nom enclature. This 
nom enclature not only represents a specific jargon but also serves as the 
theoretical/conceptual fram ework of post-structuralist discourse theory. In a last step, 
a link is made to the methodological chapter that follows, by focusing and elaborating 
on the relation between discourse theory on the one, and discourse analysis (DA) on 
the other hand. A conclusion sum m arises the major theoretical insights that have 
been gained.
So many discourses, so many theories
According to the reigning academ ic attitude, 'discourse is what scholars make of it'. 
This assumption is buttressed by the sheer number of different approaches that are 
attributed to discourse theory or discourse analysis. In a book co-edited with David 
Howarth, Jacob Torfing categorises these approaches into different generations of 
discourse theory. According to Torfing, these discourse generations vary 'both
according to their understanding of discourse and their understanding of the 
imbrication of language and political power struggles' (Torfing, 2005a: 5).
In Torfing's categorisation, the first and most 'unpolitical' generation of discourse 
theory mostly em phasises the linguistic dimension of discourse and focuses on 
semantic aspects of spoken or written texts. This focus becom es apparent in the first 
generation's methodological approaches, which are content or conversation analysis.
The second generation of discourse theory includes protagonists from Michel 
Foucault to the forem ost representatives of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) such as 
Norman Fairclough. Although the idea of discourse in their works embraces a wider 
set of social practices than the first generation of DT, it is still linked to the notion of 
talk or text: 'Discourse is defined as an empirical collection of practices that qualify as 
discursive in so far as they contain a semiotic elem ent' (Torfing, 2005a: 7). For the 
second generation, discourse is only one limited sub-set of social practices and is 
interrelated or subordinate to extra-discursive elements. In CDA, for instance, 
discourse is greatly reduced to a linguistic mediation of'socio -econ o m ic reality(ies)' 
(Torfing, 2005a: 7). However, the fact that CDA considers these 'realities' at all 
indicates that the second generation of discourse theory gives considerably more 
attention to the political nature of discourse than its predecessor.
Finally, Torfing defines the third DT generation -  post-structuralist DT -  as having an 
even w ider notion of discourse than the first two generations: 'The third generation of 
discourse theory further extends the notion of discourse so that it now covers all 
social phenom ena' (Torfing, 2005a: 8). Here discourse is conceived as something 
intrinsically and fundam entally political, as it is produced 'through historical and 
ultim ately political interventions' (Torfing, 2005a: 8).
The notion of linearity and developm ent that are inherent in Torfing's portrayal of 
discourse theory can be criticised for obscuring the more chaotic composition of 
discourse theory as an academic field or approach. Yet, his method of classifying the 
different strands according to their conception of discourse has a definite heuristic 
value. Moreover, anyone subscribing to discourse theory can use Torfing's 
categorisation as a tool for their own positioning. This has become ever more crucial 
as the concept of discourse is used in a number of ways today and Torfing's 
categorisation helps clarify individual stances.
This research refers to the post-structuralist strand of discourse theory.5 This strand is 
linked to the work of Ernesto Laclau and what is called the 'Essex School'. For the 
developm ent of this variant of DT, the publication of Laclau and Chantal M ouffe's 
book 'H egem ony and socialist strategy: towards a radical dem ocratic politics' (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 1985) (HSS) was seminal.
Post-structuralist discourse theory can best be approached by describing what it is 
not, what it does not aspire to be, and what it dem arcates itself against. To start with, 
post-structuralist discourse theory hardly fits the conception or the criteria that are 
traditionally associated with a theory. It does not 'provide a new theoretical 
apparatus, consisting of a set of core assumptions, some clearly defined concepts and 
taxonom ies, and a series of ready-made argum ents disclosing the m echanisms of a 
rapidly changing society' (Torfing, 2005a: 1). Its ontology is anti-essentialist, and its 
epistem ology anti-foundationalist (Torfing, 2005a: 13) while appending 
m ethodologies can be labelled anti-positivist, anti-objectivist and/or anti­
quantitative; as soon as the last term, at least, is included in established dictionaries.
In the following section, I will elaborate on the differences between post-structuralist 
DT and other, more mainstream approaches and traditions.
On ontology and epistemology
By subscribing to an anti-essentialist ontology, DT assumes that nothing has an 
intrinsic, unchangeable essence that is provided by a higher objectivity, for example, 
God, reason, or nature. This does not mean that DT is anti-realist, i.e., that it would 
disavow the existence of m atter independent of
our consciousness, thoughts, and language. The contention is merely that nothing 
follows from the bare existence of matter. Matter does not carry the means of its own 
representation. In fact, the social forms that render matter intelligible are neither 
passive reflections of an immanent essence of the experienced objects nor are they 
constituted by the omnipotence of the experiencing subject that reduces the object 
to a thought object. (Torfing, 2005a: 18)
5 In the course of this book, discourse theory and its abbreviation (DT) will be used in the sense of post­
structuralist discourse theory, unless stated otherwise.
To put it more simply, meaning is not intrinsic to matter, to things. Rather, it is 
socially constructed. In the words of Martin Heidegger, '[w]hen we see something, we 
always see it as som ething' (cited in W rathall, 2006: 46).
The classical exam ple used by Laclau in this context is that of the earthquake. He 
refutes idealist depictions of the earthquake as m erely some social construct 
happening in people's minds. Nevertheless, according to Laclau, whether we see the 
earthquake as a 'natural phenom enon' or as an 'expression of the wrath of God' is not 
'instilled' in the earthquake but is actually an instance of social construction (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985:108).
It is in this context that we should interpret Jacques Derrida's axiom that 'il n'y a pas 
de hors-texte'6 (see Zehfuss, 2009:158). The intention is not to claim that what counts 
as being, as existing, is only what is fixed in a semiotic way or manner, or that 
'everything is only  discourse' in the sense of 'only talk' or 'only text'. However, 'for 
things and activities to be meaningful, they must be part of particular discourses' 
(Howarth, 1995: 119). In short, the earthquake may exist materially, but to be given 
any meaning, it has to be embedded in a discourse.
As we shift from ontology to epistemology, DT's anti-essentialism  turns into profound 
anti-foundationalism . Unlike positivist approaches, DT does not assume that there is 
a world out there whose essence and laws are waiting to be discovered. In addition, 
because no higher objectivity exists, truth does not exist in DT either: 'there are no 
objective standpoints which guarantee truth or knowledge about the world' 
(Howarth, 1995: 119; see also Laclau & Mouffe, 1987: 85). The knowledge that we 
have rests on assum ptions and categorisations that are contingent, i.e., they could 
have been otherwise, and as such, they are subject to change. Such a view is 
com m only called anti-foundational, as it 'stands in opposition to the foundationalist 
view that knowledge can be grounded on a solid, m etatheoretical base that 
transcends contingent human actions' (Phillips & J0rgensen, 2006: 5).
From an anti-foundational viewpoint, any researcher is enmeshed in a discursive net 
of which he or she has a vague notion at best. It is not believed 'that one can easily 
“step outside" the traditions and practices of which we are a part and achieve a 
com pletely detached view of social processes' (Howarth, 1995: 17). 'Telling things as
6 The translation would be 'there is nothing outside the text', or, more literally, 'there is no outside­
text'.
they are' is seen as a futile venture. Likewise, anti-foundationalism  stands in 
opposition to the different com ponents of what could be called a Popperian research 
programme, which includes empirical testing and the falsification of law-like 
hypotheses. It is equally opposed to the related notion of science as a cumulative 
process that generates knowledge from 'valid' and 'reliable' research.
The discourse of discourse theory
DT does not simply consist of repudiations of more conventional ontology and 
epistemology. It also has a distinct notion of how it wants to approach things in a way 
different form other theories. The sources for DT's 'counter-program m e' are eclectic; 
they include 'Saussure's structural linguistics, Derridean deconstruction, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, and post-analytical philosophy' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 61), to 
name butthe most influential.
W hat made post-structuralist DT valuable for this research was its specific concept of 
discourse. As previously mentioned, other than in related theoretical conceptions and 
approaches, post-structuralist DT and DA are not sim ply 'the study of talk and texts' 
(see also Gill, 2000; Potter & W etherell, 1995: i). Similarly, discourse is not -  or at least 
not primarily -  about discussion, about language, or about semiotic practices. As 
Andreas Reckwitz writes, discourse is a specific system producing a context within 
which meaning can be ascribed and action becom es possible (Reckwitz, 2006: 341). In 
this way, post-structuralist DT perfectly matches the interest of this research in 
processes of meaning making and identity formation. This does not mean that 
linguistic aspects are of no relevance to this study. However, expressions or 
m etaphors are analysed for their role in the processes mentioned but not for their 
linguistic value and function.
The question remains what a post-structuralist notion of discourse 'looks like'. A 
closer investigation will not only give a more concise notion of the concept of 
discourse underlying this research, but it will also give us access to the som etim es 
disturbing and daunting world of DT nomenclature.
Discourse, signifier
Laclau and Mouffe define discourse as 'a system of differential entities -  that is, of 
m om ents' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:111). This short fragm ent confronts readers with a 
first lesson in DT vocabulary, or, as Torfing describes it, 'new  words that for outsiders 
might appear as incom prehensible jargon' (Torfing, 2005b: 153). To understand what 
Laclau and Mouffe mean, a short explanation of basic structuralist conventions is 
needed.
Structuralism  is closely associated with Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist who is 
considered its founding father. From Saussure's work, Laclau and Mouffe have 
adopted two com ponents in HSS. The first is the split of the sign between the signifier 
and the signified. This means that the sign 'table', for instance, is composed of 'the 
label' table (spelled t-a-b-l-e, the signifier) and the 'thing' that bears the label (the 
wooden board on four wooden posters, the signified). The two are seen as detached 
from one another. The signifier and signified have no a priori connection and their 
assignm ent to one another is not necessary. Laclau and Mouffe have also built on the 
Saussurian axiom that signs have no meaning of their own and that they gain 
meaning only in relation, in juxtaposition, to other signs. To know the meaning of 
'm other', for instance, it/she has to be placed in a relational connection with 'father', 
on the one hand, and 'baby', on the other.
Elements, moments, articulation, difference, equivalence
Laclau and Mouffe slightly modify this fundam ental idea fo rth e ir purposes. First, they 
are not interested in signs as such. As previously discussed, 'things do not mean' 
(Milliken, 1999: 229) in post-structuralist ontology. The more 'm aterial' com ponent of 
the sign, the signified, is thus less im portant than the signifier. Laclau and Mouffe are 
solely interested in the signifiers because meaning is made on this level. In their 
version of the Saussurian axiom, signifiers, not signs, acquire meaning through their 
interrelation. To use Laclau/Mouffian vocabulary, meaning-free 'elem ents' (signifiers 
without any connection) are fixed into meaning-laden 'm om ents' (signifiers in relation 
with others). The process in which elem ents are related to one another and become 
m oments is called 'articulation'. There are two basic logics of articulation: the 
articulation can juxtapose the elem ents and emphasise their difference ('logic of
difference'), or it can equate them  and emphasise their equivalence ('logic of 
equivalence').
Field ofdiscursivity, decision, contingency
By articulation, 'we understand the creation of something new out of a dispersion of 
elem ents' (Laclau, 1990: 183). Creation here is the key term. The link between two 
signifiers is not arranged by nor does it emerge from a higher order; it is the product 
of a decision, and ultimately contingent. In addition, any articulation -  and, as such, 
any discourse -  is never finite or final. It is an attem pt to dominate a field of 
discursivity in which other possibilities of articulation and of meaning making are 
sheer endless. Due to this 'surplus of m eaning' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 111), chances 
are that the relation between two signifiers at some point will be abrogated and one 
of them  will be connected to an o therto  form a new meaning. Consequently, fixations 
that occur are always partial and temporary: 'no discursive formation is a sutured 
totality and the transform ation of the elements into moments is never com plete' 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 1o6f). For instance, the sym ptom s that we now link to a 
'depression' might have earlier been seen as a yoke or stigma from God. Later they 
became regarded as a mental illness that could be cured by mental health treatm ent 
such as psychoanalysis, and even later still, 'depression' was seen as a biological 
problem of malfunctioning neurotransm itters that could be fixed with medical 
treatm ent.
As becomes clear from this example, post-structuralist DT does not limit itself to 
linguistic phenomena. However, 'in Laclau and M ouffe's discourse theory, all social 
phenomena are understood as being organised according to the same principle as 
language' (Phillips & J0rgensen, 2006: 35). In this conception of discourse, discourse 
denotes an interrelation of meaning(s) that can be found in oral comm unication or in 
written texts as well as in behavioural practices or in institutional complexes (see also 
Laclau & Mouffe, 1987: 82; Reckwitz, 2006: 341). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
this understanding of discourse means that nothing is extra-discursive -  not even, as 
CDA asserts, socio-econom ic forces. For a socio-econom ic force to 'becom e' a socio­
econom ic force, i.e., to be given the meaning of socio-economic force, it must be part 
of a discourse. As Laclau and Mouffe elaborate:
Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices. It 
affirms ... that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no 
object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence ... if the non- 
discursive complexes ... are analysed, we will only find more or less complex forms of 
differential positions among objects, which do not arise from a necessity external to 
the system structuring them and which can only therefore be conceived as discursive 
articulations. (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:107)
Empty signifier, nodal point, key signifier
Because discourses consist of a multitude of articulations, the question arises as to 
what holds together the various chains of equivalence and difference and what gives 
them  a certain order. In post-structuralist DT, not all signifiers are equal. Some of 
them  hold a special position within the discourse. The 'em pty signifier', for instance, 
represents
that which links all elements of a system: a chain of equivalence constitutes itself by 
referring to the same empty signifier. Since the empty signifier tends to cancel the 
differences between the differential elements of a discourse, it introduces a negativity 
into the system which points to its exteriority. (Staheli, 2004: 233)
An example may clarify this jargon. In a random group of individuals, people may take 
to or feel different from others in many ways, for instance because of their sense of 
humour, their eye colour or their marital status. A sense of belonging may eventually 
develop between some of the crowd because they have something in common. For 
instance, they feel they share the same taste of music. If that is the case, the other 
differences between them: the humour, the eye colour, their marital status are no 
longer important. When this happens, we witness 'the universalization of a series of 
particular differences through equivalential inscription' (Laclau, 2004: 283). This 
equivalential inscription is structured by and refers to an empty signifier.
The name 'em pty signifier' refers to the fact that this signifier has to be sufficiently 
em pty of specification to integrate and to represent others. Sharing the same taste of 
music, as in the example, is a criterion that is not only arbitrary but also rather vague. 
If sharing the same taste in music means that people like the 'm usic of the seventies', 
they can still like and be fans of bands as diverse as ABBA and Led Zeppelin. This 
indeterminacy, however, is one of the major points of DT: any system of articulations,
any discourse, is essentially contingent and could have been otherwise. The same 
pertains to identity formation within such a discourse: 'In discursive group form ations 
... the differences within the group are ignored. Thereby all the other ways in which 
one could have formed groups are also ignored' (Phillips & J0rgensen, 2006: 44).
In basic DT texts, the em pty signifier has been depicted as quasi-synonym ous to the 
concept o f'n od al point'. In his 1999 book, Torfing defines 'nodal point' as '[a]n empty 
signifier that is capable of fixing the content of a range of floating signifiers by 
articulating them within a chain of equivalence' (Torfing, 1999: 303). In many parts of 
the literature, however, the concept of the em pty signifier has de facto been used in 
one specific context: the context of identity formation. Since discourses in this study 
were analysed both in this respect and in the broader sense of meaning making, 'key 
signifier', rather than empty signifier, is used in this book as a more generic label 
denom inating any signifierthat has an ordering function in a discourse.
The Other, outside
W ith respect to the above example, as soon as one group form s within the larger 
crowd, some will be in and some will be out. This is a necessity: an in-group can 
ultim ately only form with respect to an out-group. W hereas differences within these 
groups are negated, differences between these two groups are actually emphasised. 
For example, people sharing the same eye colour may feel different from one another 
now that only music taste counts. Likewise, aficionados of seventies music m ay feel 
that they differ from and do not belong to the people who like sixties or eighties 
music. These people are the 'outside', the 'O ther' -  or, as Urs Staheli term ed it, the 
system's (negative) exteriority. Equivalence and difference condition one another: 'to 
be something is always not to be something else' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:128).
The more differences a key signifier has to turn into equivalences to integrate 
different people and to create a common inside, the 'em ptier' it needs to be. This, 
however, does come at a price: 'the more they [key signifiers] aspire to speak in the 
name of wider contexts or society, the more their identity will tend to get blurred 
because it gets increasingly difficult for these parts to identify them selves as 
belonging to the same system ' (Dyrberg, 2004: 252). In our example, for instance, 
fans of Led Zeppelin may increasingly no longer feel akin to people listening to the 
Jackson 5 or The Carpenters. They may even be attracted to those that form erly
constituted 'the outside', wondering whether they have more in common with, for 
example, Beatles or Iron Maiden fans.
This precariousness of solidarity and identity has two implications. First, the outside is 
always a threat to the inside. A group always has the need -  latent at best —  of 
convincing those inside of its superiority. 'Othering', that is, depicting others as an 
unattractive, immoral, inferior outside 'helps to stabilize the discursive system' 
(Torfing, 2005a: 16). However, 'the line separating the friendly inside from the 
threatening outside is not com pletely fixed. The struggle over what and who are 
included and excluded from the hegem onic discourse is a central part of politics' 
(Torfing, 2005a: 16). In our example, for instance, it is unsure to what extent AC/DC 
fans would be on the inside or on the outside, given that the band was successful in 
both the 70s and the 80s.
Hegemony
Secondly, the threat exists that one discourse and its key signifier(s) are challenged by 
the rise of another discourse. In this competition, the latter may become dominant 
and end the 'hegem ony' of the old discourse. In the above example, one fraction of 
the inside group may finally dissent and join the ranks of the people from  the 
'outside'. They may do this, for instance, because they feel they share a distinct 
preference for guitar-based music with a strong backbeat. The discursive field in that 
case would still be structured by a signifier related to the taste of music, yet the 
hegemonial discourse would now refer to genre  rather than to a specific decade. For 
the group that has newly formed, it is no longer of any significance when some piece 
of music was written. The only relevant aspect for them  is whether some musical 
composition counts as rock music.
The political
In expanding the example, one could imagine a world in which principles of musical 
taste have dominated identity formation and meaning making for more than a 
century. Discourses could still compete in such a society. These com petitions could be 
between discourses referring to tim e (decade X had the best compositions), genre
(genre X brought the best music), gender (female bands are better than their male 
counterparts) or even quantity (large orchestras make better music than duos). What, 
however, will slowly vanish in such a society is the awareness that meaning making 
and identity formation are imaginable and still possible outside of music taste.
Such societies will have forgotten what the creative, or, as Laclau and Mouffe call it, 
what the political decision was that allowed music taste to be chosen as a structuring 
principle in the first place. As DT conceives of subjects as just as 'unfinished' as any 
discourse, '[w]e are not talking here about conscious decisions taken by some central 
decision makers on the basis of rational calculation, but rather about an endless series 
of de facto decisions' (Torfing, 2005a: 15). The subject as such only becomes a subject 
through the creative act of decision-making:
[T]he question of who or what transforms social relations is not pertinent. It's not a 
question of "someone" or "something" producing an effect of transformation or 
articulation, as of its identity was somehow previous to this effect. Rather, the 
production of the effect is part ofthe construction ofthe agent producing it. (Laclau, 
1990: 210f)
'Political' in DT has a meaning that differs from the usual use o fth e  word. Ratherthan 
referring to the political arena or to the acts of politicians, political here denom inates 
'[t]he moment of antagonism where the undecidable nature of alternatives and their 
resolution ... becom es fully visible' (Laclau, 1990: 35). It denom inates the act of taking 
a decision in a basically undecidable terrain.
The social, sedimented discourse
Returning to our music example, we may witness over tim e the developm ent of a 
society that functions m ainly on the principle of music taste. Maybe people with 
different music tastes have special radio stations for 'their' groups, maybe they have 
different political parties to vote for, and maybe, in elections, they will have a special 
clause ensuring the participation and rights of determ ination for the R&B or the 
Reggae minority. In this society, what once had a political origin has become 'social'. 
Just like 'political', social as it is used by post-structuralist DT differs from how it is 
used and from what it means in everyday language. In the case of the social, a 
hegem onial discourse has become sedimented: 'The social is the realm of the
sedimented practices, that is, practices that conceal the originary acts of their 
contingent political institution and which are taken for granted' (Mouffe, 2007: 17). 
'The social' comes close to Heidegger's depiction of what he calls 'the Earth' as 
something 'so obvious that we no longer think much about it, let alone question i t ... 
capable of supporting the world that is organized on its basis' (Wrathall, 2006: 81).
Social/collective imaginary, dislocation
In the above example, the society is structured by and functions on the principle of 
music taste. Gradually, it may develop into a 'soul-ist' society, i.e., a society that 
exclusively worships soul music and that develops norms and institutions in which soul 
music as a structural principle is pervasive.
'Soul-ism ' in this case is so dom inant in structuring the discursive field that it qualifies 
as what DT calls a 'collective' or 'social' imaginary. This means that when people think 
of the social world they live in, they think of it predom inantly in term s of soul music. 
They think of them selves as a soul-ist society. This does not mean that 'soul-ism ' is 
not vulnerable to change; social imaginaries can erode just as well as discourses can. 
Eventually, such an imaginary will be
confronted by new events that it cannot explain, represent, or in other ways 
domesticate ... they [discourses in general] will eventually confront events that they 
fail to integrate. The failure ... will disrupt the discursive system [resulting in a] 
structural, or organic, crisis in which there is a proliferation of floating signifiers. 
(Torfing, 2005a: 16)
In DT terms, such a crisis evokes a 'dislocation'. This means that any kind of 
articulatory fixation is annihilated and that moments become elements again. The 
field is then waiting to be sutured anew, and soul-ism will be replaced by other 
imaginaries that re ferto  music taste ('pop-ism ') or, more radically, by im aginaries that 
refer to other ordering principles such as marital status ('bachelor-ism '). Which new 
im aginary will get the upper hand in that circum stance is a m atter of hegemonic 
struggle and is ultimately contingent.
Analysing discourses
The choice for post-structuralist DT has implications for the overall thrust of this 
research. In post-structuralist DT, the contingency of any articulation is central. DT 
focuses on how these contingencies are obscured and how they are slowly enabled to 
present them selves as 'facts' and 'truths'. New articulations are often structured 
accordingly to 'fit' the existing discourse. Against this backdrop, the primary 
assignm ent for any empirical project drawing on DT is a revelatory  one:
The task ... is to reactivate and make evident options that were foreclosed during the 
emergence of a practice -th e  clashes and forces which are repressed or defeated -  in 
order to show how the present configuration of practices relies on exclusions that 
reveal the non-necessary character of the present social formation, and to explore the 
consequences and potential effects of such 'repressions'. (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 
155)
This depiction of DT's 'm ission' resonates well with what Ian Hacking has declared the 
lowest common denom inator of social constructionism, nam ely to unravel the taken- 
for-grantedness and presumed inevitability of a present state of affairs (Hacking, 
1999: 12). Jutta W eldes describes her work similarly: 'So I study things -  the “of 
course" that Gramsci called “common sense" and Stuart Hall called “the m oment of 
extrem e ideological closure" -  that I fundam entally do not com prehend' (Weldes, 
2006:176).
Drawing on Derrida's body of thought, Aletta Norval, however, requests that an 
additional analytical step be taken. She sketches
an operation quite different from that of only making visible the non-necessity of any 
instituted order. It will entail an analysis that aims to locate those points within a 
politically determined discursive context where there is a regulated interplay between 
multiple discursive strains/relations of forces, such that the tension between them is 
retained. (Norval, 2004:147)
To achieve this double mission -  exposing options of meaning making that have been 
discarded and exposing internal inconsistencies that exist within discourses -  the 
discourses in question are analysed. As previously shown, rather different conceptions 
of discourse theory exist and, likewise, different approaches of discourse analysis 
have emerged over the years. The lowest common denom inator between most of
these approaches may be that they all, in a technical sense, refer to a 'set of 
m ethodological devices for the analysis of speeches, writings, interviews, 
conversations and so on' (Howarth, 1995:116).
Unlike other kinds of discourse analyses, post-structuralist discourse analysis is less 
interested in aspects that are primarily linguistic (see, for instance, Potter & 
W etherell, 1995). It refers to the concepts that constitute what was named DT 
nom enclature earlier in this chapter, thereby becoming 'a contextualized conceptual 
tool kit that includes im portant concepts like dislocation, hegemony, social 
antagonism  etc.' (Torfing, 2005a: 19). This tool kit cannot only be applied to purely 
sem iotic texts. It heeds the ontological conviction that discourses 'pierce the entire 
material density of the m ultifarious institutions, rituals and practices' (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985: 109) because it allows practices or institutions to be analysed as well. 
Regardless of their character or kind, all 'texts' are treated equally in their quality of 
enabling 'subjects to experience the w orld' (Howarth, 2000:10).
Other than content analyses, post-structuralist discourse analyses are not geared 
towards 'distilling' a coherent story from  these texts once they have separated the 
good wheat of 'right' statements from the bad chaff of the 'w rong' ones (Phillips & 
J0rgensen, 2006: 21). As a m atter of principle, this is not possible given DT's anti- 
foundational epistemology. The focus of DA must be on how statem ents/articulations 
structure and in turn are structured by discourses, which discourses they re-enact or 
modify, and how this is done. In answering these questions, we
examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, 
thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities 
and preclude others. What is explained is not why a particular outcome obtained [sic], 
but rather how subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially 
constructed such that certain practices were made possible. (Doty, 1993: 298)
Although there is presently no methodological m aster plan of how Laclau's 
vocabulary could or should be 'properly' used for analytical purposes, Marianne 
J0rgensen and Louise Philips have provided a first sketch in their book, 'Discourse 
Analysis as Theory and M ethod' (Phillips & J0rgensen, 2006: 29). They propose that 
statements should be seen in their function as articulations. This requires the 
researcher to look at the elements that have been used and at how they are linked to 
one another. At the same time, s/he needs to consider which other 'm eaning 
potentials' have been excluded by positioning certain elem ents in a distinct manner.
Examining the articulations in this way, however, needs to be accompanied by an 
analysis of the w ider discursive context. The questions raised in this respect would be 
to what extent an articulation is embedded in a certain discourse, but also to what 
extent it itself reifies the discourse, modifies it or actively seeks to overturn it. An 
answer to these questions presupposes that the respective key signifier(s) of the 
articulation(s) and discourse(s) have been identified. The task is hence to indicate the 
signifiers that have a privileged status in the discourse at hand or, in other words, to 
discern the 'fixed stars'that orient other, plainer signifiers.
Further questions would be whether key signifiers are shared by articulations and 
discourses or not, to what extent differences in the constellation of articulations or 
discourses mean that meaning making crucially diverges, and, if this is the case, to 
what extent this has resulted in struggles over hegem ony between various discourses.
Philips and J0rgensen argue that by following these steps 'we can map the partial 
structuring by the discourses of specific domains. W hat signs7 are objects of struggle 
over meaning between competing discourses ... and what signs have relatively fixed 
and undisputed meanings ...  ?' (Phillips & J0rgensen 2006: 30). In other words: What, 
in the discourse(s) scrutinised, is 'political'? W hat is 'social'?
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a broad overview of post-structuralist DT as the theoretical- 
analytical fram ework for this research. Choosing this theoretical 'backbone' has 
several implications. Post-structuralist DT relies on an anti-essentialist ontology in 
which everything is discourse  in the sense that things do not have an intrinsic essence 
that researchers could distil and that meaning is relational. DT's epistemological 
stance consequently follows from this ontology. It is anti-foundationalist: no higher 
objectivity exists on which general laws or a certain cosmic order are founded. For 
researchers, trying to uncover any structure of this quality is a futile venture. In any 
case, scientists could never provide neutral accounts 'just reflecting' such a structure, 
as they are already enmeshed in a distinct regime of discursive meaning making.
7 A problematic feature in Philips and J0 rgensen's account is that they are repeatedly mistaking signifier 
for 'sign'. As has been pointed out, post-structuralist DT limits itself to the level of signifiers (see also 
Stavrakakis, 2004: 166).
The caveat must be made that the statem ent 'everything is discourse' should not be 
understood as all 'just talk and texts'. In post-structuralist DT, a discourse is a system 
within which meaning is a product of the relations between simple elements, key 
signifiers, and their outside. This 'configuration' is contingent because a num ber of 
other relations could be equally conceivable. Thus, the making of meaning is always 
political because it involves a decision made in a context that is, in principle, 
undecidable.
The primary task of DA is to remove the 'social' layer of sedim entation that usually 
builds upon such a political decision. DA needs to brush away the matter-of-factness, 
the naturalness that has built up over the years and lay bare the decision's 
contingency. It also needs to 'm ake visible possibilities ruled out or not taken up' 
(Norval, 2004: 148), and it needs to highlight existing inconsistencies and tensions 
within 'social' discourses. To this end, it can rely on a tool kit comprising what in this 
context has been called DT nomenclature.

3. METHOD(OLOGY)
The level of abstraction on which post-structuralist DT operates has repeatedly 
begged the question as to how its theoretical contents can possibly be translated into 
a workable methodological approach. How  are researchers supposed to carry out a 
post-structuralist discourse analysis in their research fields? W hat can it yield?
Methodology, broadly speaking, still counts as one of the weak parts of 'post­
structuralist' research. At least, it is one of the dim ensions that are most frequently 
attacked. Many of these attacks could probably be avoided if two points were met. 
Firstly, researchers need to be open about what DT can possibly achieve and what the 
scientific com m unity can legitim ately expect from it, given its ontological and, in 
particular, its epistemological positioning and self-lim itation. Secondly, it must be 
sufficiently clear that post-structuralist works m ay use 'standard' methods such as 
interviewing, but that their conception of both the process of interviewing and its 
function within research differ from the standard understanding. This also applies to 
this research, as it combines 'classic' methods with a 'not-so-classic' theory and 
methodology.
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. It intends to 'disclose' the m ethodological 
approach that was used for this research and to shed light on the choices that were 
made in this respect. At the same time, it will elaborate on how the m ethodological 
com ponents need to be understood in their interplay with the theoretical background 
that has been chosen.
The chapter starts with an overview of the overall methodological strategy adopted 
('interpretivism '). In a further step, it explicates the individual methodological steps, 
highlighting the research logic(s) behind the choices that have been made with regard 
to what has been analysed. W hy has environmental politics been chosen as field of 
research? W hy has it been delimited to the specific cases? W hy have interviews been 
chosen as the main source of 'texts'? Subsequently, the focus is both on how 
discourse analysis has been carried out in this project, and on what 'value' can be 
attached to the findings that emanate from it. Lastly, the attention is directed to how 
the task of writing up has been approached, and to why this issue is relevant in the 
context of this research in the first place. A final section sum m arises the conclusions.
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An 'interpretivist' strategy
Choosing post-structuralist DT as a theoretical background and DA as an analytical 
fram ew ork implies that one accepts the ontological and epistemological 'baggage' 
that com es with these choices. It also entails, however, designing an overall 
methodological strategy that fits this baggage.
In literature, post-structuralist approaches are most com m only associated with what 
is called 'interpretivist' m ethodologies. As post-structuralist ontology and 
epistemology, interpretivism  strongly differs from 'm ainstream ' positivist research.
If we consider positivism as the 'norm al' version of m ethodology in the social sciences, 
interpretivism deviates from the standard in the following ways. Firstly, 
interpretivism, and hence this work, does not embrace a deductive-nom othetical 
strategy. The latter would require beginning with a law-like hypothesis. This 
hypothesis relies on dependent and independent variables, which are, in turn, 
operationalised. The intention of a deductive-nomothetical strategy is either to verify 
or to falsify the original hypothesis (Kelle & Kluge, 1999: 15). In the case of post­
structuralism, however, both verification and falsification are impossible. The 
alternative then is to adopt an interpretivist strategy that focuses on how people 
interpret, understand, experience, and constitute  their social world (Mason, 2002: 3).
The interpretivist strategy adopted in the context of this research was exploratory  in 
nature. The research interest was primarily to learn how key policymakers in the fields 
of EU climate change and green biotechnology politics discursively 'm ake m eaning' of 
their interaction and how this, in turn, shapes their realities and identities.
To this end, a discourse analysis as sketched in chapter 2 was conducted. The texts 
that were analysed came from interviews with key policym akers (see also the 
following section). The high level of abstraction and the empirical 'em ptiness' of the 
concepts included in the DT-toolkit were no obstacle, but rather a benefit. In this way, 
the concepts could ideally be used as lenses that enable the researcher to apprehend 
and to describe relevant (social) phenomena (Kelle & Kluge, 1999: 34). At the same 
time, these concepts were open enough to ensure that the meaning making of those 
involved in policy-making was not superim posed by antecedent research hypotheses 
(Kelle & Kluge, 1999: 34). The aim was thus to avoid, as much as possible, what has 
been described as the pitfall of conventional EIS in chapter 1.
A further intention was that the discourse(s) captured in the analysis should ideally 
belong to the 'field' rather than to the researcher. The idea was not to reintroduce 
through the backdoor the conception of a neutral and objective researcher, who 
allegedly remains distant from the data in order not to spoil it. The point here was 
that 'a priori design com m itm ents may block the introduction of new understandings' 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 376), and hence the sensitivity for understandings and 
meaning making in the field.
The overall m ethodological ambition of the study was to 'develop an approach that 
respects the self-interpretations of social actors, while not reducing explanations to 
their subjective viewpoints alone' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 4). It is here that this 
research parted com pany with works that are inspired by phenom enology or social 
interactionism. Studies of this kind mostly try to distil one essence out of, for 
instance, the different accounts of their interviewees, treating them  as de facto, as a 
reflection of 'the  social reality' in which meanings are made. In contrast, this work 
relies on the post-structuralist assumption that an im manent essence of social reality 
does not exist and that any attem pt to reflect this chim era is already discursively 
structured. Against this backdrop, DA was used to trace the rather hidden patterns 
and inconsistencies that underlie both sedimented discourses and the social 
consequences that emanate from them  ('social' being used here in its usual sense).
What to analyse
In this research, the quest was not only to trace these patterns in a certain field of 
politics but also to com pare them  to the patterns depicted by conventional EIS. As 
already stated, the field of politics under scrutiny in this study was EU environm ental 
politics and the discourse analysis that was carried out m ainly relied on interviews 
with key policym akers in the field.
The choice of m ethodology and methods com prises several m ethodological 
decisions, delimiting the research. In making these decisions, other possible ways of 
doing research were excluded. It follows that these decisions need to be explained 
and justified.
The empirical field
The basic criterion for selecting the empirical field was to be as fair to conventional 
EIS literature as possible. Since conventional EIS argues that the distribution of 
form al-institutional com petences fuels conflicts between M ember States and EU 
institutions, a field had to been chosen that was indeed prone to or at least 'open' 
enough for these conflicts to appear. As such, it had to offer a history of recurrent and 
salient contentions on the distribution of com petences. The chosen field also needed 
to be a domain where conventional EIS literature would be able to state its case.
EU environmental politics was one of the fields that nicely fitted this requirement. As 
one of the more recent fields in the history of EU politics, it continuously offers new 
sites for politics and policy-making and thus for the distribution of formal-institutional 
com petences. At the same time, it is, at least on the EU level, embedded in the 
sedimented discourses that penetrate all EU politics, as procedures of and roles in 
policy-making and legislation are juridicially fixed. Moreover, it is 'm ature' enough to 
allow a long-term  view on the developm ent of discourses and not just photographic 
glim pses of the status-quo.
One additional choice that was made in the context of this research was not to limit 
EU environmental politics to environm ental politics within the institutional fram ework 
of EU legislation. Instead, a broader notion of EU engagem ent in the area of 
environm ental politics was adopted to comprise EU action on the international level 
of environmental politics. Including this level seemed appropriate, as this is a further 
arena where EU Member States and EU institutions (especially the Com mission) 
interact and where com petences are distributed. For this reason, conflicts as depicted 
in conventional EIS could also be expected on this level.
The focus on both levels of environm ental politics was on the interaction of EU 
policym akers from EU Institutions and M em ber States, especially in m atters of 
com petence distribution.8 Com petence distribution is more form ally institutionalised 
on the EU level, where it is enshrined in legislative acts. On the international level, the 
issue is raised mostly in the context of the EU's coordination and representation in 
negotiations. Who coordinates and who speaks for the EU in international 
negotiations is a question that is far less settled -  form ally and legally -  in
8 As the focus of this study was on policy-making and policymakers, EU institutions comprised the EP 
and the European Commission, but not the ECJ.
environm ental politics than in, for example, trade or agricultural negotiations. Even 
after more than tw enty years of MEAs, this is still a grey area, and EU coordination 
and representation need to be re-negotiated each tim e a new issue of international 
negotiation opens up (see also chapter 8).
The field of EU environmental politics is vast, and the decision was made to 
concentrate on two cases within the field: climate change and green biotechnology 
politics. By delimiting the field to these areas, the research became practically more 
feasible and contextually more specific, and a deeper analysis became possible.
For 20 years, both climate change politics and green biotechnology politics have been 
undergoing constant procedures of policy-making and com petence distribution. 
Conflicts have been numerous and sufficiently intense to catch the attention of the 
public eye. In addition, M em ber States and the Commission have had to agree on the 
EU's coordination and representation in m ultilateral fora in both fields. In the case of 
climate change, this need occurred in the context of the United Nations Framework 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In the case of green biotechnology, the EU needed to 
find a modus vivendi for coordination and representation in the context of the 
biosafety negotiations that both preceded and followed the Cartagena Protocol.9
The texts
As has been mentioned in chapter 2, post-structuralist DA does not have to be limited 
to the analysis of purely semiotic texts. Especially against this background, the 
decision to use exclusively  this kind of text for this research needs to be qualified.
The material for the DA conducted in the context of this study m ainly consisted of 
interview transcripts from interviews with key policym akers from EU institutions and 
five selected M em ber States. The main reasons for preferring interviews to 
alternatives such as participant observation or an extensive study of policy documents 
were feasibility and focus.
9 To be sure, biosafety issues are dealt within various international fora (e.g. the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Codex 
Alimentarius). Yet, '[t]he Cartagena Protocol provides the most extensive international instrument 
regulating transboundary movement of certain GMOs (known in the Protocol as "living modified 
organisms")' (Stilwell, 2005: 53, emphasis added).
In the case of participant observation, access would have been a major problem. EU 
m eetings during international conferences, to give but one basic example, are not 
even accessible for M embers of the European Parliam ent (MEPs). Council meetings 
are mostly closed as well. The disadvantage of policy docum ents is that they are 
usually less 'condensed' than interviews; in addition, they hardly ever explicitly deal 
with inner-EU relations beyond the description of form al-institutional arrangements.
The interviews that were conducted for this research ranged in duration from  thirty 
minutes to two hours, with an average length of one hour. At the beginning of each 
interview, respondents were informed about the general topic of the research: 'the 
interplay/relation between EU institutions and M em ber States' in the respective 
domain. This was the subject of special information sheets in which respondents were 
also guaranteed anonym ity in any kind of publication that would come from the 
project. During the 'processing' of interviews (transcription, analysis), the respective 
material (sound files, transcription files, and so on) were labelled with a code that 
guaranteed respondent anonym ity but also ensured that the institutional affiliation of 
the respondent could still be identified. Respondents received the first drafts of parts
II and III of this book for inspection and comment.
The interviews them selves were mainly respondent-driven; that is, they followed the 
priorities that the interview participants set them selves. Issues that I raised as the 
interviewer often included those that other respondents had elaborated on in earlier 
interviews. This enabled an analytical comparison of accounts at a later stage.
The basic reasoning behind this open setup was to profit from what Allan Dreyer 
Hansen and Eva S0rensen have described as 'the strong side of interviews':
[Interviews present discursive images of the world ... . In an interview situation, 
respondents provide spontaneously formulated individual expressions of the 
discursive patterns of meaning that exist in a given social field. Furthermore, 
knowledge is obtained about the ways individuals in different positions within a given 
discursive structure construct meaning and identity ... about themselves and the 
other actors, and how and where they draw discursive patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion. Finally, interviews allow the researcher to search for more detailed and 
specific information about the discursive articulation of a specific issue among those 
involved. (Hansen & S0rensen, 2005: 99)
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In addition to the interviews, policy docum ents were sporadically used for the 
analysis. The recourse to policy docum ents had several functions. Firstly, these texts 
were used to convey how new policies, in their formal-institutional dimension, were 
discursively designed.
Secondly, they were used to fill gaps left by the interviews. For example, sometimes 
incidents or processes that scholars would most likely identify as sources of conflict 
were not addressed by the respondents during the interviews. Usually when this 
happens, researchers are tempted to interpret such gaps as attem pts on the 
respondent's part to obscure contentions. In this study, policy docum ents helped to 
answer the question as to w hether this seemed to be the case, or w hether the 
respondents did not raise an issue because it, in fact, did not play a major role in 
collective processes of meaning making.
Thirdly, policy documents were used in the forefront of the interviews as a means for 
me as an interviewer to become 'im m ersed' in the field (as far as this is possible), and 
thus to enable me to enter the interviews with a background extensive enough to be 
able to follow and to respond to the remarks of the respondents.
One last source for the analysis were the verbatim reports of EP debates, as they were 
considered to qualify as texts of EU policym akers in interaction. The major drawback 
of the reports was, however, that they are 'by nature' limited to the interplay between 
MEPs, although one Commission official usually com m ents at the end of each debate. 
These texts, therefore, were regarded m ainly in addition to the interviews.
As has been described in the first section of this chapter, how interviews are 
conceived of and how they are approached in interpretivist studies differ from how 
this is done in more positivist works. This is surely the case for this research, both with 
respect to how interviews were conducted and how they were analysed. The search 
for constructions of meaning in the respondents' accounts replaced the orthodox 
'm ining' for an underlying truth.
This shift implies that researchers are not obliged to take a defensive stance on the 
'truth value' of the interviews gathered, as interviews are, in principle, not seen as 
offering such value. For example, an interview conversation in more positivist 
conceptions is mostly 'framed as a potential source of bias, error, misunderstanding, 
or misdirection; it is a persistent set of problems to be minim ized' (Holstein & 
Gubrium, 2004: 141). This is something that 'interpretivists', especially of a post­
structuralist provenience, do not have to worry about, as it is their ontological 
conviction that all social form s of rendering something intelligible are never passive 
reflections of an imm anent essence of the experienced object (see chapter 2). For 
'interpretivists', trying to find such an essence is epistem ologically futile. 
Consequently, post-structuralist DT/DA is interested in the process of meaning 
making itself, including all omissions and inconsistencies (for the scientific value of 
those inconsistencies, see also Kvale, 1996: 34).
The issue of triangulation thus must also be seen in a new light. Com paring the 
respondents' accounts cannot aim 'to uncover whether individual respondents lie 
about their actions' (Hansen & S0rensen, 2005: 101). However, a com parison can 
render 'an impression of how different events in the policy process have been given 
hegem onic meaning, or whether the content of the policy process, and the role that 
different actors play in it, are discursively contested' (Hansen & S0rensen, 2005: 101; 
see also Patton, 2002 and Stake, 2005 for a som ewhat unconventional take on 
triangulation).
The respondents
The general interview 'target group' consisted of Commission officials, EP members, 
and civil servants from M em ber States that qualified as 'key policym akers' in the 
respective domain. Participants were initially found through participant lists of 
relevant EU-wide or global meetings. These lists were available on the worldwide 
web. Names of key players were also found in secondary literature. Finally, through 
the principle of 'snowballing', first contacts led to further names on the list. The 
answer to what made these key players qualify as 'key' is rather simple: they were 
widely acknowledged as such by their peers. The respondents them selves, and not 
the researcher, determined who counted as part of this inner circle.
However, in composing the final respondent list lim itations and researcher 
interventions did come into play because M ember States respondents could not come 
from  any EU country but from five chosen M ember States. This limitation was 
considered to guarantee the possibility of tracing country-specific discursive patterns 
in case they emerged.
The shortlisted countries m ainly resulted from snowballing. Once first contacts had 
been made, respondents identified those EU M ember States that they regarded as 
essential to policy-making in the respective domain. This was not a straightforward 
process, though. Although the original intention had been to 'recruit' respondents 
from the same countries for both cases (again, in order to be able to trace 'M em ber 
State specific' discursive patterns), the M ember States shortlisted by the respondents 
differed from case to case.
As a low est-com m on-denom inator solution, M em ber State respondents were chosen 
from the following countries: the UK, The Netherlands, France, Germ any, and Austria. 
In hindsight, the question arises as to w hether it would not have been worthwhile to 
include respondents from one of the 'new ' M ember States. It might have been 
interesting to see to what extent a more or less conflictual reading of EU policy­
making and com petence distribution can be related to whether one feels or is seen as 
'new ' to the Union. On the other hand, in most of the interviews with Austrian 
respondents, their relationship with 'the EU' or with EU institutions before and after 
Austria's accession in 1995 was an issue. This might then partially 'com pensate' for 
omitting new EU members.
In total, 51 interviews were collected: 25 for green biotechnology and 26 for climate 
change. An implicit self-obligation was to have at least three respondents per case 
and institutional affiliation. This 'standard' was only missed once; the green 
biotechnology case contains only two respondents for France. In the end, 
respondents included m id-career level to senior Commission officials and civil 
servants, as well as one official from the General Secretariat of the Council. EP 
respondents comprised MEPs as much as policy advisors of the political groups.
Interviews were mostly conducted and recorded on the spot. Only a few of them  were 
telephone interviews, and these were registered with special software. Only in one 
case was the interview held in written form. This may beg the question to what extent 
this could be called an interview at all. This procedure, however, m etth e wishes of the 
respective respondent. Interviews were always conducted in a language that 
respondents felt comfortable with. In most cases, this was the respondent's mother 
tongue.
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How to analyse
To enable the technical DA of the interviews, the interviews were first transcribed. 
They were then 'fed into' AtlasTI software and analysed in clusters, depending on the 
case to which they belonged. In the beginning, climate change and green 
biotechnology interviews were treated separately.
The first phase of analysis was both rather basic and ingenuous as far as clear criteria 
were concerned. The texts were browsed, and coding was mainly restricted to the 
question of what (meetings, legislative procedures, policy issues) the respondents 
discussed in their interviews. This gave a first notion of what respondents considered 
essential in their stories of EU policy-m aking. 'Essential' here refers to what emerged 
as an issue collectively, i.e., what recurred between the accounts of different 
respondents.
These recurrences were turned into a shortlist of topics that provided a basis for new 
rounds of analysis. Later rounds focused more on how-questions, i.e., on how  
respondents talked about those topics and how  they described what happened. They 
produced a considerable am ount of additional codes; the tim e had thus come for 
some serious, theoretical/analytical clearing.
Considering the research interest and the post-structuralist fram ework, the texts were 
once more scrutinised with som ewhat more focused lenses, and the following 
questions were asked:
- To what extent was meaning making in the accounts alike/different? To what 
extent do the sim ilarities/differences of accounts seem to be concurring with 
institutional affiliation, nationality or similar?
- To what extent did schism s/conflicts appear? How have the different 
respondents described them ? Which identities have formed in the course of 
these conflicts?
In 'answ ering'these questions -  which was the task of the next round of text analysis -  
the DA tool kit as described in chapter 2 was used. The first objective was to trace the 
com ponents ('elem ents') of each discourse or its parts, as well as the way these were 
joined together into 'articulations'. The second object was to investigate to what 
extent order was provided by a 'key signifier' and which 'outside' was the discourse 
directed against. Was this discourse widely accepted ('hegem onial') or contested, and
by whom? In the course of sedim entation, which other possible discourses were 
excluded?10 In the course of discourse formation, how and along which logics of 
'equivalence' or 'difference' have identities formed? W ho is 'in ' and who is 'out'?
Such an analysis provides a foundation for further comparison. In the case of this 
research, discursive patterns that emerged for politics and policy-making within the 
EU were com pared to patterns emerging for the international level. In another step, 
discursive patterns were compared acrossthe two cases (see chapter 8).
Before cross-case comparison, however, this research heeded David Howarth's advice 
on how this type of comparison ought to be done in research that subscribes to post­
structuralist DT. According to Howarth, cases must be initially 
described/analysed/interpreted on their own terms, 'as singular instances with their 
own unique specificity' (Howarth, 2000: 139) before being compared to one another. 
In addition, the goal of comparing cases is not the establishm ent of generally 
applicable laws; it is 'to further our understanding/explanation of different logics of 
identity formation and hegem onic practice in different historical [or, termed more 
broadly: contextual] conjunctures'(H ow arth, 2000:139).
Scientific? Value?
This work takes a cautious stance as far as generalising its findings is concerned. It 
refutes that the patterns of meaning making that emerged in this study can a priori be 
expected for other cases or fields (in the sense of'law s').
This does not preclude, however, that some of the patterns exposed -  as a whole or in 
fragm ents -  may re-appear elsewhere. The findings of this research, in this respect, 
can fulfil a sensitising or heuristic function for further studies on relations between EU 
institutions and M em ber States. Still, Howarth's maxim should be heeded: that each 
case should initially be apprehended in its specificity. In doing so, the possibility of 
overlooking (discursive) discrepancies and inconsistencies in each singular case is 
minimised. These discrepancies and inconsistencies are at the core of a post­
structuralist approach -  and it is they that make DT both so valuable and so much fun.
10This raises the question of how excluded alternatives can possibly be traced ex post. In the case of this 
research, alternatives mostly emerged in the texts themselves, often as 'minority opinions'.
The rule of thum b should be that '[t]he trouble with generalizations is that they don't 
apply to particulars' (Lincoln & Guba, 2000: 24).
It can safely be assumed that generalisability is not the only positivist objective or 
standard that interpretivist research tends to fall short of. The m ethodological design 
applied in this research is also at odds with golden rules for ensuring 'scientific quality' 
as they are listed in standard method books:
In standardized research, quality is one of the major issues in constructing a research 
design, perhaps the major issue. Quality in that context is closely linked to 
standardization and control of the research situation and over influences on it. The 
basic idea then is that if we manage to control and exclude disturbing influences -  
coming from the outside or from the researchers' bias -  we can find access to the 
issue under study in an unbiased way and represent it in the results in a valid, reliable 
and objective way. (Flick, 2007: 61)
In this research, hardly anything was standardised. Neither were respondents asked 
one single, a priori established set of questions, nor were their interviews analysed 
with one single, a priori established list of criteria. The researcher -  I -  was very 
present. This begs the questions whether this work, in its subjectivity, is either reliable 
or valid, and, if not, whether it is consequently bad research.
These questions, however, do not pertain only to this research. They are also part of a 
w ider discussion not only between the interpretivist and the positivist 'research 
camp', but also among interpretivists them selves. How can we ensure that our 
research is good research? And what do we actually mean by good research?
W hat becom es apparent is that neither positivism nor interpretivism are uniform or 
coherent schools or approaches. Several strands exist within interpretivism, and each 
has a different opinion of what constitutes good research. Some scholars cling to 
standards that are usually more associated with positivism, whereas others radically 
repudiate them . An example for a more consensual, conciliatory stance is that of 
Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba. In 1985, the two researchers proposed four 'post­
positivist' criteria. These were directly translated from the more fam iliar positivist 
clover of research criteria: internal validity, external validity, reliability, and 
objectivity. For interpretive purposes, this clover was remodelled to include the 
criteria credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirm ability (for more detail 
and explanation, see inter alia Dormans, 2008: 36-38).
This set of criteria, however, evoked a fair share of criticism. The most principled line 
of critique was that 'establishing a parallel set of term s meant accepting positivist 
presuppositions about what m atters in scholarly research' (Schwartz-Shea, 2006: 94). 
It was argued that criteria used in positivist approaches emanated from the specific 
ontological and epistemological convictions that guide this sort of research (Yanow & 
Schwartz-Shea, 2006: xvii). These, however, are convictions that post-positivist 
research com m only rejects (Yanow, 2006: 67, see also chapter 2). To follow 
m ethodological standards that 'im itate' positivism, then, would be untruthful to one's 
own m eta-theoretical stance.
This research subscribes to this argum ent because it considers as a priority that 
m ethodology should fit the underlying ontology and epistem ology -  and not that it 
should convince positivist colleagues that even interpretive work has a raison d ' être. 
In this respect this work is less interested in discussions on w hether scientific criteria 
that are dom inant in the 'hard sciences' can or should be adopted in the 'soft 
sciences', or whether this is hampered by the peculiarities of the latter (for this 
discussion, see Flyvbjerg, 2004). The m ethodological argum ent this research makes 
rests on ontological and epistemological considerations only. If a set of criteria for 
good interpretivist or post-structuralist research is necessary or desired, it should 
reflect the m eta-theoretical choices and limitations underlying the research.
By choosing an anti-foundational epistemology, researchers quite willingly and 
consciously forego the possibility of truth claims. Any research subscribing to such 
assum ptions sim ply cannot make a claim to truth, even if it points to the 'correctness' 
of its methods.
What researchers can try to do, however, is to be open about as many of the choices 
made during the research process as possible. It is then left to the readers to judge to 
what extent, in the context of the current scientific discourse, they are convinced of 
the theoretical presuppositions, methods and findings of the research. Determining 
to what extent the research done bears a value of any kind, be it scientific, societal or 
other, becom es the audience's task.
In the absence of 'hard' criteria, or of a better solution, readers can evaluate 
interpretivist research by judging 'the degree to which it makes possible new and 
meaningful interpretations of the ... phenomena it investigates' (Howarth, 2000: 300). 
The least that can be said in favour of such an approach to 'determ ine' good research
is that it is far more transparent and democratic than the current, rather authoritarian, 
truth claim of mainstream science.
Producing text about texts
This dem ocratic aspiration, however, puts considerable emphasis on the one aspect 
of research that is most often forgotten in method books -  that of writing up 
(Dormans, 2008: 43). The central aim of writing up is to provide readers with a 
m aximum of insight into choices -  and detours, deviations etc. -  made in the 
research. This pertains to the theoretical and methodological design of the research, 
but also, and just as importantly, to the presentation of 'findings'. As reflections on 
theoretical-m ethodological choices have already been covered earlier in this and the 
preceding chapter, this section will focus on the writing up of findings.
In earlier versions, the book included no empirical background sections for the cases. 
It was decided that the reader would not receive passages with 'em pirical facts' 
separate from the analysis. The underlying reasoning for this was that providing a 
'fact sheet' would contradict the ontological/epistem ological presuppositions as 
presented in chapter 2. The first readers, however, almost unanim ously deplored this 
as a lack of context and indicated that it made it difficult for those foreign to the field 
to 'follow the story'. As a compromise, the final version contains short introductions, 
yet with a caveat to readers. An effort has been made to provide as much 'context' as 
necessary; however, the choice of what constitutes the context, and of how much is 
sufficient, is mine entirely and should be seen in this light.
As far as the respondents' accounts are concerned, these are consistently marked as 
such -  just as my interventions are. In writing up, a recurrent question was how long 
the statem ents reproduced should 'ideally' be. Two remarks of other researchers 
served as rules of thumb. Accordingly, the length of the statements must enable the 
author:
- 'to dem onstrate how conclusions are based on material, and . . .t o  present 
excerpts from the material in an accessible and readable way' (Flick, 2007: 
106), and
- 'to open up the text for the active reinterpretation of the reader' (Dormans, 
2008: 43).
To improve readability, the respondents' accounts were 'tidied up'. The 'erms', 'uhs', 
and sim ilar interjections have been omitted in the written version, as have simple 
repetitions. In addition, citations have been translated into English.
This, however, is a tricky business. Providing translated versions makes it impossible 
for readers to judge whether these actually correspond to the originals. It also makes 
it more difficult to judge the author's interpretation/analysis of what has been said.
A solution to this problem would be to provide part or all of the original transcripts in 
an annex. That this has not been done here has to do with ethical considerations. 
Providing the original transcripts would most likely threaten the anonym ity of my 
respondents; disclosing their mother tongue, for instance, makes respondents 
unnecessarily  easy to identify. Because of this, respondents are only specified b ytheir 
institutional affiliation, for example, as EP or Commission respondent.
It is hoped that two strategies com pensate for this lack of transparency as much as 
possible. First, the translated citations were given to the respondents for inspection, 
and I revised translations when respondents requested me to do so. Second, I 
welcom e any reader interested in the original recordings or transcripts to contact me 
to arrange for an individual inspection. This, of course, will be done in consultation 
with the respondents.
Conclusion
To remain truthful to the ontological/epistem ological com m itm ents established in 
chapter 2, this research chose an interpretivist methodology. This included an 
exploratory  overall goal. Self-interpretations of the actors were central to the analysis, 
but were not treated as given truths. Rather, they offered systems of meaning making 
that could be 'scanned' for hidden patterns, inconsistencies or exclusions.
As the intention was to compare these patterns with those asserted by conventional 
EIS, environm ental politics was chosen because it ensured a level playing field for 
both conventional EIS and DT. Environmental politics has the additional advantage of 
offering insight into the relationship between EU institutions and EU Member States 
not only on the EU level, but also on the international level. These features were
retained when the field was restricted to two cases (climate change politics and green 
biotechnology politics) for reasons of feasibility and specificity.
Interviews seemed to promise a com paratively easy access to meaning making in the 
context of EU politics and policy-m aking. They relied heavily on the respondents, as 
the latter widely determined what became a topic of conversation and identified new 
potential respondents. Reflecting meta-theoretical convictions, interviews were 
conceived to offer instances of meaning making rather than mining sites where truths 
could be uncovered.
For the analysis, the post-structuralist DA-toolkit was deployed. Texts came mainly 
from  the interviews. Every case was treated in its singularity and specificity first, 
before a 'grand', cross-case comparison. This research takes a cautious stance 
towards generalisability. It also rejects standard criteria for 'good research' 
(reliability/validity), as they are at odds with the research's ontological/ 
epistemological 'ueberbau'. Instead, the research advances plausibility, renounces 
claims of scientific objectivity and authority, and shifts the focus and judgm ent to the 
readers instead. As a consequence, the role of writing up increased in importance. 
Diligent writing up is needed to facilitate the reader's judgm ent, as it opens up the 
black box of the research process and exposes the researcher's decisions and 
interventions.
PART II Case study: EU institutions and Member States in climate 
change politics 
4. THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Among all of the sub-fields of environm ental politics, climate change is currently the 
most prominent. No other environmental issue receives more attention from 'the 
public', media, or politicians, and climate change is the only of its 'class' to be 
repeatedly addressed during high level talks both inside and outside the EU. As such, 
it figures among allegedly 'harder' issues such as security or economy.
Although climate change has been put on a political pedestal by and within the EU 
right from its inception, this position has not always been stable. In the last years of 
the millennium, the threat of 'clim ate fatigue' was particularly palpable (see for 
instance Deutsche Welle, 2003). Now, barely a decade later, this fatigue has made 
way for the issue's political revival.
From the start, the evolution of climate change as a new field of international political 
activity has been closely -  and explicitly -  linked to the EU's developm ent as an actor 
in this domain. In this role, the EU has issued a clear blueprint for international climate 
change politics: it should act as a unified force and lead the field. Given this blueprint 
and the EU's attem pt to create a 'personality' for itself, meaning making and identity 
formation within the EU in the field of international climate change politics are 
especially intriguing for analysis.
After a short overview of the EU's 'history' in international climate change politics, 
this chapter critically analyses what is understood by 'EU ' on this level, especially in 
term s of its form al-institutional setup. The EU is arguably very state-centred in this 
context, with M ember States rejecting a Commission negotiation mandate. It could 
be claimed that this rejection reflects the 'classical' com petence struggles between 
the Commission and the M em ber States. In a next step, however, it is argued that 
reducing conflicts to this dimension would mean ignoring the num erous other 
contentions and schisms, loyalties and identities that betray such a straightforward 
interpretation. It would also mean disregarding the discursive shifts that have 
occurred over the last years. These shifts have form idably altered meaning making 
and identity formation in the EU on this level, as, increasingly, the performance of the
EU as a whole has been advanced in lieu of the sovereignty of singular Member 
States. How identity processes in the EU depended on the outside context is the last 
analytical aspect of this chapter, followed by concluding remarks.
Historical overview
Clim ate change became part of the EU's political agenda in the late 1980s, a decade 
that Ute Collier has termed the 'hey day of EU environmental policy' (Collier, 1996: 
123). During the eighties, environm ental legislation in the EU rose to unknown 
proportions.
Seen from a discursive point of view, climate change as a policy field was relatively 
virgin fabric; meaning making and identity formation had yet to develop. First 
'stitches', however, were made quickly. From the start, climate change was seen as 
transboundary, crossing not only the borders of individual M em ber States, but also 
those of the EU as a whole. The EU perceived climate change as an international issue 
to be addressed in an international regime. From an early stage, the EU advanced that 
such a regime needed to include concrete C0 2 reduction com m itm ents for major 
developed countries.11 As the United States, in particular, was not convinced of this, it 
was soon regarded as the EU's adversary in what was dubbed a 'North-North conflict' 
(Steffan, 1994).
Finally, states agreed to address climate change internationally, albeit on a rather 
basal level. In 1990, the UN General Assem bly established the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Com m ittee (INC) to design a fram ework convention. The United Nations 
Conference on Environm ent and Developm ent (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was 
set as a deadline for the INC's work. Also in 1990, the European Union chose to adopt 
one common emissions target instead of many individual and different reduction 
targets on the M em ber State level. It proposed that EU C0 2 em issions be stabilised on 
a 1990 level by the year 2000.
11 It must be noted that although 'the EU' is used in this situation, some Member States deviated from 
the overall line in this phase. The UK rejected concrete commitments in the beginning. This was for 
instance the case during one of the first international 'political' conferences on climate change in 
Noordwijk, The Netherlands, in 1989 (Oberthür, 1993: 25).
Still in 1990, the 'Environm ental Imperative Declaration' was issued from the Dublin 
Summit. This declaration stated that '[t]he Com m unity and its M ember States have a 
special responsibility to encourage and participate in international action to combat 
global environm ental problems. Their capacity to provide leadership in this sphere is 
enorm ous'12. Thus, an overall goal -  again jo in t  and shared  -  was officially decreed: 
that of international climate change leadership.
By making these decisions, the EU left rather decisive and lasting stitches on the 
fabric of international climate change politics. Firstly, it decided that climate change 
should be addressed c o lle ct iv e ly-  not only at home, but on the international level. By 
choosing the international leadership role, the EU additionally presented itself, if not 
as a hom ogenous entity, then at least as a bloc on the international level. Similarly, 
albeit more implicitly, a link was made between the EU level and the international 
level in this context; international leadership, at least as it was and is still com m only 
presented, requires satisfactory action 'at home'. Lastly, and as mentioned previously, 
this leadership role was from the beginning directed against the USA.
In Rio, states agreed on a United Nations Fram ework Convention on Clim ate Change. 
This convention acknowledges climate change as a m an-made problem and the 
responsibility of developed countries, in particular, in this respect. Equally, it calls for
[a] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic developmentto proceed in 
a sustainable manner. (UNFCCC, Art. 2)
During the first Conference of Parties13 (COP-1) in Berlin, the parties issued a mandate 
to supplem ent the UNFCCC with a protocol or with another legal instrument. At COP- 
3 in Kyoto, such a protocol (the 'Kyoto Protocol') was accepted. The Kyoto Protocol 
includes concrete greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction com m itm ents for developed 
countries (adding up to an average of minus five percent in the period 2008-2012, 
compared to GHG emissions in 1990) and a 'm arket-based' GHG reduction approach.
12 See http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/dublin/du2_en.pdf.
13 As the glossary of the UNFCCC website explains, the Conference of Parties is the 'supreme body of the 
Convention. It currently meets once a year to review the Convention's progress'. Since the Kyoto 
Protocol came into force, the COP also 'serves as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The 
sessions ... are held during the same period to reduce costs and improve coordination between the 
Convention and the Protocol' (UNFCCC, n.d.).
The latter is epitomised by the flexible mechanisms, which stimulate reductions 
through econom ic incentives.14
Although the Clinton adm inistration, unlike its predecessor, acknowledged climate 
change as a problem and showed a basic willingness to tackle it, many EU Member 
States considered the US's approach as lacking ambition. For them , it was both too 
soft and too permissive. In 2000, the COP in The Hague, where details of the Protocol 
were to be clarified and decided, collapsed because of participant conflict. 
Contentions existed not only between the EU and the US, but also between EU 
m em bers on h o w to  deal with US demands.
In 2001, the Bush administration came to power and changed the US's overall course 
on climate change by declaring that the US would not ratify the protocol after all. The 
EU im m ediately announced its intention to save 'K yoto' and pressed other countries 
to adhere to their initial com mitm ents. However, it faced the problem of 
confirm ation: if the protocol was to come into effect, it would need to be ratified by at 
least 55 parties to the Convention. The latter, in turn, had to account for at least 55 
percent of the total GHG emissions of Annex I countries15. The overall future of the 
protocol thus remained uncertain until Russia ratified it in Novem ber 2004. Ninety 
days after Russia's ratification, 'Kyoto' was a legal reality.
In the meantime, climate change politics has become an issue that is no longer limited 
to the UN track. In recent years, it has figured rather prom inently on the to-do lists of 
m eetings of the Group of Eight (G8) or on the agendas of the US-initiated Major 
Econom ies Meeting (MEM). Com pared to the UN process, however, the latter fora 
have a more exclusive character: either not all EU Mem ber States are present (MEM) 
or the EU as a legal entity is not a party (G8). Thus, the EU has not only had to face the 
broader, more general question of whether or how these new processes are related to 
the UNFCCC, but it has also had to deal with a varying EU 'cast' in the different fora.
Since 'Kyoto' expires in 2012, talks on a 'post-Kyoto' regime have already begun. 
According to the Bali Action Plan from COP-13, parties ought to agree on a Kyoto 
follow-up regime by COP-15 in Copenhagen, in Decem ber 2009. Many com m entators 
hope that under the Obama adm inistration, the United States will agree to
14 For more details on flexible mechanisms, see Yamin, 2000.
15The Annex I to the UNFCCC lists countries that have a com m itm ent to stabilise/reduce their GHG 
emissions. It mainly includes 'developed' countries.
com m itm ents this time. The EU, for its part, has already declared its intention to 
retain leadership in the next phase of negotiations.
The EU: More than the sum of its Member States?
A new actor
Even today, the EU is regarded as som ewhat of a curiosity in international politics; in 
the early nineties, it was conceived as an outright novelty. This meant that the EU had 
to fight battles that 'norm al' states had fought a long time ago and whose outcomes 
and consequences had become sedimented and taken for granted ever since. As Tom 
Delreux points out, '[s]tates are traditionally  and historically  the main subjects of 
international law'; as such, 'their participation in international negotiations is not 
contested' (Delreux, 2006: 232,233, em phasis added). For constructions such as the 
EU, however, the case was altogether different in the 1990s.
W hereas in the 1990s, any recognised state was free to participate in international 
climate negotiations and to become a party to its conventions and protocols, the 
same was not true for the EU. In that sense, the earlier statem ent that international 
climate change politics were, discursively, a relatively untouched field of politics 
needs to be specified. No discursive field is ever com pletely 'blank' but always 
partially structured, and so were international climate change politics. They were 
inter-national. Nation states, or at least those that were com m only accepted under 
this label, uniquely held the 'ticket to the ball' (Waever, 1995: 420), purely on account 
of their statehood. In contrast, what the EU qualified for was uncertain. The only 
certainty was that it was different and, as such, viewed with suspicion. Consequently, 
the EU was not admitted as a distinct party during the conferences of the INC but was 
represented by its M ember States (Steffan, 1994: 86). During the UNCED itself, the 
European Com m unity (EC)16 was officially accorded 'full party status'. This status,
16The term s European Union (EU) and European Com m unity (EC) have so far been used 
interchangeably. This has become an implicit convention in common language use. From a legal point of 
view, however, the two are distinct. 'The EU' was only established by the Treaty on European Union in 
1992. Before, the regional-political entity it refers to was com m only known as 'the EC'. Today, the EC is 
but one of the three pillars of the EU (see Pollack & Shaffer, 2001: 40 for more details). In the context of 
international negotiations, the two need to be differentiated in principle, as the EU lacks the 
international legal personality that is needed to enter agreements: 'A first condition to conclude 
international agreements and to become a party to these is possessing international legal personality ...
however, was in effect less full than that of 'real' states (Kraack, 2000: 224).17 When 
the EC finally became one of the ratifying parties to the United Nations Fram ework 
Convention on Climate Change, and later to the Kyoto Protocol, it did so parallel to 
the M em ber States.
For the composition of delegations, this means that the delegation of the European 
Com m unity m ainly com prises Commission staff, accompanied by interested MEPs, 
who, however, do not have any formal role (Oberthur, forthcom ing). M ember States 
have their own, separate delegations. This reduces the Com m unity to what is 
com m only labelled 'Brussels' (a vague shortcut for the EU institutions) -  or, taken one 
step further, to the Commission.
Consequently, identity formation, from the outset, was more straightforward for the 
Comm ission staff and MEPs than for the civil servants of the M ember States. The 
latter represented their country. In negotiations, they were 'France' or 'Sweden'. For 
Comm ission staff, however, being part of the Com m unity delegation merged with 
representing and being the EU. This confusion becomes apparent in many of the 
statem ents made by Commission respondents
In the beginning, when we started to discuss climate change, there were relatively 
few areas where the EU could really claim, or the Commission could claim that there 
was a clear EU competence (Commission respondent, emphasis added)
At that time, we were parties, the EU was a party to the Climate Convention ... . So 
therefore, then we were recognised in that context ... . But before you had the 
Convention ... we were just sort of a bit of an outside body (Commission respondent, 
emphasis added)
The Commission, I mean, normally the way the EU will negotiate in international 
agreement is b y -  given a mandate. (Commission respondent, emphasis added)
In these accounts, Commission and EC/EU merge into one fuzzy entity. This is 
accentuated by the Commission staff's use of the pronoun 'w e' in this context, which
The main point is that the European Union ... does not hold international legal personality, in contrast to 
the European Com m unity .... Consequently, the EC -  and not the EU -  is able to conclude international 
environmental agreements' (Delreux, 2006: 233). Since this is the case, an official 'EU delegation' does 
not exist in international negotiations, but there is an EC delegation.
17 In particular, the EC lacks voting rights under the UNFCCC (Van Schaik, forthcoming).
indicates that identification has gone beyond a purely representational stadium ('we 
as the Commission represent the EU/the Com m unity'). At least in this context, the 
respective respondents do seem to feel that they are  the EU.
The above statements indicate that m embers of the Com m unity delegation seem to 
have fully adopted a distinct European identity. The question remains as to whether 
the same can be said for civil servants of the M ember States. After all, M ember State 
representatives so far largely have remained in their national setting. They are still full 
peers to the other fellow state parties. Given that the formal status quo for Member 
States has not changed drastically, it could be expected that civil servants m ainly 
think of them selves in term s of the country they represent, and that there is hence a 
basic identificational divide between EU institutions and M ember States.
EU coordination and representation
A short glimpse on the EU's system of coordination and external representation 
seem s to support this assumption, as this system, especially in the beginning, echoed 
the state-centred discourse that dominated international climate change politics. 
Even when the UNFCCC came into force and INC meetings were replaced by the 
COPs, this change did not impact the distribution of com petences between the 
Com m unity and the M ember States. In short, although the Com m unity had gradually 
become a formal party, the Com m ission's formal role within the EU's coordination 
and representation setup was restricted to the benefit of the Member State 
Presidency. The Presidency was in charge of negotiations and spoke on behalf of both 
the Com m unity and the M em ber States. In doing so, it was bound by a mandate from 
the Environment Council of Ministers, and thus, in abstract terms, by its fe llo w  states. 
High level negotiations, on the other hand, were handled by the troika, a trium virate 
of the former, the current, and the incoming Presidency. The troika constellation had 
no form er legal model in EC environmental policy; it was sim ply taken over from the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy Pillar (Van Schaik & Egenhofer, 2003: 3). It can 
thus be concluded that, as far as international climate change politics are concerned, 
the EU worked in a state-centred environm ent in a rather state-centred setup for a 
long time.
Unlike the field of climate change politics, negotiations in other fields of 'mixed 
com petence' (i.e., fields 'in which both Com m unity and Member State
com petences apply' (Elgstrom, 2003: 57)) have experienced a shift of com petences to 
the Com m ission.18 In these cases, the Com m ission has been accorded a mandate by 
the M ember States to lead negotiations. This could also have been an option for 
climate change politics, and according to a number of Member State respondents, 
discussions on 'who should speak' keep recurring. Yet, according to one of the 
respondents, these discussions have always followed the same pattern:
The Commission ... wanted to have the role of the one that speaks forthe EU, just as 
they did in the case in the Montreal Protocol. That has always been rejected by the 
Member States. (Member State respondent)
During the interviews for this research, the mandate question was certainly one issue 
to which respondents replied em otionally with quite pointed statements. As in the 
above quotation, M ember State respondents predom inantly described issuing a 
Comm ission mandate as something they, the M ember States, rejected unanimously:
It has always been the clear opinion of the Member States that we do this through the 
Presidency (Member State respondent, emphasis added)
Of course it would be possible to have the Commission negotiate in domains of mixed 
competence, but that is something the Member States do not want (Member State 
respondent, emphasis added)
The Member States ... did not want to cede all their competence to the Commission 
(Member State respondent, emphasis added)
It has not been the practice and it will not be the practice under current rules that we 
give a mandate to the Commission. To negotiate. (Member State respondent)
In this context, M em ber States are depicted as peers, as forming a coherent group 
('the M ember States'). The use of the pronoun 'w e' is very telling in this respect. As a 
non-state, the Comm ission is excluded.
In the accounts of the M em ber State respondents, the Com mission and the Member 
States are juxtaposed: the Commission wanted something that the M em ber States 
consequently declined. In addition, in the opinion of several M ember State 
respondents, the Com m ission's line of action is suspicious and sneaky. Respondents
18 For instance, the Commission was granted a mandate to negotiate on the international cooperation 
for the protection of the ozone layer in 1982 (Oberthür, 2000: 100).
were prone to interpret the Com m ission's actions as attem pts to snatch  com petences 
to the detrim ent of the M ember States:
The Commission tried to take overthe primacy in the field of climate change from the 
Presidencies. That failed. Consequently, that created very much distrust between the 
Member States and the European Commission (Member State respondent, emphasis 
added)
My very first impressions of the Commission were already in '96 that it claimed the 
negotiating mandate. That it thus made a big effort to roll back the influence of the 
Presidency and the troika. (Member State respondent)
To state it in DT terms, many M em ber State respondents, at least in this context, 
perceived and depicted the Commission as a potential outside threat to an inside, i.e., 
the com m unity of EU M ember States.
This interpretation of the mandate issue, however, is in no way natural or self-evident. 
It represents the dom inant discourse in this context, and, as such, it dwarfs alternative 
ways of meaning making. Although overshadowed, these alternative ways of 
meaning making do exist. In the interviews, they existed on the part of Commission 
respondents who depicted the question o f'w h o  speaks' as a legal question that was to 
be decided by referring to basic legislation:
It has to be sort of acknowledged, that even though ... gradually there is a stronger 
EU competence in the areas which are important for the mitigation of climate 
change, there was never any effort made to change this somehow anachronistic 
setup. That it was always the Presidency that did the negotiations (Commission 
respondent)
You could say that increasingly three-fourths of the C0 2 emissions are being 
managed through European law, and the standard equation is that, when we mirror 
international competence with internal competence, it should be the EU speaking 
(Commission respondent)
The remaining point ... is whether at some point the Commission will take over the 
competence to negotiate these things in international fora. As in principle, they 
should, if you go back and read the treaty on how the EU is conducting its 
international business. (Commission respondent)
57
Just as m any M em ber States respondents considered that their right to speak was 
based on their statehood, many Comm ission respondents believed that the 
Com m ission's right to represent the EU stemmed from legal texts. In this respect, 
respondents either implicitly or explicitly referred to the 'doctrine of parallelism 
between internal and external com petences' (Delreux, 2006: 235), which the ECJ 
established in the context of the infam ous ERTA case:
[W]hen the EC has first elaborated measures in a particular policy area, it is able to 
conduct external relations in that domain ... . Following the 'in foro interno, in foro 
externo' principle, conducting external policy does not have to be based on explicit 
provisions in the Treaty ... external policy can also arise from internal measures. 
(Delreux 2006: 235)
According to the ECJ decision, the distribution of com petences on the international 
level hence should mirror that on the EU level. As Commission respondents refer to 
this principle to defend a re-distribution of com petences, legality and legitimacy in 
their accounts closely coincide.
This legal logic, however, not only appealed to Comm ission respondents. It also 
resounded with some of the M em ber State civil servants, in particular those that had 
a legal background:
The Commission has ... grown stronger... parallel to its making ever more regulation 
proposals for the European Union. And thus the influence got bigger. Seen from a 
legal point of view ... the external power ... also grew stronger. Seen from a purely 
legal point of view (Member State respondent)
At the end of the nineties we were much more focused on the Member States and 
now are much more communitised in this area ... which fortifies the role of the 
Community for which the Commission is speaking. (Member State respondent)
M em ber State respondents have thus not unanim ously deemed Commission claims 
to 'speak for the EU' as illegitimate. Likewise, the views that 'com petence snatching' 
lies in the general 'nature' of the Commission and that it is the general 'strategy of the 
Comm ission to usurp com petences' (M em ber State respondent) are not something 
that all M ember State respondents subscribe to. Particularly those respondents who 
have been involved in earlier phases of international climate change policy depict the 
Com m ission's behaviour as far more timid:
To give the negotiating mandate to the Commission was never really pursued, not by 
the Commission either.... I was also astounded that they did not force it, I recall that, 
but that's the way it was. (Member State respondent)
To sum up, the hegemonial discourse on mandate m atters among M ember State 
respondents approached what conventional EIS asserts. In the context of the 
mandate issue, most M ember State respondents perceived a split between the two 
cam ps of 'th e' M ember States and 'th e' Commission. They referred to the 'peerness' 
and solidarity between the M em ber States, and to the common suspicion towards the 
Commission, which they considered the threatening outside intruder. In fact, a 
potential Commission mandate was linked to notions of relinquishing com petences 
that, by nature or history, or simply as a m atter of principle, were supposed to be 'the 
states".
This seem ingly monolithic discourse, however, is more inconsistent than is at first 
obvious. Some M em ber State respondents interpreted not only the legitim acy of 
Comm ission mandate claims differently but also how vehem ently or 'pushy' the 
Comm ission tried to see them  realised (see above). In this respect, the hegemonial 
discourse was weaker in dominating meaning making and identity formation than 
might have been expected.
Coalitions, loyalties, identities
As indicated in chapter 1, academic research has frequently 'zoomed in' on mandate 
struggles. In the case of climate change, a scientific reification of the hegemonial 
discourse in mandate m atters is problem atic because it obscures not only the 
existence of competing discourses but also the various cracks and inconsistencies that 
are discernible in the wider context. It suggests that EU cooperation in international 
climate change politics is dominated by a schism between the Commission, which is 
trying to enlarge its com petence base, and the tight-knit com m unity of Member 
States, which is trying to keep the form er in check. The assumption that one singular 
M em ber State identity opposes one singular Commission identity, however, neglects 
two things: the proxim ity between the Commission and some  of the M em ber States 
as well as the divides between  M ember States them selves.
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During the interviews, it became apparent that several M ember State respondents 
did not view the Commission, either on the EU or on the international level, as others 
did. Some of them saw more sim ilarity between their country and the Commission 
than between their country and other M em ber States, especially in term s of 
'environm ent mindedness'. Together with the Commission, these respondents wanted 
the EU to become an environmental leader. Together with the Commission they also 
deemed them selves as belonging to the progressive fraction of those in the EU that 
valued 'ecology' more than others. Consequently, their opposition was not the 
Comm ission, but laggard  countries.
Narratives of schisms between M ember States recurred in the interviews. Often, 
respondents reported on struggles between 'big' and 'sm all' M em ber States. In some 
contexts, then, divides were embedded in discourses that centred on the different 
sizes of M ember States rather than on institutional affiliation. In these contexts, 
M em ber State respondents did not think of them selves as belonging to 'the' group of 
M em ber States, which was basically the case in the context of the mandate question. 
Instead, they associated them selves with a special kind  of M ember State -  either big 
or small. The criteria for this distinction were neither explicit nor consistent, but 
oscillated between several factors such as geographical size, alleged econom ic or 
political power, or historical considerations (former empires or not).
Respondents of other M em ber States not only referred to a M em ber State as big or 
small, but the respective M ember State respondents them selves used these labels. As 
these exam ples illustrate, being a small or big M ember State was and still is part of a 
M em ber State's identity formation in international climate change politics. It often 
lies at the foundation of meaning making:
Austria ... is a small country, you see? It is a small country within the EU (Member
State respondent)
[On the relation between Scandinavian Member States and the respondent's own
country] We, well, have similar positions. And that is, I think, due to the fact that we
are all small and know that we cannot do it alone. (Member State respondent)
As already mentioned, the reason why a M ember State is referred to or refers to itself 
as big or small is mostly inconclusive. In the interviews, the Scandinavian countries, 
for instance, were identified as small M ember States. Yet, Sweden has both a larger 
geographical size and  a higher per capita gross national capita than Germ any, an
allegedly big M em ber State. Adm ittedly, Germ any has a larger total population. 
However, few people would speak of Spain as big M em ber State, although it has the 
fifth largest population of all EU countries and therefore a considerable number of 
votes in the Council. These exam ples dem onstrate the arbitrariness of this kind of 
categorisation, and thus its political character.
In the past, to think in the categories o f 'b ig ' and 'sm all' M em ber States provided a 
breeding ground for tensions and conflicts in international climate change politics. 
The reproaches made during the interviews were reciprocal. 'B ig' M ember State 
respondents criticised the 'habitual m istrust' (M em ber State respondent) that small 
M em ber States displayed towards big M em ber States and, in particular, towards big 
M em ber State Presidencies. Respondents also complained about
small Member States imagining that we are having parallel negotiations with the US 
or with China or with Russia or with Japan and that there is some deal being done 
behind people's backs. (Member State respondent, emphasis added)
Respondents of allegedly small M em ber States disapproved of the fact that they were 
unable to participate in crucial negotiations and th a tth e  'big ones' pursued an agenda 
of their own:
Sometimes you really had deals being made between France and the UK together 
with the President, without other Member States being involved. (Member State 
respondent)
According to the respondents, the discrepancies between big and small Member 
States became most virulent during COP-6 in The Hague. Again, small Member 
States felt that they, on account of their lack of weight, were both disregarded and 
discarded by big Member States when it came to 'real talks':
There were ... talks in which we as X ['big' Member State] have also been involved ... 
in order to save the lot. And these ... ran in parallel. And for those not involved, those 
were some meetings in different rooms. And that caused distrust ... . And ... in the 
case of the small ones [the small Member States] it induced the feeling of "we are no 
longer in". (Member State respondent, emphasis added)
Although small M ember States were kept 'outside' crucial talks, this did not mean in 
the eyes of the respective respondents that their countries were outsiders. Small 
M em ber States identified the big Mem ber States as the odd ones out. In their
accounts, the big ones had moved beyond the Com m unity fram ework and had 
interests and an agenda of their own instead of representing those of the EU. Because 
of this, small M em ber States were forced to intervene at times.
After COP-6 collapsed, the discourse of small M ember State respondents became 
hegemonial. The failure of COP-6 was widely associated with the fundamental 
disparateness of the EU internally and, in particular, with the 'single-handed' actions 
of big M em ber States. The latter were no longer accepted as making 'efforts to save 
the lot' (see above) but were decried as practicing 'anti-com m unitarian' behaviour.
Ever since COP-6, big M ember States have made a concerted and rather explicit 
effort to shun any possible impression of unilateralism. They emphasise their vigorous 
attem pts to include their fellow M em ber States as much as possible:
I was in every single [international] meeting and every single discussion and I had a 
sense of what would happen. And others [other EU Member States] weren't. And 
therefore you had to spend a lot of time reassuring and persuading, and, you know, 
bringing them along. Making sure they understood the strategy (Member State 
respondent)
We just had to explain to people. You just had to keep talking to them. You just had to 
keep them informed about what's going on (Member State respondent)
Don't forget to properly inform all Member States. Otherwise there is a risk that they 
will drift to the margins. And that can't be healthy for such a process. (Member State 
respondent)
To conclude, while the 'peerness' and the com m onality between Member States was 
prom inent in the context of the mandate question, these feelings were replaced in 
other contexts by more inclusive notions of equivalence among a lim ited  num ber of 
M em ber States (at tim es including the Commission).
In the context of international climate change politics, the M ember States- 
Comm ission antagonism  hence did not singularly dominate meaning making and 
identity formation. Rather, schisms existed that crossed and separated the bulk of 
M em ber States. The outside, in these instances, was not the Com mission, but the 
respective 'other' group of M em ber States.
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EU on the move -  Discursive shifts
New discourse in sight?
The aversion that M em ber State respondents displayed towards a potential 
Comm ission mandate could also obfuscate the fact that they generally seemed to 
disapprove of the current system of a rotating Presidency, too. Indeed, virtually all 
respondents criticised the idea that Presidencies represent the 'face' and the 'voice' of 
the EU:
The fact that the EU has changed its main negotiator every six months is not an 
advantage. And it's particularly not an advantage when you end up with a bad 
negotiator. And I think I would daresay ... that the environment minister of X [EU 
country] who was actually the one who was meant to conduct the negotiations for the 
EU in X [at a COP] was not the person who would have been chosen for that job, if 
there had been alternatives (Commission respondent)
[On Presidencies in general] Sometimes people ... arrive without a great deal of 
knowledge (Member State respondent)
The difficult thing about the EU is that it is very closely linked to the Presidency ... 
every six months there is another one. And there are big differences (Member State 
respondent)
Depending on the capacity and frankly the competence ofthe individual Presidencies, 
the EU performed well or it didn't perform well (Member State respondent)
With the changing Presidency every six months, it was rather down to good luck or 
bad luck whether the lead minister was a good negotiator or a poor negotiator. 
(Member State respondent)
In their interviews, M em ber State respondents generally associated having a rotating 
Presidency in charge of coordination and external representation with signifiers such 
as luck, volatility, and temporariness. The rotating Presidency was seen as an 
im ponderable fa c to r'X ' in the EU's perform ance calculation.
Yet EU performance was important. As became apparent in the interviews, it had 
gradually become a major, if not the main, concern to M ember State respondents. 
Rather than pursuing individual M ember State success, M ember State respondents 
had seem ingly moved to putting EU fortune first. To ensure EU success, however,
they no longer considered a rotating Presidency satisfactory for negotiating. 
Respondents desired reliable, continuous EU negotiators instead, people who could 
convince because of their capacities and com petences and who were recruited 
because of them. Only once the EU had found such people could it make a bigger 
impact and actually attain the goals it set.
Although associating the rotating Presidency with failure was dom inant in most of the 
respondents' accounts and is also a recurrent them e in scientific publications (see 
Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 177), such a chain of articulation is neither necessary nor 
self-evident. As dem onstrates the following statement, alternatives ways of meaning 
making in the context of the rotating Presidency are conceivable and do exist:
The rotating system certainly is good. There are always fresh forces coming in, there 
are Member States of different strength coming in ... . Over the time, there is also a 
certain balance of interests ... plurality of opinions. I would say that, seen from a 
democratic perspective it is more sensible that there is a rotating Presidency. 
(Member State respondent)
This articulation differed from other articulations in this context in crucial aspects. In 
the statements of other respondents, EU performance was a key signifier. In this 
quotation, however, EU performance was com pletely absent. In its function as a key 
signifier, it was replaced by democracy; chains of equivalence ran between signifiers 
such as difference, plurality, and balance of interests. The tem porariness of the 
Presidencies was no longer connected to a lack of continuity but to the arrival of fresh  
forces. As such, the good-bad hierarchy of competing accounts was thoroughly 
reversed.
Yet, this quotation was the exception to the rule in promoting dem ocracy as key 
signifier. Generally, 'dem ocracy' -  a powerful signifier in many other contexts -  was 
dwarfed by other signifiers. This did not only pertain to the issue of the rotating 
Presidency; in most of the interview texts, 'dem ocracy' was virtually absent when it 
came to the EU in international climate change politics.
'EU perform ance', on the other hand, has become a truly dom inant key signifier, even 
to the extent that it enabled a major institutional overhaul of the EU's coordination 
and representation setup. This m ajor overhaul comprised several changes, the first of 
which was the decision to integrate the Commission officially into the troika.
As M ember States were generally reluctant to invest the Commission with more 
com petences than they deemed necessary, this remained the only explicit step to 
enlarge the role of the Commission formally. Still, M ember States were caught 
between a rotating Presidency system that they saw as malfunctioning and a 
Comm ission mandate that was rejected for reasons of principle. Consequently, more 
creative ways to circum vent formal institutional impasses had to be found. In the 
1990s, the first deviations from  the 'the-Presidency-speaks' principle began to appear:
During Buenos Aires [the COP in 1998] we decided to have the comprehensive 
strategy negotiated by somebody who was n o t... presiding the WPIEI19, but by X [a 
civil servant of an EU Member State]. And he was thus the 'special envoy', or I don't 
know howto call it, ofthe EU in the field of climate change .... He is very good at that, 
he could orchestrate it all very well, he had a very good notion ofthe whole game. 
(Member State respondent)
The EU's Catch-22 situation, however, asked for further, more drastic and more 
lasting changes. These changes gradually evolved into the current system of 'issue 
leaders' and 'lead negotiators'.
Changes mostly concerned the responsible EU working party, the WPIEI (CC). The 
WPIEI is responsible for the bulk of EU coordination and representation in the 
negotiations. This working party m ainly consists o fth e  climate unit heads from the 
environm ent ministries as well as officials of the Directorate-General (DG) for the 
Environm ent (Costa, 2008: 536), who meet once or twice a month. Before 
international negotiations, the working party prepares the EU position (Van Schaik & 
Egenhofer, 2003: 78). During COPs, working party m em bers sit at the negotiating 
tables for most o fth e  conference, whilst the high-level segment with ministers etc. 
occupies only the last few days. In the opinion of scholars, WPIEI (CC) has surpassed 
the status of a group of experts who m erely prepare 'the technical aspects of the 
m inistries' decisions'. On the contrary, '[en viro nm ental M inisters usually give 
approval to the decisions taken by the W PIEI/CC' (Costa, 2008: 536).
The WPIEI (CC) was gradually divided into as well as supported by expert groups. 
These groups focused on special issues within the broad subject of climate change 
and the climate change regime, for example, 'sinks' or 'technology transfer' (see also
19 The official W orking Party on International Environment Issues is divided into two w orking groups: a) 
global environmental aspects of sustainable developm ents and b) climate change. The latter one is the 
W PIEI (CC) (Van Schaik & Egenhofer, 2003: 4).
Oberthur, 2009: 197; Van Schaik, 2006: 78). As Sebastian Oberthur elaborates, '[t]he 
establishm ent of these expert groups ... to some extent mirrored the differentiation 
of the international process in which ... these issues were also increasingly discussed 
in separate negotiating groups' (Oberthur, forthcoming).
In a later step, issue leaders and lead negotiators were recruited for these groups. As 
described in internal documents, issue leaders take the lead in preparing relevant 
draft docum ents, position papers, statem ents and speaking notes whereas lead 
negotiators lead the negotiations in contact groups of the UNFCCCC on a particular 
issue for the Presidency. Both issue leaders and lead negotiators are chosen on the 
basis of their personal ability, experience and qualities, and they are supposed to work 
together as a team. The current Presidency, with feedback from the WPIEI (CC), 
form ally com poses the complete list of lead negotiators and issue leaders. Usually, 
however, the Presidency considers the preferences of the respective expert groups 
when assigning these posts.
The introduction of this system of lead negotiators and issue leaders is historically 
linked to the Irish Presidency in the first half of 2004. The Irish Presidency adopted 
this system after a special session on how to improve efficiency and effectiveness of 
EU working arrangem ents for international climate change negotiations. W hen the 
Irish Presidency implemented the new working arrangements, it was agreed that this 
decision would not bind future presidencies. This notwithstanding, the system has 
been in place ever since. As clear from the interviews, the system enjoys considerable 
approval and support from both Commission and M ember States.
The new system was strongly embedded in the discourse that had formed around the 
'EU perform ance' signifier. As one respondent put it, the origin of this system lay in 
the perceived need
[to] react to the fact that you need more constancy and more professionality ... . It 
emerged ... because we realised that it is simply inefficient and also is perceived as 
strange by the outside, that every six months there are new people ... . Neither are 
they good at this, because they do not have a period of vocational adjustment, n o r... 
do they have a chance to build up a network, so that people know them, recognise 
them as a negotiator... and this is where some people say, we have to shift this more 
towards the Commission. That would have been politically impossible. (Member 
State respondent)
In this statem ent and earlier quotations, signifiers dominate that have a distinctly 
managerial flavour (professionally, inefficiency). The same or sim ilar signifiers also 
dominate respondents' accounts of how lead negotiators and issue leaders are 
recruited. W hereas in earlier tim es the question of 'who speaks' was dealt with on a 
principle of M em ber State ratio (as a Presidency, each M em ber State served an equal 
term  of six months), the experts, as they are called, are appointed by other criteria:
Let's say that it's a mix of ... resources and quality and let's say regional balance. But 
... especially the more technical and the less political it gets, the experts' knowledge 
counts. You just realise that. Those are the best people (Member State respondent)
I think there's a much greater recognition that we have, you know, talent throughout 
and that the European Union should use it to its best advantage, really. (Member 
State respondent)
These quotes illustrate that the underlying principle of selection moved from one of 
M em ber State affiliation to one of expertise in the name of both increasing 
effectiveness and improving the output. In addition, as experts no longer needed to 
change every six months, seniority  is stimulated:
These would be people who were experts and really knew the subject ... . And they 
would follow that subject maybe for two or three years. So that meant that there was 
much more continuity. You had people who knew what they were doing. (Member 
State respondent)
From the preceding statements, it can be concluded that the change in the EU's 
coordination and representation setup was an expression of the discursive shift that 
had taken place in this context. 'EU perform ance' became established as the key 
signifier of a new discourse that preponderantly drew on 'm anagerial' signifiers. This 
shift enabled an institutional setup that was primarily based on considerations of 
institutional affiliation to develop gradually into one that operates on criteria such as 
expertise and seniority.
However, the question remains as to what became of the Commission in such an 
altered discursive setting. In this respect, it is striking that the 'new ' system of 
coordination and representation and the signifiers that form its discursive embedding 
correspond to the signifiers with which the Commission is com m only associated:
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The Commission ... always had good officials, who were a dab hand at the subject of 
climate (Member State respondent)
They have good expertise. They have some good people (Member State respondent)
Nowadays ... super-experts are sitting in the Commission. Who also do not fluctuate 
as strongly as in many of the Member States (Member State respondent)
They play an important role because they pretty much provide continuity, there are 
capable people sitting there (Member State respondent)
[On the improvement of the EU on the international scene] That was partly also due, I 
think, to having very good people in the Commission team. Who were the continuity. 
(Member State respondent)
Because the EU's coordination and representation system works on the principle of 
institutional affiliation only in formal terms, and inform ally follows a discursive logic 
that com plies with the Com m ission's assets, it provides the best platform for more 
Comm ission activity and responsibility beyond the troika. And indeed, Commission 
staff were nominated as lead negotiator or issue leader in the past. The most 
prom inent nomination case may be the appointm ent of a Commission official as lead 
negotiator for the expert group that deals with the issue of a post-2012 regime, one of 
the key issues in current negotiations. According to respondents, this nomination did 
not meet many objections:
On at least one of the key issues, the work of the ad hoc working group on the future 
targets for developed countries, we have given a particular role of negotiator to the 
head of delegation of the Commission ... . It is the choice of a person rather than an 
institution. I think there is one or two people who question whether it is the right 
choice not on the grounds of the person, but because it is the Commission. I certainly 
never had any problems on that. Cause I've always seen it as being using the best 
people .... We looked at a few people who could be negotiator. I thought it was by far 
the best choice. Everybody else did. And we all agreed very quickly on that one. 
(Member State respondent)
The new negotiating system seem s to allow for more Commission participation, as 
experts are no longer judged on the basis of their institutional affiliation. Often, they 
are even no longer linked to or identified with it. Respondents saw experts not as 
'negotiator X from the Com m ission' or 'negotiator Y from M ember State Z'. Experts
were perceived sim ply as 'a person negotiating on behalf of the European Union' 
(M em ber State respondent).
The 'm anagerialisation' of the discourse largely de-politicised com petence 
distribution in the context of the coordination and representation setup. In a discourse 
dominated by signifiers such as 'perform ance', 'effectiveness', or 'expertise', 
respondents no longer considered negotiators as 'political' actors in the conventional 
sense, loaded with national (M em ber States) or institutional (Com m ission) power 
interests. Actors became experts who possessed technical knowledge or other 
managerial assets such as negotiating abilities.
In this respect, the 'EU perform ance' key signifier and its 'aides' managed to nullify 
the discursive divide between Commission and 'the Member States' that was 
prom inent in com petence distribution on the international level and that was 
supported by a state-centred discourse. As such, the turn towards 'EU perform ance' 
had an equalising as well as unifying effect. Som ebody negotiates on behalf of and for 
the benefit of the EU; this is what counts and not their institutional affiliation.
This means, however, that two key signifiers try to dominate and structure the same 
discursive field independently of one another. After all, the principle of the rotating 
Presidency is still form ally upheld, and M ember States refuse to cede com petences to 
the Commission. Here, the statehood signifier is still dom inant and juxtaposes 
M em ber States and the Commission. Informally, however, 'EU perform ance' sets the 
tone, and institutional arrangem ents have been adapted accordingly, albeit in a non­
codified manner. Affiliation with either the M ember States or the Commission is 
quasi-irrelevant and has been replaced by 'm anagerial' criteria. Given these seem ingly 
contradicting logics, how has co-existence between the two key signifiers been 
maintained?
The first tentative answer given here m ay at first appear to be more of a truism  than 
an analytical insight. That these signifiers have so far managed to coexist rather 
peacefully could be because they are com m only not associated  with the other. This 
'schizophrenia' has so far not caused any practical problems. On the contrary, it allows 
M em ber States to uphold, on the one hand, a discourse boasting their statehood and 
sovereignty. In this way, they can display an unwillingness to do something that 
would allegedly be a 'subm ission' to the Commission. On the other hand, Member 
States sim ultaneously engage in a discourse in which 'the EU' strives to excel
internationally. This discourse focuses on fulfilling the leadership role that the Union 
has designed for itself o verthe last two decades.
For most of the respondents, the mandate question and the practical, everyday 
system of lead negotiators and issue leaders were two separate spheres of thinking 
and acting. Only in singular cases were respondents aware of this construction's 
distinct advantages and the 'w in-w in' situation it creates:
You work with a hybrid that allows both sides to tell the outside, we did not cede any 
competences. (Member State respondent)
According to the same respondent, the two spheres need to be kept separate, as any 
connection between them would expose their basic incom mensurability:
One has found ... very functional compromises ... in which the Member States and the 
Commission can formally retain their position ... when outsiders come in, these are 
sometimes people who would like to make a particularly hard separation [of 
competences] ... in that case things would come out which have actually long been 
forgotten and long been overcome. (Member State respondent)
New discourse at work
On the basis of what has been said so far, it can be argued that the discursive 
structuration in the context of EU com petence distribution in international climate 
change politics is less straightforward than it appears. Although the rotating 
Presidency principle, embodying the statehood signifier, has been retained, an 
alternative key signifier has emerged in its shadow. This signifier dom inates widely 
how the EU is thought of and how it currently 'works' in this environment.
Especially after 'The Hague', 'EU perform ance' became central. This meant, first of all, 
that thinking in term s o f'M em ber States' (for instance, in term s of their interests) was 
largely subordinated to thinking in term s of 'the EU'. Secondly, the 'EU perform ance' 
signifier ensured a certain degree of legitimacy, as performance, effectiveness, and 
sim ilar signifiers occurred and still recur in accepted and established discourses in all 
societal contexts conceivable -  they are part of current 'neoliberalist' imaginaries. 
Consequently, a well-perform ing EU would be more readily accepted than an ill- 
performing Member State.
'EU perform ance' is strictly seen no monolithic signifier but can be divided into two 
dimensions: 'EU ' and 'perform ance'. It is in their interplay that the two became 
powerful. For respondents, a common  ambition (e.g., making 'the EU' a powerful 
player, improving 'the outward face of the EU' (M em ber State respondent)) and 
common  policy goals (e.g., what 'the EU' wants) were no longer subject to discussion, 
but presupposed:
You know, we came to Bali [COP-13] knowing exactly what we wanted, how we 
wanted it, how we wanted to get there ... we got just about everything we wanted 
and more than what we expected (Commission respondent, emphasis added)
I certainly felt that under the UK Presidency, we were able as the EU really to say, this 
is the outcome we want to the Montreal climate change conference. And we are 
going to talk to them and we are going to talk to them and we are going to bring it 
together. (Member State respondent, emphasis added)
At the same time, 'EU perform ance' had a disciplining effect, as a united EU and good 
performance came to be thought of as going together. A good EU performance 
required internal unity, and unity was closely associated with success. Conversely, 
discordance was associated with failure:
On the subject of climate change, the European Union was indeed very respected. 
And ... that of course kept developing in a positive manner the more we could show 
we act as one (Member State respondent)
We can only win when we are united (Member State respondent)
[About the 'failed COP' in The Hague] And I did not think that the European Union 
operated at its best at that time. Much discordance (MemberState respondent)
The EU can only negotiate effectively with the USA or with China when we are acting 
collectively and as one (Member State respondent)
We realised very early ... that we can only effectively communicate our positions to 
the outside when we really speak with one voice (Member State respondent)
It's been a gradual change, with more and more Member States realising that 
speaking with one voice is strengthening the position. (Member State respondent)
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Although EU performance was closely linked to notions of EU unity, the discourse it 
structured was flexible enough to integrate the separate parts, the M em ber States, as 
well. The parts were seen as quintessential in achieving the goal of the whole:
The climate negotiations have become very complicated. And ... I think that no one 
can raise ... all the expertise, all the personnel that is necessary to follow that. So we 
are condemned to join forces (Commission respondent)
We have huge resources, and we need to use them as a collective whole. (Member 
State respondent)
'EU perform ance' discourse and embedded practices hence are able to tam e the ever 
present tension in EU matters, nam ely that the EU is one consisting of many. They 
manage to integrate and to balance both unity and diversity; they depict them not as 
opposites, but as forces working in favour of one another.
In the respondents' views, this was the case for the new system of coordination and 
representation, as it allowed for more people to speak without challenging the overall 
impression o f'E U  unity'. In the current EU constellation, 'the parts' and 'the whole' are 
perceived to peacefully coexist or even mutually benefit one another. During the 
interviews, the respondents thought that the EU as a whole profited from what its 
parts had to offer:
[On the new coordination and representation system] That developed into a much 
more effective way of working. And overtime the EU prepared better in advance, and 
it pooled its resources. (Member State respondent, emphasis added)
The 'success story' of the 'EU perform ance' signifier, however, did not stop here. As 
boosting the EU's perform ance became a common  ambition, the perceived 
differences between M ember States became less relevant, and their conflict potential 
decreased.
This was arguably the case for the tensions between big and small Member State. As 
previously mentioned, respondents of 'big' M em ber States were eager to state that 
they renounced the single-handed approach of earlier tim es and that they were 
making genuine efforts to act as 'inclusive' and 'com m unitarian' as possible. Small 
M em ber State respondents, on the other hand, seemed to have put aside their 
suspicious attitude towards their big peers. W hile they had previously been anxious 
when big M em ber States potentially moved outside of marked EU terrain, their
interview statements indicated that they currently seem to be far more relaxed with 
sim ilar activities. This is striking since big M ember States are nowadays active in fora 
such as the G8, to which small M ember States are not even adm itted20. Nonetheless, 
small M ember State respondents asserted that distrust remains at a fairly low level:
[On climate change negotiations within the G8 framework] Some of the other 
Member States indeed have difficulty with it, because they say, we are not part of the 
G8. But I think, well, if this is instrumental to the process ... it so happens that we have 
very many converging positions with the UK, Germany and France in this domain, 
also with Italy ... . The fact that they do it [negotiate on climate change issues in G8 
fora] saves us time (Member State respondent)
Some ... think of course that the process [in G8 or MEM fora] is not transparent. But 
[UNFCCC] negotiations aren't either. Because it always starts off in a very transparent 
manner, everybody can talk about first steps. But at the end, decisions have to be 
made. And you always end up in the small rooms. There is nothing to be done about 
that. So what you have to do is to arrange for good representation ... . So if it's good 
for the process under the UN ... then we do not mind. On the contrary, we were very 
pleased with the role played by [Angela] Merkel [at the G8 summit] in Heiligendamm 
(Member State respondent)
The international environment group [the Working Party on International 
Environment Issues] meets on a regular basis. And that's where you have regular 
reports before and afterthe G8 meetings .... There's always also cautioning words by 
the small states vis-à-vis the big ones. They do have to inform them ... . It is perfectly 
clear what the EU position is in climate negotiations. Therefore, it is sufficient if the 
groups [the EU countries included in the G8] stick to the EU position. And they 
certainly do, you see? ... Notably, these are also the same big EU countries that have 
co-authored and supported these very EU positions. And if you thereby succeed ... to 
move other G8 states in a direction ... where you can use or integrate the lot for the 
UN negotiating framework, then that is good. I mean, you cannot negotiate 
everything in a circle of 180 or 193. (Member State respondent)
Against the backdrop of these statements, it can be argued that the way small 
M em ber States made meaning of big M ember State activities drastically shifted in the 
post-Hague era. Firstly, big M ember States were no longer generally suspected of 
representing their interests at the expense of the EU position. According to the
20 It is true that, in recent years, the Commission has been allowed to attend G8 meetings, just as the EU 
Presidency has. However, there is, for instance, no formal EU coordination within the G8.
statements, they enjoyed a certain leap of faith in this respect. Secondly, and maybe 
more strikingly, small M ember State respondents came to consider extra-EU moves 
as a necessity; they saw them  as a legitimate means to advance the common cause.
It's hard to be us -  EU identity processes
EU-US: Know your enemies?
The ascent of the 'EU perform ance' signifier may have ensured the developm ent of 
crucial chains of equivalence in EU discourse while it weakened chains of difference. 
This shift towards equivalence, however, could not have been as successful if a 
convenient outside  that worked as both catalyst and am plifier had not existed.
In international climate change politics, the EU was 'lucky' enough from the outset to 
have a promising candidate for the function of 'eternal opponent'. In 1989, at the 
Noordwijk Conference, the US refused to sign a declaration that aimed to reduce C0 2 
emissions (Oberthur, 1993: 25). Moreover, the US rejected an international line of 
action altogether. This attitude still had not changed by the tim e of the W hite House 
Conference in April 1990. Instead, both those involved in and those watching the 
conference felt that they were witnessing the emergence of what was to become the 
main axis for climate change politics in the decades to come. In the words of one 
respondent:
The two poles have always been the Europeans versus the Americans. And everything 
else was knitted around that. (Member State respondent, emphasis added)
At the tim e of the White House Conference, international climate change politics 
were quickly switching from a domain where actors discussed abating em issions to 
one where identities were, very publicly, in the making:
Especially against ... the American administration of Bush father it [climate change 
politics] had become a matter of profile. (Commission respondent, emphasis added)
In its opposition to climate change, 'the US' or 'the Am ericans' fulfilled the role of the 
EU's outside. In doing so, they were not just a simple 'other' as, for instance, 
developing countries were. The US was considered a genuine threat that endangered 
the European cause and its goals:
[On the initial discussion whether the EU should be admitted as party to an 
international climate regime] The Americans have always been very destructive, 
unconstructive, let me put it like that, on this question. Because whenever they could 
sort of throw some gravel into the machinery and make life more complicated, they 
did (Commission respondent)
In Brazil [during the UNCED in Rio in 1992] they also tried to play us off against one 
another... the usual game. That you speak separately to the French or the Germans 
or the English ... a negation of Community competence in this field (Commission 
respondent)
And the Americans of course made use of everything that could put our credibility at 
stake ... whether it was the [carbon] tax [see chapter 5] or other measures, whenever 
certain things inside the EU turned out weaker than expected or envisaged (Member 
State respondent, emphasis added)
The US still has a strong tendency to send messages to individuals rather than to the 
EU as a whole. And certainly does on occasions try to play a sort of divide and rule 
type of game. We've seen that in other fields as well as climate change of course. It's 
nothing new, that will not change. At least not as long as the current [Bush Jr.] 
administration is there, and my suspicion is, any future administration will also -  not 
necessarily have problems understanding the nature of the EU, but certainly continue 
to exploit the potential which is there. (Member State respondent)
The aim of this section is neither to judge the 'factualness' of these statem ents nor to 
decide whether the US 'indeed' had malicious intentions. It is, however, im portant to 
note that this is how respondents interpreted the situation. Respondents 'read' US 
actions as attem pts to negate the EU and to undermine EU unity. They perceived the 
actions as intrusions into their territory. EU M em ber States saw the US as destructive 
and as making life hard not only whenever possible (see notably the use o f'w henever' 
in the first and the third quote) but also on a quasi-structural basis ('the usual game', 
'nothing that will change').
However, EU unity as a sentim ent may never have been bigger, and it may never have 
been more self-understood than in accounts of how the EU had to overcome US acts 
of 'sabotage'. In being the outside, the US, at least tem porarily, clouded all of the 
issues on which 'the EU' among itself could not agree. Differences within the EU were 
simply 'covered over' when it came to the one fundam ental difference that was 
between the EU and the US.
In the light of this outside, the US, the EU invented itself as its positive negation. It 
became everything the US was allegedly not: acting in favour of a common good and 
choosing the side o f'th e  weakest', those who could not possibly defend them selves. 
In their interviews, respondents depicted the EU in term s that employ a strict 
good/evil separation:
Of course, we [the 'North'] were basically seen as having to be held to putting our 
own house in order first. And, you know, the EU said that all along whereas the US 
was not saying that. So to that extent we had good relations with the G77 (Member 
State respondent, emphasis added)
[On the 'victory' at COP-12 in Montreal, where agreement was reached to explore 
options for a post-2012 regime] what it proved was that the EU at its b e st... working 
with the developing countries, and, you know, other allies, could create that situation 
and that momentum where the US and Saudi Arabia had no choice butto back down. 
(Member State respondent, respondent's own emphasis)
The most obvious linguistic expression of the antagonistic relation between the EU 
and the US is the matter-of-fact use of the pronoun 'w e' for 'the EU' in contexts where 
both the EU and the US are mentioned:
[On American demands that the EU should explain how it possibly wanted to reach its 
targets] We always said, that's our business, none of yours (Member State 
respondent)
[On the current situation] It is no longer: how close shall we cuddle to the Americans 
(Member State respondent)
[On the current situation] We may be in need of the Americans with regard to certain 
points, but there are other points when America very much needs Europe. (Member 
State respondent)
Nevertheless, the impression needs to be avoided that the EU demarcated itself from 
the US deliberately and strategically to establish itself as 'a power' (whatever that 
m ay mean). Admittedly, it is perfectly conceivable that some EU actors in certain 
cases tried to exploit the situation. However, in this work the outside-inside relation 
between the EU and the US is seen first and forem ost as something that discursively 
presented itself as a reality for those involved and, as such, that it facilitated a distinct 
w ay of meaning making and identity formation.
When insides and outsides are no longer what they used to be
In any case, 'em bracing' the US as an outside was not always feasible. The 
adm inistration of George Bush Sr. was an easy target and offered the EU manifold 
possibilities to portray the US as conservative and environm entally hostile. The 
Clinton adm inistration, on the other hand, was more difficult to villanise. EU Member 
States found it difficult to uphold the picture of a som ewhat antiquated, narrow­
minded America, when its youthful, liberal president promised both a more 
multilateral approach to international politics and a more environm entally friendly 
course, the latter embodied by the US vice president, Al Gore.
With its outside gradually eroding, 'the EU' was increasingly at odds over the question 
of how to deal with and what to m ake o f  the US. W hereas the attitude of the Bush Sr. 
adm inistration had created enough concord in the EU to agree on a leadership role, 
the world in the Clinton era was much less black and white. To judge the US was 
difficult, given its public com m itm ent to 'the climate change cause', on the one hand, 
and its allegedly too soft stance on concrete mitigation measures, on the other. This 
ambivalence divided the EU:
So that was actually the biggest question within the EU, how do we deal with the US? 
Do we treat them hard, or do we precisely try to engage them. And sometimes this 
bore some friction (Member State respondent)
[On conflicts within the EU] That was ... triggered by the fact that, well ... with the 
unwilling Americans .... Of course there was a tendency saying the Americans have to 
be on board. So let's somewhat weaken our position ... . So ... tensions developed. 
And some indeed wanted to go further, make more compromises. Others didn't. 
(Member State respondent)
With difficulty, the EU tried to cope with an outside that no longer existed as such. 
The tensions this caused within the EU reached their apogee at COP-6 in The Hague.
At this COP, m em bers intended to solve the last outstanding issues from 'Kyoto' so 
that the protocol could be ratified and implemented. These issues, however, had been 
bottlenecks before, with the EU and the US positions, in particular, being at odds.
At that time, the 'outside' status of the US was more undecided than ever before. The 
2000 US presidential race had not yet re-emerged from the phase of judicial trial that 
it entered after counting ballots had not produced a new president. How much of an
outside the US was going to be depended on who the next president would be, and at 
that time, that question could not be answered.
If the US courts decided in favour of Al Gore, the United States would be led by one of 
the most public protagonists of climate protection. The EU would be confronted with 
a 'greener' America, an outside 'm ore inside' than ever before. However, how would 
the EU deal with such a US? Did the EU not have a moral duty to help this green 
president and the green America that he represented against the true outside  of 
climate sceptics, conservatives, and the oil and car industry? Did this not mean that 
the EU's way forward in The Hague was to be appreciative and accom m odating?
Even if the outside was again to become a real outside, as was expected with a Bush 
Jr. victory, an answer to how to deal with 'the Am ericans' was not straightforward. 
After all, in that case COP-6 could be the last chance to have Kyoto signed before the 
coming of the dark ages. Even if they came, the crucial question remained whether 
and to what extent the EU negotiation strategy needed to be conciliatory rather than 
conflictual.
To sum up, the situation that the EU faced was com pletely undecided, and this was 
intrinsically linked to the brittleness of the inside-outside relation. Confronted with an 
environm ent of increasing discursive fragm entation, EU unity fell apart. Iconic 
pictures and sound bites emerged from this process. When COP-6 ended without 
result, John Prescott, then leading the negotiations for the UK, openly displayed his 
anger at his EU colleagues. The latter had rejected a final com prom ise draft that the 
UK and the US had negotiated. A tabloid-filling feud followed between Prescott and 
Dominique Voynet, then environm ent minister of France, the country that held the 
Presidency at that time. The public rancour only fortified the impression among 
observers that the EU had sunk to its lowest level.
The diverging accounts of what had happened at The Hague underline the EU's 
fragm entation at the tim e. W hereas UK representatives were convinced that they had 
given their all to 'save Kyoto', their EU colleagues were far more critical of the UK's 
m anner of proceeding:
And at the ... end of the negotiations on the climate treaty, there was an impasse ... .
And who was awkward? ... the United States. And thus England went out and
negotiated a bit with the Americans in order to make sure there was an agreement.
Not on behalf of the European Union, but on its own account (Member State 
respondent)
John Prescott, the UK deputy prime minister ... tried, or at least we had the great 
suspicion, that he was isolating a deal with the Americans. (Member State 
respondent)
Michael Grubb and Farhana Yamin sum m arise the different interpretations as follows:
According to the British, the EU troika, led by the French minister Dominique Voynet, 
together with other key European ministers, agreed the deal negotiated by Prescott 
with the United States but then failed to defend it when it was put to the full group of 
EU ministers. According to European colleagues, the British never had any mandate 
to forge such a deal and the troika was lukewarm about its merits but agreed to take 
it to the full EU group to debate. The full group rejected the compromise as going too 
far, and for being incomplete and unclear. (Grubb & Yamin, 2001: 263)
Within months, however, the 'burden' of indecision that caused tensions in The Hague 
was taken off the EU. In January 2001, George W. Bush came into office. In April, he 
declared that, as far as his country was concerned, Kyoto was dead.
Within a short period, the outside again deserved its name. Even before this 
declaration of death, both EU politicians and EU media had questioned the new 
adm inistration's dem ocratic legitimacy. It was decried as the cabinet that was led by 
the 'toxic Texan', the 'President who bought power and sold the w orld' (Vulliamy, 
2001), and sacrificed climate change for filthy lucre ('Payback for the energy industries 
which backed him' (Vulliamy, 2001)). John Prescott stressed his unease about the new 
adm inistration's actions when he warned that the latter 'm ust know it cannot pollute 
the world while free-riding on action by everyone else' (Prescott, 2001).
Bush Junior's April statem ent pushed these critical tendencies to an even higher level. 
Perhaps more publicly than ever, outside and inside were 'spun' anew. Here 
'Am erican' lack of democracy, corruption, 'econom y before environm ent' attitude, 
and ruthless unilateralism -  there 'European' integrity, environm ental 
progressiveness, and com m itm ent to 'global', m ultilateral causes. If it were initially 
just the US president or just the US administration that was the target of European 
grievances, this nuance soon got lost. The offender was, in short, the US.
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In the light of the renewed US 'threat', EU unity and leadership again came to be seen 
as a necessity in both EU negotiating circles and the media. The Observer, for 
instance, claimed in its leader that the US was 'not fit to run the world'. The 
imperative for the UK was to 'help Europe take on the jo b ' and to 'fill the leadership 
void that the US is creating under its new President' (N.N., 2001b).
This attitude formed a common denom inator in meaning making in the months that 
followed. The EU was cast in the role of the 'green knight', who spearheaded a 
crusade to save the common good of climate for the benefit of all. EU 'm issions' went 
to key countries all over the globe to obtain a consensus on Kyoto. When global 
agreem ent was finally reached at COP-6bis in Berlin, in July 2001, the interpretation 
of officials and media was quasi-unanimous:
Particular praise is due to the European Union, which took the lead when others 
faltered. This was the EU at its best, acting with unified and determined purpose to 
achieve that which its component members, acting singly, could not' (N.N., 2001a, 
emphasis added)
It has been very clear where the leadership has been on this issue. (the former EU 
environment Commissioner Margot Wallstrom, cited in Houlder, 2001)
W ithin months, the EU's crusade had allowed the EU to 're-invent' itself as the 
legitimate leader of the climate change issue, against the US, and to spread the word 
on climate change more widely than ever before.
The impact of (post-)Hague events for the relations within the EU was just as 
remarkable:
The first thing that happened, only a couple of months later, was that Bush said, 
goodbye, we are not going to participate. Well, that was when ranks were joined 
again, so to say (Member State respondent)
For the EU some things have become easier after Bush wrote ... that he would no 
longer take part in the Kyoto process. Since, before that, you had different currents ... 
closing of ranks with the USA, we need to have them on board as the biggest polluter 
or ... a different line, the one that led to success in the end ... coalition with the 
weakest, the ones mostly affected, the developing countries. And ... bringing about a 
consensus there. And thus, the arrays of course were much clearer ... . You had a 
common object against which you could jointly demarcate ... . Your own differences 
... did no longer play a role because there was simply ... discontent on how the USA
had behaved ... and there was a positive vision ... we, a lot that otherwise was often 
difficult to organise, can make global history and we are going to shape this now for a 
change. And that finally succeeded. And that was, that was something very positive 
and elated people ... out of discontent there came this very positive force to go and 
shape things. And that worked beautifully. (Member State respondent, respondent's 
own emphasis)
However, an unsteady US was not the only problem the EU had to encounter. 
'Europe' struggled not only with an outside that was som etim es too much of an 
inside, but also with an inside that was too much of an outside. This renegade inside 
had a name: the UK.
The UK may have been the Member State that appeared most frequently in 
interviews with many respondents going into depth on what they perceived to be its 
singular nature. They depicted the UK, at least for the first years of international 
climate change politics, as the black sheep of the white EU herd:
In the beginning, they [the UK] were always a bit of the odd one out (Member State 
respondent)
They did not want to drift apart from the Americans (Commission respondent)
Sometimes they are called the fifth column of the Americans. (Member State 
respondent)
A num ber of respondents considered the UK as not really belonging to the EU, as 
standing apart from or even standing outside  of the EU core in this first phase. The 
UK, in this respect, was often seen as closely connected with the 'real' outside, that is, 
with the US. As the UK was often conceived of as a foreign entity within the EU, and 
as being close to the outside at the same tim e, it was som etim es regarded as a 
potential defector and thus as a threat to the EU:
[Alluding to the UK] There have always been Member States of which you assumed 
that they sent out signals in bilateral contacts ... with the Americans or others .... And 
then of course others tried to drive a wedge inside the EU. (Member State 
respondent)
In the above quote as well as in other accounts, the UK was depicted as a potential US 
infiltrator, as the Achilles heel of EU unity in the first phase of international climate 
change negotiations. Again, this interpretation is in no way 'natural' or 'logical'. Other
M em ber States, for instance, had sim ilar contacts with the US but were not subject to 
general suspicion.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, UK respondents saw things in a different light. They depicted 
the UK as an honest broker who tried to use its capacities and its supposed 'm iddle 
position' between the EU and the US to forge deals between the adversarial parties:
We always act as broker. Or try to act as broker between any set of parties (Member 
State respondent)
We have good relations and bilateral links with a lot of countries. So we can actually 
reach out quite well to countries like China and the US and so on. So I think we 
actually have quite a strong capability to broker and facilitate behind the scenes. 
(Member State respondent)
The idiosyncrasy with which the rest of the EU responded to the UK's 'single-handed' 
actions exposes the tensions that the UK's affinity with the US caused. This affinity 
was repeatedly displayed by UK politicians as they drew on the mantra of A nglo­
Saxon friendship. Emphasising the bonds between the US and the UK, however, 
com plem ented narratives on the UK's difficult relationship with the EU and 
aggravated the UK-EU relationship even more. For a long tim e in international 
climate change politics, the UK was an EU country that was obviously institutionally 
in, but historically and spiritually out.
The UK's undecided position exacerbated the ongoing process of EU identification. 
'EU ' as an em pty signifier seem ingly failed, as it was unable to integrate the UK and to 
establish 'European' as a shared identity. Against this backdrop, it was easier for the 
rest of the EU to re-think the UK as a kind o f  outside. In this way, at least, the EU 
identification screen could be upheld for the other, remaining EU members.
Still, this undecidedness caused frictions and climaxed in The Hague. In the weeks 
that followed, the EU seemed to be split into two lopsided camps: the UK, infuriated 
about the reluctance of an ideologically pig-headed EU to accept the deal it had 
negotiated with the US, and the rest of the EU indignant over 'yet another' instance of 
Anglo-Saxon conspiracy.
Particularly when considering the UK's difficult position within the EU, it is striking to 
see the developm ent that set in after the US announced its withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol. Judging from the interviews, it seem s that although the UK nowadays
still encounters more suspicion than other EU countries, the gap between the EU and 
the UK has virtually disappeared:
The English in the end also went along on those things. [They] also act more as ... one 
of the Member States now (Member State respondent)
The Brits came on board very well in the course of time. Well, when they had finally 
decided ... to be leader (Member State respondent)
I mean we try and do everything in a ... Community way (UK Member State 
respondent)
[About the US] It's a great sport, getting them in the corner ... there were two 
occasions in 2005, where we really put the Americans in the corner. And one was the 
meeting of the environment and development G8 ministers. Where we just cornered 
them into having to sign up to something. It was fantastic. And then the other one 
was the Montreal Climate Change Conference, where they had to back down. It was 
great. (UK Member State respondent)
The stark outside that the US provided during the years of the Bush Jr. adm inistration 
seem s to have facilitated two things. Firstly, the UK was readmitted to the EU team, 
and it defined itself, with the EU, as an environmental leader. Secondly, as clear from 
the last two statements, the UK, to a certain extent, became 'European' not only by 
playing by the EU rules, but also by sharing its outside. The UK thus joined the EU in 
being a leader against the 'laggard' that was the US. As Detlef Sprinz rephrases 
Michael Grubb's depiction of dynam ics in the post-Hague era:
[T]he UK was strongly torn between its traditional role as a mediator in transatlantic 
relationships and being a core member of the European Union, but it appears that it is 
now "one of the team, and an effective member" of the European contingent once 
the USA removed itself from the negotiation table. (Sprinz, 2001: 8)
It's good to be EU?
Interviewing EU key actors in the field of international climate change politics in 
2007/2008 was a rather rewarding task because all respondents basically enjoyed  
discussing what they did and what they did as 'the EU'.
To be sure, this does not mean that respondents painted a rosy picture of the EU as an 
'actor'. Respondents criticised the EU as being an inward-bound 'negotiating 
apparatus' (M em ber State respondent) to being 'very good at talking the talk, and 
very bad at walking the w alk' (Commission respondent). Despite this criticism, many 
respondents emphasised the common learning process  that they thought the EU had 
undergone and the im provem ents that had been made overtim e:
We can only win, if we are united ... And I think that, in this respect, The Hague has 
taught us a lot (Member State respondent)
The EU is really geared towards having continuity and maximum of preparation of 
what they're doing ... . And it's ... because we've been learning a lot (Commission 
respondent)
By the time I le ft... you got the feedback from other countries that the EU had largely 
got its act together. And it was much better at presenting its position (Member State 
respondent)
Within the different expert groups, it's not always the Presidency doing all the work. 
We get the other experts to do it .... Which is not something we did in 2000. So we've 
learned lessons since then. We had some good presidencies, we had some less good 
presidencies ... and I think we've particularly learned after some of the less good ones. 
What it is we should do. And I think we've got a system which now works. We 
continue to make it better (Member State respondent)
[There sometimes was] animadversion about the Union. That we had actually spent 
too much time to decide among ourselves on the position. And cared too little about 
what happened elsewhere. And thus tried too little to win others for our position. And 
that also is a little bit better balanced now (Member State respondent)
I think that cooperation has grown enormously over the years. I can remember the 
Europe of 15 ... well, even the Europe of 8 [sic!] ... where every comma was 
negotiated. And what you see now, partially due to the growth of Europe but also 
partially due to growing up, is that the coordination between the Member States is 
more focused on the major lines. (Member State respondent)
The most prom inent feature in the image that the respondents painted of the EU was 
not its weak points, but the shared experience of having successfully  worked on 
deficiencies and of being on the road towards ever more improvement. This was 
accom panied by a wide-spread sense of moving together, of closing ranks. From a DT
viewpoint, it is safe to say that the narrative of the 'com m on process of learning and 
evolving' has become an integral part in the formation of a common identity, 
especially since it is associated with the notions of leadership and success.
More than ever, being united, and being united as the EU, seem s the only way 
forward and a guarantee to make an impact:
The European Union then [in former times] acted much less as a block. If you 
compare that to now, with the Bali Conference, then that is completely different 
there (Member State respondent)
[On the post-2012 future] We very much want to negotiate as a block. And have a 
visibility on what is the commitment of the whole of the European Union post-2012. I 
do not think that in the international debate we will want to negotiate individual 
Member State targets. We will want a Union target which we will then have the right 
to share out. (Member State respondent)
The second statem ent is especially remarkable, given that whether there should be 
such a thing as an EU target had been a major point of discussion only ten to fifteen 
years earlier (see also chapter 5).
Two further aspects are of particular interest. The first is the sheer frequency and the 
taken-for-grantedness with which respondents -  be they from the Commission or 
from the M em ber States -  repeatedly spoke in term s of 'we', when they referred to 
the EU in current international climate change politics. The second is the vehem ence 
with which the respondents asserted their intention to serve the Com munity, to work 
to the benefit of the grand scheme:
I would say that in the field of international climate politics, when it comes to work ... 
we certainly have a role [within the EU] that exceeds our size. Because we are very, 
very active ... a supporting worker bee (Member State respondent)
Jacques Delors had a wonderful phrase ... he used to say, you know, the Commission's 
role is to be useful. And you boil the whole down, that's what it is (Commission 
respondent)
We always ... had to put the main emphasis on elaborating a good position for the 
European Union (Member State respondent)
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And we almost had a duty ... we had more people than most of the other countries, 
we had more people in the team. And therefore, you know, we always felt that we 
were doing a public service by putting all these people at the disposal of the EU. 
(Member State respondent)
Very explicitly, then, the respondents declared that the priority, internationally, was 
to ensure the well-being of the whole instead of the pursuit of individual interests.
It remains to be said that respondents widely perceived 'the EU' as something that, as 
an identification screen, had become rather attractive. The EU was depicted as 
progressive, ambitious, and respected by others. Respondents alm ost unanim ously 
shared the conviction that the EU was not only a driving force but also the leader in 
the field. To put it bluntly, the EU was sim ply better than others:
It's a much sleeker, better prepared organisation than ... any other group and also 
than many of the other countries in the negotiations (Commission respondent)
We are, despite all criticism, still betterthan others (EP respondent)
The EU claims to have the leadership role ... . Which I think we have, namely given 
that most of the proposals come from the EU, that we are actually the only ones 
pushing on all levels and setting a high standard of ambition. Which probably nobody 
else would do (Member State respondent).
A Europe that has strongly reflected on and knows what it wants to do after all is the 
key to the global organisation of the fight against climate [change]. We see very well 
that the others don't care a fig (Member State respondent).
Conclusion
Compared to conventional EIS literature, discourse theory and discourse analysis 
allow a more inclusive  picture of 'the EU' in the field of climate change politics. They 
consider accounts of com petence struggles between M em ber States and the 
Comm ission as a starting point ratherthan as a final result of analysis, as an explanans 
ratherthan as an explanandum.
As has become apparent in this chapter, 'reading' the EU in term s of competence 
struggles between M ember States and Commission is but one possibility of meaning
making and identity information in this respect. Although this pattern is rather 
dom inant among policym akers in the context of the mandate question, it is by no 
means necessary or natural. Alternative discourses exist, and these expose its 
contingency.
Beyond the mandate question, meaning making and identity formation have largely 
become dominated by the 'EU perform ance' signifier. Around this signifier, discursive 
chains have developed that have facilitated far-reaching institutional changes. A new 
coordination and representation system has limited the Presidency to an almost 
managerial task and has rendered institutional affiliation quasi-irrelevant. In this 
respect, the difference between Commission and M em ber State staff is largely 
irrelevant. At the same time, the new key signifier has a smoothening effect on the 
overall EU relations in the field of international climate change politics, as it calls on 
the responsibility, engagement, and capabilities of all EU actors. With unity as the 
new catchphrase, it also has a disciplining effect.
The big 'advantage' that the EU has had in recent years, however, is that all these 
developm ents have been enabled and fortified by the developm ent of a stable and 
rather stark outside. In a sense, without reference to this outside, the effective, 
unified EU sketched above would not be thinkable.
The EU was lucky enough to find a suitable candidate in the US for the function of 
outside. However, as has been pointed out, the EU suffered from a precarious balance 
between inside and outside throughout the nineties, and it was only with the arrival of 
the Bush Jr. administration that the balance stabilised. In recent years, the EU has 
enjoyed a more favourable constellation in this respect.
From this constellation, a narrative has developed that serves as a kind of common, 
small-scale imaginary. In alm ost classical Greek fashion, this imaginary includes 
antagonists, an odyssey and a catharsis. The common narrative among EU 
policym akers is that to overcome the hurdles posed by darker forces, the EU had to 
unite and that it has done so in a way that accounts for the success that it now enjoys. 
Rather than considering the Com m unity or the Commission a potential threat to 
M em ber State sovereignty, Member States have come to see the EU in international 
climate change as something that is attractive to identify with. In the coming years, 
an interesting pastime for researchers will be to observe to what extent this 
constellation is challenged or, in contrast, is allowed to settle further.

5. THE EU LEVEL
The fact that, from the start, the EU defined climate change as a trans-border issue 
also had an impact on politics on the EU level. The trans-border 'nature' of climate 
change suggested that it best be addressed by common Com m unity policies and 
measures. Hence, EU clim ate change politics m ainly revolved around the making of 
EU legislation in this area. It is in this context that processes of meaning making and 
identity formation have become most apparent.
From the broad range of legislative acts or proposals that could be linked to the issue 
of climate change, several stand out as 'salient' in both literature and the interviews 
that have been conducted. These were the failed proposal of a combined 
carbon/energy tax21 at the beginning of the 1990s; its 'substitute', the EU-wide 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS); and target setting in the context of both the 
Kyoto and of the post-Kyoto era.
After a brief historical overview and contextual introduction, this chapter investigates 
processes of meaning making and identity formation that accompanied these 
legislative activities. Starting with the proposal for a carbon tax, its discursive 
embedding is analysed, just as oppositional discourses are. These competing 
discourses passed through  EU institutions and M ember States, enabling the 
emergence of cross-loyalties, or even cross-identities. The competition between the 
various discourses was decided primarily by formal-institutional provisions. The EU- 
ETS is intriguing because it is a market-based instrum ent whose discursive 
embedding has differed from that of the carbon tax in crucial aspects. This discourse 
was so successful that opposing voices were ruled out, just as sovereignty 
considerations were. States have been increasingly willing to relinquish com petences 
in order to make the EU-ETS work. A sim ilar developm ent can be seen in the context 
of target setting. As emerges from the analysis, whereas target setting in the Kyoto 
context had been a states-only matter, in which state sovereignty was emphasised, 
target setting in recent years has become both a Com m unity and a Commission issue. 
This developm ent was stimulated and encouraged by M em ber States. Analytical 
findings are summarised in a short conclusion.
For brevity, the shorter, but admittedly less concise term 'carbon tax' shall be employed in the 
following.
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Historical overview
In putting the problem of climate change on the EU's political agenda, the EP was one 
step ahead of the Com mission, which is usually seen as the European agenda setter 
par excellence. Through a resolution in 1986, the EP called the Commission to take 
political action beyond the existing m easures on air pollution (Europäisches 
Parlament, 1986).
In the comm unication 'The greenhouse effect and the Com m unity' (COIVK1988) 656), 
the Com mission presented some initial suggestions on how the problem could 
possibly be addressed within the EU. Shortly before the UNCED, plans became more 
concise. In its docum ent 'A  Com m unity strategy to limit carbon dioxide emissions and 
to improve energy efficiency' (C O V (i9 9 2 ) 246), the Commission outlined a schem e of 
EU climate change policy that rested on four pillars. These included a programme 
stim ulating energy efficiency (Specific Action for Vigorous Energy Efficiency, SAVE), a 
program me advancing specific actions for greater penetration of renewable energy 
sources (ALTENER), and the implementation of a mechanism for monitoring CO2 
emissions and other greenhouse gases in the EU. The showpiece and fourth pillar was 
the proposal for an EU-wide carbon tax. Its introduction would have been a first in the 
EU, where tax matters were still exclusively dealt with on the V e m b er State level (for 
a detailed discussion, see Liberatore, 1995).
In the years that followed, this showpiece evoked 'some of the fiercest lobbying ever 
against an EU proposal' (Grant, Vatthew s, & Newell, 2000: 123). This was 
exacerbated by the legal provision that all EU legislation on tax matters was, and still 
is subject to a consultation procedure22. For the tax proposal to succeed, it needed the 
Council's unanimous vote. After a long process of withering away and unsuccessful 
attem pts at reanimation by the Com mission, the tax proposal died a rather silent 
death at the beginning of the new m illennium .23
22 As Neil Nugent describes it, the consultation procedure 'is a single reading procedure in which the 
Council is the sole final decision maker. However, it cannot take a final decision until it has received the 
opinion of the EP' (Nugent, 2003: 400).
23 It must be mentioned, however, that recent developments seem to indicate that the carbon tax is still 
alive or at least undead. In October 2009, the Commission 'floated the idea of im posing a tax on sectors 
outside the EU's emissions trading scheme' (Euractiv, 2009c). The reception of this renewed concept for 
an EU-wide carbon tax remains to be seen.
The failure of the tax proposal could not be compensated by the other com ponents of 
the original EU strategy. Underfunded and poorly im plemented, SAVE and ALTENER, 
for instance, achieved less than had been hoped for (Collier, 1997: 53; European 
Comm ission, 2000a: 4; Loske, 1997: 276; W agner, 1997: 330). In 1997, Jay W agner 
stated that '[s]ince 1992, EU climate change policy has been substantially watered 
down' (Wagner, 1997: 322).
In the meantime, in the run-up to Kyoto, the EU agreed to enter the international 
negotiations with a common em issions reduction target but to distribute this target 
to the individual M em ber States in unequal shares afterwards. In defending this 
contested decision, M ember States referred to different economic conditions and 
energy infrastructures in their countries. A scheme for distributing the common target 
was drafted both for the initial negotiating position of fifteen percent and for the 
target of eight percent that was finally agreed to in Kyoto.
Still, while reduction agreem ents had been reached in Kyoto, it was not clear how EU 
countries were to meet these targets in practice. At the end of the millennium, the EU 
was confronted with the fact that its emissions -  which had been decreasing until the 
mid-1990s -  were rising once again (Grubb & Hourcade, 2000: 241). For this reason, 
the European Climate Change Programm e (ECCP) was established in June 2000. The 
ECCP brought together 'stakeholders' such as representatives from the Commission, 
M em ber States, industry, and environm ental groups. As defined by DG Environment, 
the goal of ECCP was 'to identify and develop all the necessary elem ents of an EU 
strategy to implement the Kyoto Protocol' (see also European Com mission, 2000a: 6; 
European Commission, 2008a).24
One of the first policies advanced by the ECCP was the introduction of the EU-ETS. 
This action was remarkable because, for a long time, the EU had been reluctant to 
accept this mechanism, especially in international negotiations (Oberthur & Tanzler, 
2002: 321f). It viewed the emissions trading as part of a soft 'Am erican' approach.
W hereas the ETS as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol envisages emissions trading 
among countries, the EU-ETS focuses on emission trading between companies. The 
proposal for the introduction of such a schem e in the EU encountered no problems at
24 In 2005, ECCP II started. Its task is to review the results of its predecessor; in addition, it will focus on 
future policies and possibilities for carbon capture and storage, the inclusion of the transport sector into 
the ETS, and the issue of adaptation (Euractiv, 2008b).
the legislative stage, and it swiftly passed through the process of co-decision. The 
preparatory phase was also brief, and trade was launched in 2005.
Currently, the EU-ETS is in its second trading period. It includes large energy­
intensive plants that, taken together, account for forty percent of the EU's total GHG 
emissions. Incentives for trading, let alone reducing emissions, have so far been low. 
In both trading periods, the market has been overshadowed by the problem of over­
allocation, i.e., M em ber States assigning 'their' plants an overflow of emissions 
allowances.
To address this problem and to provide an overall EU strategy for the post-Kyoto era, 
the Commission presented its energy and climate package in January 2007. This 
package follows a maxim of '20/20/20 by 2020'. This means that the EU com m its to 
the three-fold target of
- reducing its overall GHG em issions to at least tw enty percent below 1990 
levels, or thirty if other major players follow suit and com m it to comparable 
reductions;
- reducing its energy consumption by at least tw enty percent through improved 
energy efficiency;
- increasing the share of renewables in energy use to an EU-wide average of 
tw enty percent.
According to the Commission, these targets shall be met by the year 2020.
To this end, the package includes policy proposals to overhaul the EU-ETS and to 
explore the possibilities of carbon capture and storage (CCS)25. In addition, it 
envisages a distribution of both the overall renewable target and the overall target for 
EU emissions that are not covered by EU-ETS26. These have been translated into 
concise national targets.
25 In the words of DG environment, CCS is 'a technique for trapping carbon dioxide as it is emitted from 
large point sources, com pressing it, and transporting it to a suitable storage site where it is injected into 
the ground' (Environment Directorate-General of the European Commission, 2009).
26 As summarised by Euractiv.com, '[s]ectors not covered by the ETS, such as transport, buildings, 
agriculture and waste, are to achieve an average GHG reduction of 10% by 2020. To achieve this, the 
Commission has set national targets according to countries' GDP. Richer countries are asked to make 
bigger cuts ... while poorer states ... will be entitled to increase their emissions in these sectors' 
(Euractiv, 2009a).
At the end of 2008, both the Council and the Parliam ent endorsed the energy and 
climate package. W hether the package will be sufficient for the EU to fulfil its 
com m itm ents internally or to assume a leadership role in future international 
emissions talks remains to be seen.
Carbon taxing
The tax that had it all
The proposal for a carbon tax was the project that dominated EU climate change 
policy-making in its infant years. Over the years, the project has mostly been linked to 
the idea of failure; it was seen as yet another EU policy disaster. This obscures the fact 
that, at its outset, the idea of introducing such a 'green tax' was alluring to many 
audiences. The proposal of the 'green tax' was not only endorsed in OECD circles 
(Zito, 2002: 245), but also had fervent supporters in the Commission, the European 
Parliament, and among M em ber States such as Denmark, The Netherlands and 
Belgium. In its heyday, only the unanim ity clause for tax issues circum vented the 
introduction of a carbon tax, with a large m ajority of M em ber States giving their 
approval. For its supporters, a carbon tax offered countless advantages:
President Delors supported the idea very much also because of the double dividend. 
You know, increase taxation on pollution in order to reduce social security 
contributions on labour. So this idea of double dividend was very much around 
(Commission respondent)
Europe has suffered from high costs, high taxes either directly on labour in some 
countries, or indirectly via high income taxes on earnings. And therefore we thought 
th a t... the whole core ofthat [idea of] sustainable development... would be to switch 
taxation from taxing labour to taxing resource use and emissions (Commission 
respondent)
Already in 1988 ... I started following the discussion [on a carbon tax]. The Heidelberg 
Institute in Germany had written some things ... . And I followed the international 
discussion that emerged about taxes. About a new instrument to, well, not to make 
environmental policy solely through command-and-control, but also through taxes ... 
. Energy ... can indeed be tackled more easily with a tax. (EP respondent)
The carbon tax was perceived as the epitome of a new breed of sm art policy 
instrum ents outdoing inflexible, old-fashioned com m and-and-control (see 
Jachtenfuchs & Huber, 1993: 47 for a similar argument). According to its supporters, 
the tax was convincing because it embraced and combined econom ically informed 
insights, such as the polluter pays principle and the internalisation of costs. The goal 
was to tax 'un-ecological' behaviour and to use the respective revenues to reduce 
labour costs. Therefore, the tax would create a win-win situation, with both economic 
and ecological advantages. As described in the discussions, it would pay a double 
dividend. Moreover, the tax was revenue-neutral; seen in its totality, it would hurt no 
one. In the words of one respondent:
This would be good for Europe in a broader context. Not just in an environment 
context, but in the whole economic development. And for common people ... they 
would not be taxed so heavily on their income, there would be more of an incentive to 
work, and less of an incentive to pollute. (Commission respondent)
In the light of all its advantages, supporters had difficulty in understanding how 
anybody could not want the tax.
By seeing econom y and ecology as interconnected, as m utually enhancing one 
another, the carbon tax was firm ly entrenched in a new kind of discourse that 
opposed the 'traditional' way of seeing economy and ecology as different and 
juxtaposed. As such, it shared the discursive ground of concepts such as sustainable 
developm ent and ecological modernisation.
A multitude of oppositions
Needless to say, the carbon tax idea was not positively received by everyone. After 
the tax failed, scholars quickly declared that sovereignty considerations had played a 
pivotal role in obstructing its introduction. They depicted 'the M em ber States' as the 
driving force behind the carbon tax's failure.
To give but two examples, it has been argued with hindsight that
the carbon/energy tax ... suffered as fiscal measures have been notoriously difficult to 
agree at the EU level, with the Member States keen to guard their sovereignty in such 
matters (Collier, 1997: 43)
and that
[t]he idea of a carbon energy tax has collided with the desire of Member States to 
retain control of fiscal policy. (Haigh, 1996:184)
Upon closer exam ination, however, it is difficult to 'locate' opposition against the tax 
in this manner, as the pro-tax discourse was attacked from several different angles, 
whose only equivalence lay in rejecting the concept.
To start with, the carbon tax was embedded in a discourse that linked econom ic to 
ecological advantages. This discourse, however, competed with more traditional 
discourses that regarded econom y and ecology as rivals in a zero-sum game. The 
carbon tax, hence, was not unanim ously seen as benefiting both. On the contrary, 
parts of all EU institutions and Member States primarily considered the carbon tax as 
a threat to econom ic competition.
Moreover, the advocates of the carbon tax had presented it as an economic 
instrument, as opposed to a classical state-dom inated approach. According to some 
opponents, however, a carbon tax was still a tax, and therefore, from a neo-classical 
point of view, a crude exam ple of statism. As one respondent described the response 
in the UK government:
They went through their normal performance ... they were going, it's a tax, it's a tax. 
(EP respondent)
A tax thus seemed to contradict what Tim O'Riordan and Elizabeth Rowbotham 
describe as the policy preferences in the UK government at the time:
belief in the market, minimal state intervention except where socially or structurally 
justified, privatization of the economy, deregulation and freedom of consumer choice 
based on information, guidance and limited regulatory interference. (O'Riordan & 
Rowbotham, 1996: 230O
As can be concluded from the last paragraphs, several different discourses motivated 
the opposition against a carbon tax. For advocates of the tax, however, the true 
threatening outside indeed consisted of those who rejected the tax due to 
sovereignty considerations. As much as it seemed feasible to integrate other 
opponents and opposing discourses (for instance, those discourses that also relied on 
econom ic signifiers), this seemed out of the question in this case:
the UK ... said, well, maybe we will introduce a tax, but on no account do we want 
Brussels to impose an obligation to introduce such a tax on us ... . They have 
ideological blockages with regard to certain subjects. And for them ... fiscal 
subsidiarity, well, that is ... they cling to it convulsively (Member State respondent, 
emphasis added)
[On those opposing the carbon tax] I think it was a bit of an unholy alliance between, 
on the one hand, particularly Spain. Which was afraid that because they were lagging 
behind on economic development, that such a tax would hit them in their efforts to 
catch up with the others. And then there was the UK opposition, which was rather 
ideological, that they didn't want any taxation issue to be dealt with at the EU level. 
Because that would create a precedent for other taxation issues. Which they strictly 
wanted to maintain as national competence. (Commission respondent, emphasis 
added)
Sovereignty considerations were seen as part of an ideological, irrational discourse 
that could not be integrated through 'rational' reasoning or consensus. Expressions of 
this discourse were entirely rejected by tax supporters, who, however, showed 
considerably more understanding when it came to more 'econom ic' anti-tax 
discourses. Cohesion states, for instance, quite persistently tried to circum vent or at 
least delay the introduction of the tax. They pointed to their right of retrieving 
econom ic developm ent. Their reservations were judged as natural and legitimate:
Portugal and Spain of course were a bit reserved [on the matter of a carbon tax] 
(Commission respondent, emphasis added).
Rejecting the tax because of sovereignty considerations, on the contrary, meant 
placing oneself outside  of reason, of rationality. In the interviews, fears of sovereignty 
loss were linked to ideology and dismissed as an UK peculiarity that no other Member 
State shared. As such, the picture of a core EU was upheld, an EU that shared 
common ground but stood against the UK, the notorious, potentially disruptive 
outside element. Othering the UK in this m anner was not a sport exclusive to 
'Brussels' or to the Commission, in particular; it was something that even 'fellow' 
M em ber States engaged in, as they blamed the UK for acting in an idiosyncratic and 
anti-com m unitarian manner.
'Reading' the story of the carbon tax as a further exam ple of com petency skirm ishes 
between EU institutions and EU M ember States omits crucial aspects of meaning 
making in this context. It obscures the fact that different discourses were underlying
the opposition to the tax and that meaning making and identity formation in this 
situation were not as straightforward as most scholarly accounts suggest. Sovereignty 
considerations, for instance, did not unite M ember States, but mainly distanced the 
UK from the rest. Considering that other states openly favoured this tax, it may also 
be argued that, for a num ber of M ember States, having a Com m unity-wide tax simply 
did not equal forsaking sovereignty in the first place. A common, intrinsic Member 
State interest in upholding sovereignty thus did not exist in this context.
Green loyalties
Other considerations also suggest that we cannot speak of a monolithic Member 
State interest when referring to the carbon tax issue. Carbon tax rejection was mostly 
embedded in discourses in which signifiers such as sovereignty or statehood did not 
play a significant role. Similarly, none of these signifiers dominated processes of 
identity formation. Schisms did not heed the lines of institutional affiliation. Instead, 
they were passing through  individual M ember States, through  the Comm ission, and 
through the EP:
Directorate General II [Economic and Financial Affairs] was interested [in promoting 
the carbon tax] at a certain point. I do remember that. The internal market people 
were not interested at all (Commission respondent)
We had big, big fights in the political groups ... some of the industry and the coal- 
trade unions tried, in the socialist group, to weaken this ... some Dutch colleagues 
who will remain nameless, who were close to the oil and chemical industry started to 
cause trouble ... in the EPP. (EP respondent)
From both statements, a notion of the differences emerges that existed within what is 
often seen as 'the' Commission and 'the' EP. Judging from these statements, the issue 
of sovereignty was irrelevant in this context. The main antagonism involved a pro-tax 
discourse that connected econom y and ecology and an anti-tax discourse that 
regarded these two concepts as opposites. This antagonism fostered identity 
formation especially on the part of tax supporters, who increasingly came to think of 
them selves as progressive forces within their institutions. As progressives, they 
considered it their task to overcome stubborn and old-fashioned traditionalism  and its 
disbelief in a fruitful and feasible econom y/ecology symbiosis:
We saw ourselves as pioneers, also within the Commission ... . With all tricks possible 
did we try to further environment policy ... . There was a complicity between the 
people involved. We had the feeling that we are the first generation who really 
advances this in the Community ... . And we were also seen by the usual Commission 
as a clique of progressives (Commission respondent)
The Environment Committee in those days ... had a huge esprit de corps. Because we 
were actually inventing environment policy on the back of single market policy with 
almost no opposition. (EP respondent)
In both accounts, the sense of being progressive and part of an environm ental avant­
garde is prominent. It may not then come as a surprise that perceivably like-minded 
Comm ission and EP representatives (m ostly from DG Environment and the 
Environm ent Com mittee) found each other in o rd erto  join forces:
There were suppers in Brussels. Four, five times a year? ... different people would 
come each time. But there were always some Commission officials, some NGOs and 
some members of the Environment Committee. And they were very exciting. 
Because people would say: hey, I've thought of another thing we can do ... they were 
immensely creative exercises. (EP respondent)
Thus, as antagonism s were 'criss-crossing' what are usually considered monolithic EU 
institutions and actors, they facilitated the developm ent of what could be termed 
cross-loyalties or even cross-identities.
It could be claimed that the 'conspiracy' between the two EU institutions in the 
context of carbon taxation partially confirm s conventional EIS assum ptions; after all, 
the Commission and the EP joined forces. This, however, misses two points. Firstly, 
we cannot speak here of the Parliam ent and the Commission in their entirety, but 
only of their 'environm ental avant-garde'. Secondly, their declared line of attack was 
not to 'seize M ember State com petences' but to make progressive policy against the 
conservative forces in the EU. As such, they often had the same institutional affiliation 
as their opponents.
W ithin their institutions, the respondents perceived them selves as Davids, a minority 
fighting against the Goliaths of narrow-minded economism:
[On the main concern within the Commission] Internal market, internal market, 
internal market. That was the priority. The environment ought not to disturb the 
circles of those who really work in the core area (Commission respondent)
The non-environmentalists in the [parliamentary] groups were very suspicious of 
what these dangerous bearded environmentalists would do. So we had real fights in 
the groups. (EP respondent)
The sense of being avant-garde was hence clearly and strongly linked to the notion of 
being an underdog  within one's own institution. 'Environm entalists' were alienated 
from  their institutions, which no longer provided the main screen of identification. In 
union with environm entalists from  other institutions, however, these underdogs 
found a new identificational home.
From respondents' accounts, we can see that these kinds of cross-loyalties and cross­
identities also existed between 'progressive' parts of M em ber States and their 
counterparts in the Commission. These loyalties were not specifically bound to the 
carbon tax issue, but to environmental politics in general:
The Commission has actually always been a [green] driver, too. Throughout all this 
time ... it has been a partner... a real partnerfor us (Member State respondent)
I think that the differences between individual resorts [within a Member State] are 
bigger than the one between the Commission and us [the environment ministry of a 
Member State]... if it is about contents. (Member State respondent)
At tim es, being green indeed seemed more crucial than being a (M em ber) state in 
shaping decisions in the context of the carbon tax. In Decem ber 1994, the Essen 
Sum mit dealt a serious blow to the Com m unity-wide introduction of the tax. As EU 
ministers realised that the chances of the proposal overcoming the unanimity hurdle 
in the near future were minimal, they concluded that those M ember States that 
wished to go ahead with the carbon tax on a national basis should be able to do so, 
and the Commission would provide a basis of common parameters. In response, a 
group of self-perceived green and progressive M em ber States declared that they 
would move forward on their own. By forming a 'top group' in the EU, they aimed to
find out ... in the fiscal field ... how you could move a few steps. (Member State 
respondent)
Moreover, several M ember States supported by the Commission even tried to alter 
the formal-institutional frame itself, and urged for the Am sterdam Treaty, which then 
was still under preparation, to 'exclude the eco-tax from the principle of unanimity'. 
(EP respondent)
To many M ember States, or to many actors within the M em ber States, being green 
was hence more im portant than clinging to whatever concept of sovereignty and 
statehood that they had. In the second half of the nineties, this did not facilitate a 
constellation in which M ember States were opposing the Com mission but one in 
which 'environm ental progressives' were opposing the rest.
When frozen discourses melt
Despite its common or individual efforts, the cross-institutional front of tax 
supporters could not prevent the carbon tax from failing. After the Essen Summit, the 
Comm ission drastically changed the proposal and made the introduction of the tax 
voluntary for singular Member States. Pro-tax MEPs tried every manoeuvre possible 
to keepth e legislative proposal on the agenda:
Normally, parliamentary reports lapse at the end of a parliamentary session. And 
uniquely we managed to prolong ... [the carbon tax] report into the next Parliament 
with the same rapporteur. (EP respondent)
Yet, the 'top-group' of environm ent-m inded, tax-eager M em ber States slowly fell 
apart. Additionally, with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the idea of 
introducing emissions trading in the EU became more accepted, and DG Environment 
re-directed its energies accordingly. In Decem ber 2001, the Com mission officially 
w ithdrew the last proposal for a carbon tax.
Although the sovereignty signifier was only one among several key signifiers that 
'headed' discourses opposing the introduction of a carbon tax, it played a crucial role 
in deciding the issue. Its advantage was that it was 'frozen', i.e. that it was part of a 
sedimented discourse embodied in the legal unanim ity requirem ent for tax matters. 
W hich discourse finally prevailed was then not a matter of the pervasiveness and 
'success' that the discourses had attained among the actors. The sovereignty 
discourse derived its impact m ainly from its legal entrenchment. This entrenchm ent 
meant that the discourse was difficult to 'tackle' by other discourses that might even 
have been more popular at the time:
And while the eco-tax ... made a lot of sense, and was very well prepared, it dropped 
back on the unanimity for tax matters. The decisive moment in that discussion, and in
decision-making, had nothing to do with the Member States internally supporting the 
concept. But just with the mechanics of policy-making (Commission respondent)
A C0 2 tax is probably the most intelligent manner to tackle the issue ... But you need 
unanimity ... in the Council.... But you cannot bring about this unanimity. Today even 
less than in formertimes. So this instrument... is discarded. (EP respondent)27
Overall, it can be argued that the dividing line throughout the discussions on the 
carbon tax only partially  reflected sovereignty considerations. Consequently, the issue 
only partially  juxtaposed the EU institutions and the M em ber States. Instead, the 
main com peting discourses revolved around the relation between ecology and 
economy, and identity was strongly formed along this line. In opposition to a 
'conservative' outside, 'environm entally progressive' M ember States or parts of them 
formed an inside with like-minded parts of the Commission (especially DG 
Environment) and parts of the EP. It is the irony of the carbon tax story that it was not 
decided in these term s but through the intervention of a frozen, and in this case 
'defrosted', discourse.
Emission trading
Love at umpteenth sight
Even though the idea of a carbon tax lingered on the EU's political agenda until the 
late nineties, legislative progress in the area of climate politics and policies came to a 
halt. This only changed when the Commission presented the proposal of what was to 
become the EU-ETS.
The idea of an ETS first appeared on the international level. There, the USA had 
advocated it as an instrum ent for the Kyoto Protocol, and it, in fact, became one of 
Kyoto's three flexible mechanisms. After Kyoto was signed in 1997, its ETS became a 
subject of imitation. In 2000, the Commission wanted to initiate a discussion on the
27The case of the carbon tax, however, also shows the logical cracks inherent in both the sovereignty 
discourse and its embodiment in the unanim ity principle. It is, for instance, rather inconsistent to argue 
that Member State sovereignty is defended by this principle when the principle itself prevents a 
proposal from being adopted despite the support of a large number of Member States.
introduction of a similar mechanism within the EU and presented a green paper28 'on 
greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union' (European 
Comm ission, 2000b). However, at that time, three of its M ember States: Denmark, 
The Netherlands, and the UK, had already made attempts to install their own nation­
wide system (see also Veenm an & Liefferink, 2005).
This situation would have been unthinkable only a couple of years earlier. When the 
US delegation first put em issions trading on the COP negotiating tables, EU reactions 
were far from enthusiastic. In the words of an MEP,
[w]e were told something strange about something called emissions trading ... we 
were told that emissions trading is a dangerous American right-wing market 
mechanism. And good Europeans couldn't possibly be in favour of it. (EP respondent)
Hence, as soon as it emerged on the international level, the idea of em issions trading 
was subjected to the dom inant discursive logics. For Europeans, it was a non- 
European, an American instrument. As such, it was infused with and emblematic for 
all that was different and considered to be problematic about 'the US'. ETS was 
regarded as too soft from a regulative point of view, while at the same tim e being too 
friendly towards business (see also A. C. Christiansen & W ettestad, 2003: 4).
Gradually, however, this constellation shifted, and the 'Am erican-ness' of the ETS 
moved to the background. This was facilitated by the complete US withdrawal from 
the international climate change arena. What moved to the fore was the scheme's 
'm arket' aspect instead. The scheme fitted increasingly well with altered conceptions 
of what made 'good' policy, which were propagated by 'N ew Public M anagem ent' and 
sim ilar schools of thought. In the course of the nineties, regulation-based approaches 
generally became decried as 'com m and-and-control' and came to be seen as 'rigid' 
rather than solid (see for instance Sbragia, 2000: 294). They were regarded as 
deterring business (which had to be on board if a policy was to succeed), and as 
allowing state interventions where a market would quasi-autom atically have led to a 
maxim um of cost-effectiveness.
28 The EU glossary describes green papers as 'docum ents published by the European Commission to 
stim ulate discussion on given topics at European level. They invite the relevant parties (bodies or 
individuals) to participate in a consultation process and debate on the basis of the proposals they put 
forward. Green Papers may give rise to legislative developments that are then outlined in W hite Papers' 
(European Communities, n.d.).
The Commission set the first steps towards an EU-ETS with its green paper. Intended 
as an opening for a discussion on such a scheme, the docum ent embedded EU-ETS 
into a discursive web of largely 'econom ic' signifiers. The basic claim was that the EU- 
ETS would enable the EU to meet the Kyoto targets in the most cost-effective way; in 
addition, it would provide 'incentives to invest in environm entally sound technologies' 
(European Commission, 2000b: 4).29
The necessity to have a Com m unity-wide approach was sim ilarly advocated. Such an 
approach was needed 'to ensure competition is not distorted within the internal 
market'. In addition, '[t]he wider the scope of the system, the greater will be the 
variation in the compliance of individual companies, and the greater the potential for 
lowering costs overall' (European Commission, 2000b: 10).
The EU-ETS shares several traits with its unfortunate predecessor, the carbon tax. 
Both were presented as new approaches and as more auspicious than their 'outdated' 
com m and-and-control counterparts. The idea of a double dividend combining both 
ecologic and econom ic benefit is also inherent in both. Moreover, both operate with 
concepts that were inspired by or taken from economics.
In other contexts, however, the EU-ETS and the carbon tax differ greatly. Firstly, 
although the idea of a carbon tax explicitly drew on econom ic theory, it was often 
associated with the notion of blunt state intervention. As opponents of the tax 
argued, it would have been 'the state' or one of its authorities that would have 
collected the tax. Furthermore, decisions on how to (re)distribute revenues would, 
again, have been the state's prerogative. The EU-ETS, in contrast, was and still is 
associated with the 'sm art' and 'sm ooth' logic of the market mechanism. As the 
market idea gained the favour of more and more policymakers, the EU-ETS had the 
definite asset of looking like a state-of-the-art policy instrum ent that promised self­
regulation and  a maximum of cost-effectiveness. This made it alluring to a variety of 
policym akers, e.g. in the Commission:
29 As Atle Christer Christiansen and J0 rgen W ettestad point out, '[t]he argument most often raised in 
favour of emission trading ... is that it promises to reduce emissions at a lower cost compared to what 
can be achieved using other policy instruments. According to a body of economic literature and 
practical experiences from S 0 2 allowance trading under the US Clean Air Act Am endm ents of 1990, the 
benefits of ET owes largely to adding flexibility in terms of when and where emission reductions are to 
take place' (A. C. Christiansen & W ettestad, 2003: p.5).
I believe that you d o n 't... achieve environmental goals easily unless you involve the 
market place. The market place is far more powerful than, you know, three or four 
companies or five ministers or so. (Commission respondent)
The EU-ETS and the carbon tax also differ in how  they depict the symbiosis of ecology 
and economy. In the case of the EU-ETS, speaking of a sym biosis at all is exacerbated 
by the fact that, at a closer look, ecology is sim ply transform ed into  economy. It 
becom es yet another area of trade and is then no longer a real priority of policy but, 
rather, a by-product.
Consequently, the impetus behind the EU-ETS was no longer primarily linked to the 
notion of environmental avant-garde or to the promotion of new policy instruments 
to the benefit of higher ecological goals (as had been the carbon tax). The discourse in 
which the EU-ETS was embedded was dominated by the signifier of cost- 
effectiveness, nothing more and nothing less.
Lack of opposition
Given the widespread support that the idea of the EU-ETS enjoyed, it seem s that, 
other than in the case of the carbon tax, no major internal battles were fought in the 
EU. This, however, is only partially true, although it must be said that disputes never 
attained the level of fierceness that the carbon tax discussions did.
One of the advantages of the EU-ETS was that it discursively integrated part of the 
carbon tax opposition. Carbon tax opponents who basically objected to the idea of a 
tax as a blunt state instrument could easily 'fall for' the ETS, as it seemed to be fully in 
line with Chicago School books. The ETS was grist for the mill, especially in countries 
where the market idea enjoyed a wide popularity in policy-making:
I mean the difference between an emissions trading scheme and a specific regulation 
is generally that, within an emissions trading scheme, you define the outcome you 
want and you leave up it to them [business] how they get there in the most economic 
way. Whereas if you regulate, you say, you must do this and you have no choice about 
it. So from a strictly economic point of view, the UK has always preferred sectional 
targets. And looking for the most economically rational way of getting there. 
(Member State respondent)
However, not everybody was quick to embrace the ETS and the underlying discourse. 
In some countries, this discourse had not yet become hegemonial but competed with 
discourses that linked meeting environm ental goals to 'hard' state action:
Germany was the worst. Germany had a tradition of technical ... standards and 
regulation. So, the last hurdle was really Germany. The French were not so much in 
favour of a market-based instrument, but they saw the tax was not working. So the 
rest of Europe saw the tax was not working. But Germany was quite, was quite 
difficult. I mean, there was a basic distrust that a market instrument would work. And 
we knew it from the beginning ... . And it was very, very difficult to get the industry 
moving and to get the chancellor moving. And the vote of the Parliament between 
German MEPs was completely split. Half was in favour, half was against. In all parties. 
(Commission respondent)
Hence, as the discursive hegem ony in the EU changed, so did the 'cast' of the inside 
and the outside. Germ any and the UK switched roles in this regard. It was no longer 
the UK, but G erm any that was the odd one out within the EU. It became the country 
that was thwarting the common climate change policy from progressing. To see the 
market approach as the most promising way to advance EU climate change policy had 
become truly hegemonic: doubting it was associated with backwardness and 
irrationality.
When sovereignty does not matter
Sovereignty considerations are striking by their absence in interview statements and 
literature on the EU-ETS. Even in its first 'practice' phase (2005-2007), the EU-ETS 
schem e covered a considerable number of large industrial installations. It could 
therefore have been considered an attem pt by 'Brussels' to intervene in national 
energy policy. As energy policy is still considered a M em ber State prerogative, the 
EU-ETS could even have been regarded as a ruse to secure more control or 
com petence over what used to be M em ber States' business. Until now, however, no 
such allegations have been levelled against the Parliam ent o rth e  Commission.
To be sure, several Member States and the Commission have had disagreements. 
These, however, concerned less principled questions, such as the definite design of 
the ETS. The UK, for instance, which already had a national system in place, was
reluctant to join the EU scheme. Respondents, however, hardly depicted this 
reluctance in term s of sovereignty or com petence struggles:
Well, the UK had a system ... we learned a lot from the UK system, because it was so 
complicated ... . And so our concept is lighter. It's opener... . In the beginning, there 
was a problem with the UK. They thought, we have our own system and, you know, 
you have now your system. But after a year they switched around. And industry in 
particular saw that our solution was much more workable. And for the subject we are 
talking about, in the beginning, the UK strongly believed in a UK market. But... when 
you have a market, you have to have a good size of the market. And they also saw, 
the UK is too small ... . And now we see that the success of the ETS was that it was 
European-wide (Commission respondent)
The UK publicly was very sceptical about the EU-ETS, because they had their own EU- 
ETS which they elaborated together with their industries through a big stakeholder 
consultation exercise. So ... publicly they were very reluctant to set that aside. And 
replace it with what we were doing at the EU level. But unofficially ... a lot of the UK 
people working on the UK-ETS were very dissatisfied with what they considered to be 
a not so very good system (Commission respondent)
We were using that [the UK-ETS] as a, you know, an experimental model. And trying 
to get the EU to learn from ... some of our experiences. Because we worked it out with 
industry. And the first attempts of the European trading scheme were much too 
officially led, government led. Without full involvement of the industry ... . And also 
too prescriptive, in my view ... it's not the way we did it. We almost let industry design 
most of the scheme. And we kept back the regulatory part (UK Member State 
respondent)
And the UK in particular didn't want a compulsory scheme because the way we had 
designed the UK emissions trading scheme was as a voluntary scheme. And we had a 
political point of view that that was the better way forward. (UK Member State 
respondent)
The decisive schism here was not between sovereignty and co m m u n icatio n ; 
differences stayed within the overall discursive frame of the ETS. The UK respondents 
indicated that they mostly struggled with what was seen as still too much regulation, 
too much state. The Commission respondents, on the other hand, did not accuse the 
UK of anti-com m unitarian behaviour or anything similar. Their basic reproaches were 
that the UK system did not w ork efficiently, as it lacked the sim plicity needed and as it
had a problem of scale. The latter argum ent seems to have found supporters 'even' 
among UK respondents:
I think, yes, there are many policies that can be put in place by national governments, 
but at the European level it's quite important that we see policies like the EU 
emissions trading scheme, that applies across the whole of Europe, driven forward. 
Because this is very much a Europe-wide issue. (UK Member State respondent)
Member State self-curtailment
It could be asserted that sovereignty was not an issue in this context because de fa cto  
M em ber States were still retaining control. Ultimately, M ember States them selves 
decided, and still decide, upon the allocation of emissions rights in their territories in 
their National Allocation Plans (NAPs). In the latter, M em ber States them selves 
determ ine the total quantity of allowances to be issued -  the cap -  and how this 
quantity is allocated to the concerned installations (European Comm ission, 2008b).
This argum entation, however, neglects the gist of developm ents that the EU-ETS has 
undergone over the years.
Already in the first Commission proposal, the right to decide on national allocations 
was assigned to M ember States. In doing so, the Commission was responding to the 
dem ands of M em ber States such as the UK and Germany. Not all M ember States 
agreed, however. Some of them  opposed individual decisions on allocations from the 
beginning and pleaded to agree on a central cap:
The French said, this is the market, this is Europe, let's have it Europe-wide, within the 
internal market, the same system (Commission respondent)
We would have liked the first period, 2005-2007, to have a much more ... harmonised 
approach than we g o t... . We would have liked much stronger harmonisation of the 
system, we pushed for it. We pushed for annexes in the directive, which would at least 
harmonise the way that allocation rules would be agreed ... and we were unhappy 
that that was not given (Member State respondent)
It's what we wanted already back then, in the first draft of the directive, as much 
harmonisation as possible. But that didn't work. (Member State respondent)
To accom m odate such concerns, the first Commission draft included common criteria 
that M em ber States needed to consider in drafting the NAPs. Nevertheless, worries 
were expressed that these criteria were too few and too soft to prevent Member 
States from over-allocating, that is, from granting 'their' industries too many emission 
rights. The major concern was that over-allocation would distort the market and block 
its mechanisms. This would result in ineffectiveness, or, to put it bluntly, in market 
failure.
Consequently, even before trading was officially inaugurated, the establishm ent of a 
'supervisory body' was promoted. As M em ber States them selves were deemed to be 
partial and only interested in advancing their interests, som ebody else needed to be 
found for the task:
We did say, it is the European Commission, the European Commission, which must 
approve of National Allocation Plans. And not the Member States themselves, simply 
because we were afraid that the Member States would grant their own industry too 
much ... . It is very important that the Commission has the last word ... we said, ok, 
then we can live with it, because that way a realistic system will develop. (EP 
respondent)
The final directive indeed established the Commission as the controlling body in the 
EU-ETS. During the first phase, however, it seemed uncertain whether common 
criteria and a 'w atchdog' Commission would be enough to ensure that the scheme 
worked:
Actually, the ... first phase of emissions trading ... was not about reduction at all. 
Because the Member States all handed in allocation plans in which they put down the 
emissions of the year before, or the average of the three years before, I think ... 
already, you saw that the Member States tried to keep some space for economic 
growth. So they wanted some leeway for new companies coming to the country ... . 
Whereas the intention was that you ... have a limit. And when you had new 
companies in the sector, that you then had to re-allocate. You see? It is a question of 
re-allocation. But that did not happen. (Member State respondent)
Shortly before the NAP subm ission deadline for phase two in May 2006, there were 
reports that, during the first phase, several EU countries had emitted far less than 
they had expected in their NAPs. As this indicated the prospect of a large surplus of 
tradable emissions permits, their prices plummeted. The verdicts were virtually 
unanimous:
UK environment minister Ian Pearson said "the results across the EU do raise 
questions about the stringency of the caps in some Member States". "I will be 
encouraging the Commission to use this information to improve the enforcement of 
tough caps for Phase II so that the scheme provides the appropriate incentives for 
investment in clean technology".
Most market analysts cited by Bloomberg news agency agree that over-allocation is 
the main reason why most EU countries fell short of planned quotas. "It's clear that 
most countries were too generous when handing out allowances," said David Foster, 
head of emissions and weather derivatives at Calyon, part of Credit Agricole SA. 
"There's no doubt [EU countries] had an incentive to exaggerate emissions," said Per 
Lekander, an analyst with UBS AG in London.
For environmental groups, the data brings confirmation that EU Member States 
have "abused the Emissions Trading System" by granting their industries "far too 
generous carbon emissions allowances in the period 2005-07". (cited in Euractiv, 
2006c, original emphasis)
'The' M em ber States were thus associated with and blamed for the quasi-crash of the 
market. Their supposed state interests were considered as providing a structural 
incentive for m arket-harming behaviour even in the future, if not restrained. In brief, 
state interest was the forem ost culprit for market failure. Sovereignty, in turn, came 
to be seen as a probable threat to the overall aim of cost-effective policy-making.
When confronted with the NAPs for the second phase, the Commission decided to 
return the m ajority of them for revision. It argued that, in their original versions, these 
NAPs would again lead to over-allocation. However, 'in order to have the ETS 
operating effectively  we need scarcity in the m arket' (Com m issioner Stavros Dimas, 
cited in Euractiv, 2006b, emphasis added).
Several M em ber States, especially the 'new ' ones, protested against the 
Com m ission's intervention. Poland and Estonia took legal action. The m ajority of 
M em ber States, however, had gradually come to favour a stricter approach. Not only 
did many M ember States finally acquiesce to the Com m ission's dem ands in June 
2007, the Environment Council also advocated a revision of the EU-ETS in order to 
tighten the rules for the M ember States. M ember States themselves, in turn, 
promoted changes that would leave them  with less discretion to over-allocate.
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In January 2008, the Com mission presented its proposal, which outlined its ideas for 
an EU-ETS review. In addition to enlarging the scope of the scheme to include further 
sectors in the future, such as aviation, the Commission proposed a single EU-wide 
cap, with allocation 'on the basis of fully harmonised rules' (European Commission, 
2008b). In a memo, the Commission stated that this was the only way forward, as the 
previous approach
has generated significant differences in allocation rules, creating an incentive for each 
Member State to favour its own industry, and has led to great complexity ... 
experience so far has shown that greater harmonisation within the EU ETS is 
imperative to ensure that the EU achieves its emissions reductions objectives at least 
cost and with minimal competitive distortions. The need for more harmonisation is 
clearest with respect to how the cap on overall emissions allowances is set. (European 
Commission, 2008b, emphasis added)
M any M em ber States supported the proposal. As one representative affirmed
Experience working with the scheme has shown that there are a number of areas 
where improvements can be made. And the European Commission's proposal ... 
suggested a number of changes, one of the most important of which is that there 
should be ... a cap set at the European level rather than that each Member State 
should decide what its own cap should be. Now, I think that's quite important. 
(Member State respondent)
Again, M ember States did not attem pt to re-claim the com petence to draft NAPs, by 
ham mering on their right of self-determination or sovereignty. In the hegemonic 
discourse on the EU-ETS, the significance of the sovereignty signifier was generally 
low; national self-determ ination had come to be associated with market distortion, 
and, as such, it was considered to impede the overall goal of cost-effective policy­
making. It was the latter that enjoyed general support. Against this backdrop, 
M em ber States approved of Commission m easures to
break down national restrictions in terms of imposing real effective targets on their 
industry and so on and so forth. And making the credits credible. (Commission 
respondent, emphasis added)
Although the Commission was accused of having a 'hidden agenda' in other contexts, 
it was seen as devoid of any self-interest when it came to the EU-ETS. Its increasingly 
drastic interventions were welcom ed by M ember State respondents, even by those
who, on other issues, were declaredly sceptical about a 'too active' and 'too pushy' 
Commission:
[On the bigger role that the Commission is going to have in the third phase of EU- 
ETS] With regard to my experiences in particular with emissions trading ... I do 
welcome this. Since it has become obvious: harmonisation is needed, and nobody 
else can render this but the Commission. In that respect, I do not consider this to be 
something negative (Member State respondent)
I mean, if you look back at the second phase of the national allocation plans in the 
ETS, you can see the Commission went from a ... role in the first period of, well, ok, 
these are the NAPs ... to one of really trying to put things into order and give it some 
sense. And give considerable rationality and tightness to ... the National Allocation 
Plans ... its role there was central. To give credibility to what would have been a purely 
diffuse system which would not have worked had the Commission not stepped in. It 
could easily have decided to take a ... backseat, not to intervene in the active way it 
did. And I think the fact that they did has strengthened its position enormously ... . It 
has gained credibility. Including because of the way it dealt with the national 
allocation plans. (Member State respondent)
From these statements it is clear that in the course of EU-ETS, the Commission came 
to be seen as an institution that was driven by rationality. It was considered to be free 
enough from M em ber State politics to operate in a way that ensured the integrity and 
the effectiveness of a policy instrum ent such as the ETS. Its interventions, 
consequently, were deemed to be necessary and legitimate.
The discursive fram ework in which the EU-ETS was embedded facilitated the 
subordination of sovereignty considerations to the overall goal of cost-effectiveness 
that was to be realised through a functioning market. Increasingly, the self­
determ ination of M em ber States was seen as the prime threat to the creation and to 
the functioning of such a market. At least after the permit prices plummeted in 2006, 
state interests were associated with irrationality, market failure or ineffectiveness. 
Against the backdrop of this developm ent, M em ber States agreed to actions that 
strongly clashed with conventional EIS assumptions. Not only were the Member 
States at peace with a restriction of their own com petences, they also agreed to a far- 
reaching com munitisation of EU-ETS, as the EU-level quickly became associated with 
advancing scale effects and forestalling competition inequalities. W ithout much 
protest, M ember States confided central com petences to the Commission and
trusted in its ability to become a functional, rational remedy against irrational, 
egotistic state interest.
W hat is striking in this respect is how the 'm anagerial' or 'econom ic' coating of the 
dom inant signifiers in the context of EU-ETS removed 'politics' from this policy 
instrument. Sovereignty was no longer treasured but willingly sacrificed. The 
Comm ission was at no tim e equated with adjectives such as 'pow er-driven' or 
'com petence-snatching' but seen as the only conceivable neutral referee, with a prime 
interest in seeing the rules applied and thus in guarding the integrity and credibility of 
the system. Its interference was increasingly welcome; the fact that it rebuked 
M em ber States was m ainly met with approval. This was considered to be necessary to 
tam e 'national instincts'. To benefit cost-effective policy-making, M em ber States 
quite willingly submitted them selves to a system in which the Commission was 
accorded both a 'driver' and a 'w atchdog' authority.
Target setting
Target setting in the 1990s
Targets have played a crucial role in EU climate policy-making from the very 
beginning, setting the scene and the fram ework for concrete policy proposals such as 
the EU-ETS. It was the stabilisation goal of 1990 that basically established climate 
change mitigation as an aim of EU policy. At the same time, it was with this target 
that the EU demarcated itself from other countries or blocks on the international level 
and tried to stylise itself as a leader. After the COP in Kyoto, EU M em ber States 
shared out the common target that they had agreed to in the negotiations. For 'post­
Kyoto', the EU prom otes the 20/20/20 target. In this way, targets have always been 
directed at the EU and the international level, thereby interlinking them.
Targets, however, also raised the question as to who was in command of target­
setting. This became especially virulent in the run-up to the COP in Kyoto. After the 
EU stabilisation goal had been set in 1990, the following years brought no clarification 
as to how this target would be realised. The carbon tax struggled with the unanim ity 
hurdle and other EU projects lagged behind expectations. Still, the Berlin Mandate, 
adopted at COP-1 in 1995, ignited the 'hot phase' of international negotiations, and 
the EU needed to agree on the target(s) with which it would enterthem .
In this phase, the EU decided to enter the negotiations with a common target, which, 
however, would be distributed between the M ember States. According to Member 
State respondents, M em ber States considered this a necessity:
Countries did not want to enter the negotiations without knowing what the stake of 
Europe would be and what its stake would mean for individual Member States 
(Member State respondent)
We had then certainly still considerable differences within Europe with regard to 
economic development. Also with regard to the organisation of the energy system. 
France [had] pre-dominantly nuclear energy, and, well, if you say, like, you have to 
reduce the emissions, then they cannot get much more out of the electricity sector. 
And the same was valid for Sweden at that moment. (Member State respondent)
The solution fo rth e  differences between Member States would be that
the countries which can do more, do more. And ... the countries which can do less, do 
less. But together with each other we agree ... where we stand as European Union. 
(Member State respondent)
In the accounts of M em ber States respondents, the statehood signifier was central. 
The EU was depicted as a mere conglom erate of M em ber States, which, in being 
states, were equal because each had their own econom y and their own energy 
structure. This, however, implied that M em ber States were regarded as clearly 
separate, closed units. Sharing out the burden implied that Member States had a 
common interest to function internationally as 'the EU', but that they were, first of all, 
states.
In the second half of the 1990s, this discourse became hegemonial and suppressed 
other alternatives of meaning making. These -  hardly perceptible -  alternatives 
consisted of, for instance, thinking in EU-wide energy systems. In the words of a 
Comm ission respondent, to depict energy markets as national no longer made sense
because at that time [when the decision was made to share out the EU target], 
energy markets were becoming more and more European. And you could see at the 
time that no government would anymore be in control of their electricity generation, 
because with the liberalised electricity market, of course, it's for the companies to 
decide these things. So you can have as much of a national commitment, but if your 
companies decide not to produce or to produce, I mean, it switches the C0 2 back and 
forth. (Commission respondent)
In this alternative discourse, the logic revolves around transboundary markets that 
transcend M ember State borders. Seen in these terms, thinking and making energy 
policy in a national fram ework was neither sensible nor effective. The desired 
alternative supposedly consisted of adopting an EU-wide sectoral approach or a 
sim ilar scheme.
These, however, were not the criteria and solutions applied in the state-centred 
discourse. Here, it mattered whether a target was acceptable to the individual state, 
was feasible for the individual state, or sim ply fitted the individual state's 
circumstances.
Accordingly, attempts were made to find burden sharing schem es that were 
acceptable to all M em ber States. Commission proposals existed, but they did not 
m eet with general approval (see, for instance, Haigh, 1996: 173). Finally, the Triptych 
approach, tabled by the Dutch Presidency in 1997, formed the basis for a pre-Kyoto 
scheme. The Triptych approach was an effort to realise burden sharing on a scientific 
basis using objective criteria. The way that final agreement was reached, however, 
was rather different:
I mean ... as a preparation for this burden sharing there were studies and evaluations
etc. etc. etc...... Finally the whole thing was a compromise that was indeed based on
certain facts, but still political (Member State respondent)
The Triptych method ... did provide a certain basis ... but has not formally been the 
basis, the point of departure for burden sharing. And that has finally been horse- 
trading (Member State respondent)
[On the 'hot phase' of negotiations among the Member States] That of course had no 
longer anything to do with ... the Triptych approach. That was naked bargaining. 
(Member State respondent)
From this bargaining process, the Com mission was virtually excluded and the 
European Parliam ent had been discarded from the outset. The individual targets were 
negotiated in a 'confessional' procedure. This meant that the British Presidency led 
bilateral talks with each individual Member State. Target setting and sharing in the 
m id-nineties was a states-only affair.
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Target setting today
Ten years after the first round of target setting, auspices for new, post-Kyoto targets 
were somewhat different. In its Com m unication 'Lim iting Global Climate Change to 2 
degrees Celsius: The way ahead for 2020 and beyond' (European Commission, 2007), 
the Commission proposed the central targets for EU action in post-2012 years. These 
targets were subsequently adopted by the Council of March 2007 as originally 
proposed.
On invitation of the same March Council, the Commission also made suggestions on 
the 'distribution' of the overall targets among M ember States. It provided a proposal 
for 'effort sharing' (that is, for sharing out the reduction target for emissions not 
covered by ETS) and a proposal for a directive on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources (including renewable energy targets for M em ber States). 
Both of these had to undergo a co-decision procedure. This time, the Parliam ent was 
on equal formal and legislative footing with the Council.
As in the case of the ETS revision, the M ember States no longer seemed to mind a 
further com munitisation of target setting, nor did they reject a more active and 
maybe also more demanding dem eanour of the Commission in this respect. In the 
interviews, M em ber State respondents expressed their approval of both:
You now see an enormous series of proposals for legislation coming and ... I think that 
these are all areas where it makes sense to regulate on a European level (Member 
State respondent)
[On potential fears that, with communitisation in the field, too many competences 
are transferred to 'Brussels'] Well, that indeed depends on how you elaborate a 
couple of things. But we are not negative about that in principle (Member State 
respondent)
[On communitisation] Well, in many areas it surely is good. Because those who are 
less ambitious are then brought to a higher level (Member State respondent)
X [the respondent's Member State] has been very slow to develop renewables, but 
this [communitisation] is something that is likely to mean that we'll move forward 
much more rapidly on the renewables front (Member State respondent)
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Without the Commission's initiatives, we would not have a unilateral 20 percent 
target, no 30 percent for an international agreement ... . Well, it [the Commission] 
simply incredibly pushes the EU forward ... there are also a couple of Member States 
that very much move into this direction, but they could not move the whole in the 
same way (Member State respondent)
Without these requirements ... which country ... would, of its own accord, say, ok, 
we'll have 34 percent renewable energy? ... I do not see that. (Member State 
respondent)
Different aspects come to the fore in these statements. First of all, it is safe to assert 
that, again, sovereignty considerations did not form part of the hegemonial discourse. 
Instead, Member State respondents responded positively towards further 
com m unitisation as well as active Commission intervention. Moreover, 
com m unitisation and Commission action were regarded as a prerequisite for an 
environm entally progressive EU. According to the respondents, a target-setting 
Comm ission ensured that laggard M em ber States were pushed in the right (that is, an 
ambitious) direction.
It is striking to see that, also in the context of target-setting, M ember States were 
increasingly perceived as the weak links in the EU structure, whereas the Commission 
was deemed necessary to circum vent Member State interests from taking over. This 
is more than an instance of M ember States transferring com petences to the 
Comm ission in order to 'protect' them selves from one another (e.g. to prevent the 
emergence of competitive advantages for some M em ber States to the detrim ent of 
others). Rather, com m unitisation and Commission engagem ent were considered 
necessary to protect the individual M ember State from  itself, from its irrationality, and 
from  the policy failure  that M em ber State interests seemed to engender. According to 
the last statements, a watchdog was needed to ensure effective policy, even 
nationally. The Comm ission, leaning on ever more Com m unity regulation in the field, 
fulfilled this function. Hence, the Comm unity, and in particular the Commission, 
prevented the individual M em ber State from deploying its potentially auto­
destructive self.
As the targets are not exclusively linked to the EU level, the respondents' statements 
have yet another dimension. M em ber States not only potentially weakened policies 
on the national or the EU level, but they were seen to endanger the EU's success at 
the international level as well:
Our credibility in the negotiations on an international level depends on 
implementation on the national level of what we [the EU] have already agreed. And 
being clear on what we will do in the future (Member State respondent)
And I don't think the EU preaching, which is what it tends to do, helps when it's not 
actually delivering at home as well as it oughtto do. (Member State respondent)
An effective EU policy was hence not considered an end in itself. It was distinctly 
linked to the EU's outer performance. Consequently, com m unitisation and 
Comm ission action not only protected Member States from them selves, but they 
were also seen to protect 'the EU' and its international role as a leader.
Conclusion
In comparison, international and EU climate change politics exhibit crucial 
differences. The most central of them may be that, on the EU level, the outside was 
usually emerging on the inside. This means that the threats to the different 
hegem onic or aspiring discourses emerged from within the EU as a political system. In 
the context of the carbon tax, for example, tax advocates found their outside either in 
an 'ideological' UK or in the conservative forces that still rejected the beliefs and 
principles of ecological modernisation. ETS in the beginning was threatened by 
states, such as Germany, that clung to 'outdated' com m and-and-control instruments. 
This meant, however, that the process of othering was not as unequivocally beneficial 
to the emergence of an EU identity as it was on the international level. Instead, inside­
outside relations on the EU level stimulated and reflected the genesis of identities 
within 'Europe'; rising frictions stayed within the EU and they could not be vented to 
an outside. This difficulty of identity formation within the EU, in turn, endangered 
schem es for a 'united EU' in global climate change politics.
Another aspect that separates the EU level from the international level is that it is 
institutionalised to a far higher degree. The EU level has a far denser web of formal 
institutional rules and procedures, and these both contain and reify 'frozen' 
discourses. These discourses mostly depict the EP, the Comm ission, and the Member 
States as entities that confront one another in a sort of organisational triangle. As 
clear from the case of the carbon tax, this higher institutionalisation can considerably 
ham per the success of new, aspiring discourses.
A common feature, however, is the extrem ely am bivalent role statehood and 
sovereignty signifiers have played in dom inating discourses so far. In climate politics 
on the EU level, such signifiers were present in the m id-nineties when the Member 
States agreed on distributing the Kyoto 'burden'; however, their importance has been 
decreasing ever since. More remarkably, they have been subject to 'transvaluation', as 
they came to be perceived as im pedim ents to effective policy. In that respect, they 
were increasingly seen as something that needed to be overcome in the context of EU 
climate policy. M ember States them selves, in turn, were rather willing to transfer 
more com petences to the Com m unity level and to grant the Commission more 
scrutiny. This was the case both for the third phase of the EU-ETS and for the targets 
included in the energy and climate package.
In a broader context, M em ber States came to be considered not only a potential 
threat to effective EU climate policy-making, but also a menace to the EU's 
international am bitions and notions. Consequently, as on the international level, 
sovereignty concerns on the EU level in recent years have been considerably pushed 
into the background when it has come to the welfare of the EU at large.
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PART III Case study: EU institutions and Member States in green 
biotechnology politics 
6. THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Not m any environmental issues have managed to attract as much attention as 
climate change has, w hether within the EU or internationally. Green biotechnology is 
no exception. On the international level, green biotechnology has been mainly 
addressed in the context of biosafety, i.e. the safe transboundary transfer, the 
handling and the use of genetically modified organism s (GMOs). Although biosafety 
has been a topic of negotiation for as long as climate change has, it has aroused 
considerably less political fervour. Whereas, for instance, high-level talks have been 
an inherent part of climate change COPs, they have been the exception rather than 
the rule in biosafety negotiations. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, biosafety gradually 
caught more attention and hit the headlines, especially when discussions revolving 
around a potential international protocol on biosafety concurred with the heyday of 
alter-globalisation activism.
As biosafety is a rather unknown field to many, this chapter starts with a rough outline 
of its history in the realm of international policy-making. In a next step, the evolution 
of the EU within the fram ework of biosafety negotiations is traced, as it developed 
from  an outright conflictual conglom erate into a considerably consensual formation. 
In early years of EU activity on the international level, mandate struggles opposed 
Comm ission and M ember States. In later phases, however, M em ber States and the 
Comm ission moved together, forming a common EU inside. The unity that the EU 
displayed at this later stage is subsequently scrutinised. As an inside cannot be 
formed and exist without an outside, the last analytical section focuses on the 
identification/dem arcation process of the EU. It concentrates on the identity that the 
EU created for itself in the context of international biosafety negotiations. Implicitly 
or explicitly, the EU formed this identity against a US outside that was perceived and 
depicted not only as a simple other, but, at times, as an outright threat. The chapter 
ends with concluding remarks.
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Historical overview
When, just like the UNFCCC, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) was opened for 
signature in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the role that genetically modified organism s and 
their handling played in this agreem ent was rather small. Only in its Article 19.3, the 
Convention asked that
[t]he Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out 
appropriate procedures ... in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any 
LMO3° resulting from biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
This meant that GMOs were mentioned in the Convention, but that parties were still 
far from a clear mandate that would have initiated negotiations on a specific protocol 
or another legal instrum ent in the context of international biosafety.
From the start, a strong preference for such an instrum ent prevailed mainly among 
developing countries (DCs) (Falkner, 2°°2: 4). Anxious that they might be used as 
guinea pigs for W estern inventions in the field of green biotechnology, many DCs 
actively pushed for a binding protocol. The USA, on the other hand, had already 
declined to ratify the CBD; likewise, it rejected any legal instrum ent on biosafety. As 
far as the EU M em ber States were concerned, 'Germ any and France had clear 
reservations about the need for a protocol' (Rhinard & Kaeding, 2°°6: 1°38). Their 
reservations were com m only ascribed to the fact that these countries wanted to 
create as few barriers for green biotechnology as possible, as they regarded it as a 
technology with large economic potential. Denm ark was in favour of a protocol, just 
as the M ember-States-to-be Austria and Sweden (Rhinard & Kaeding, 2°°6: 1°38). 
The Netherlands and the UK, in the meantime, were more occupied with the 
developm ent of voluntary safety guidelines. These efforts resulted in the 1995 UNEP 
International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology (Falkner, 2 ° ° 6 :1°).
The disparity of opinions within the EU was reflected in its Council conclusions in the 
run-up to the Second Conference of Parties of the CBD in 1995. Therein, the Council 
estimated som ewhat equivocally that 'suffisam ent d'élém ents prouvent la nécessité
30 Rather than use GMO, the Convention used the term 'Living Modified Organism' (LMO). 
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et l'urgence d'adopter une action internationale pour la sécurité en biotechnologie'31 
(N.N., 1995), but it did not state that this should lead to the adoption of a protocol. At 
the COP-2 in Jakarta, it was only after extensive negotiations that the parties could 
agree on a mandate for an additional biosafety protocol. As far as its contents were 
concerned, disagreem ent continued to prevail both within the EU (La Vina, 2002: 
p.38) as well as internationally. In order to find a common denom inator, the 'Open- 
ended Ad Hoc W orking Group on Biosafety' (BSWG) was created. Its task was, among 
others, to elaborate on key term s and concepts; to develop procedures for an advance 
informed agreem ent (AIA) between countries32; and to identify the categories of 
LMOs that would be relevant in a potential protocol.
Just like climate change, biosafety was a new field of international politics in the 
1990s. However, unlike climate change, it was not perceived by EU policym akers as 
another arena in which the EU wanted to emerge as a prominent or leading actor. It 
remains even doubtful to what extent we can speak o f 'EU ' action when referring to 
the infant years of biosafety, as the Member States mostly went about their own 
disparate ways.
Nonetheless, when the mandate for opening protocol negotiations had finally been 
agreed on, this also had an impact on the formal arrangem ents within the EU. For the 
BSWG process, which started in 1996, the Commission was given a mandate to 
negotiate for the EU on 'm atters within the Com m unity's field of com petence' 
(Rhinard & Kaeding, 2006: p.1034). This form ulation, however, offered enough space 
for multiple and controversial interpretations. In total, it took two years and an 
exhaustive list containing the distribution of tasks between the Presidency and the 
Comm ission so that discussions within the EU would gradually settle. From then on, 
'the Commission would negotiate on all trade-related matters and on m atters closely 
related to the acquis and the Presidency would negotiate on the remaining issues' 
(Bail, Decaestecker, & Jorgensen, 2002:170).
This distribution was retained throughout the BSWG process and the two 
Extraordinary Conferences of Parties (ExCOPs) that followed. The original deadline
31 This could be translated as: 'There are enough aspects which prove the necessity and the urgency of 
international action on biosafety'.
32 As Robert Falkner and Aarti Gupta explain, AIA obliges exporting countries to notify importing 
countries in advance of the first shipm ent of a LMO charge. They also need to supply a detailed 
description of the respective LMO (Falkner & Gupta, 2004: 3).
set for BSW G's preparatory work was 1998. According to the schedule, the fourth 
meeting (BSW G-4) should have been the last (Falkner, 2000: 303). However, two 
more BSWG meetings and two ExCOPs were required to come to an agreement. 
During the process, the negotiations were increasingly cast in term s of environm ent 
protection versus the promotion of trade. Particularly during the ExCOPs, the EU 
positioned itself as a m ediator between the Like-Minded Group33 and the Miami 
Group34 and as the more likeable alternative to the US.
In opposition to the US, the EU dem anded that the protocol not be subordinate to 
other international agreem ents (especially existing agreem ents in the W TO frame) 
and that a broader scope of LMOs be targeted by the protocol. It demanded that 
parties be allowed to block imports by invoking the precautionary principle and that 
the LMOs in question be provided with extensive labelling and documentation (Bail et 
al., 2002: 174; N.N., 1999). When talks came to a deadlock at the first ExCOP in 
Cartagena, Colombia, in February 1999, the EU tabled a proposal that was explicitly 
presented as a com prom ise between the positions of the Like-Minded Group and the 
Miami Group. It was eventually accepted by the Like Minded Group. The six Miami 
Group countries, however, declared that in the end they preferred no deal to a bad 
deal. The ExCOP was accordingly suspended without result (Falkner, 2000: 304f).
During the resumed ExCOP in Montreal, Margot Wallstrom, the Environment 
Com m issioner at the time, and all fifteen environm ent ministers of the EU Member 
States came to Canada (N.N., 2000). This set a precedent, as, unlike in climate change 
negotiations, politicians had so far been absent from the negotiation process. 
Agreem ent was indeed reached in Montreal, where, in the end, the Miami Group was 
considered to be isolated.
Just as the CBD, the Cartagena Protocol was never ratified by the US. W hen the 
protocol came into force in Septem ber 2003, several aspects still needed 
consideration. Discussions about the documentation requirem ent system persisted
33 The Like-Minded Group consisted mainly of DCs that were not exporting GM seed and crops.
34 The Miami Group consisted o f major exporters of GM seeds and crops such as Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Uruguay, and the United States. As Cathleen A. Enright points out, '[f]or the United 
States, participation in the Miami group was vital to its participation in the negotiation', as 'it was in the 
unique and unenviable position of negotiating the protocol as a non-party to the protocol's parent 
agreem ent [the CBD]' (Enright, 2002: 98). As a non-party, the United States could fully participate in 
negotiations, but did not have any voting powers.
until parties reached an agreem ent at a COP/M OP35 in Curitiba, Brazil, in 2006. In the 
past few  years, the issue of 'liability and redress' has become prominent. Discussions 
here focus on whether a binding regime is needed to deal with the potential legal 
claims made by countries that assert that they have been damaged by LMO imports. 
To address this issue, an Ad Hoc Open-ended W orking Group of Legal and Technical 
Experts on Liability and Redress (WGLR) was established at the first COP/M OP in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2004, agreeing in 2008 to what was vaguely termed 'a 
political com prom ise that will pave the way towards adopting a legally binding 
regim e' (IISD, 2008). For negotiations on both the documentation requirement 
system and the W GLR process, the Commission had to request additional negotiating 
mandates, which it was granted in both cases.
From conflict to conciliation
Conflict
Especially in the first phase of the BSWG process, conflicts within the EU were 
dominantly, though not exclusively, mandate conflicts. For BSWG negotiations, the 
Comm ission was given a mandate; yet, from the start, this mandate was 
accom panied by struggles within the EU that were visible even to third parties and 
other outside observers.
According to one respondent, a potential Commission mandate first became an issue
when moving closer to Jakarta. Where the decision to start a negotiation [for a 
protocol] had to be taken. (Council Secretariat respondent)
It must be mentioned that in Jakarta itself, negotiations were still being handled by 
the Presidency. At least, this was the case in principle. De facto,
35 In the context of biosafety, a COP/MOP is '[t]he Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol'. It is 'the governing body of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Its primary role is to keep under regular review the im plem entation of 
the Protocol and to make decisions necessary to promote its effective im plem entation' (Convention on 
Biological Diversity, n.d.).
Spain had the Presidency and ... they had too little manpowerto do it, and they asked 
whether the Netherlands and the UK would do it for them. (Member State 
respondent)
This constellation changed drastically at the first BSWG meeting in Arhus, Denmark, 
when it was the Commission that offered support to the incumbent Presidency at the 
tim e (Ireland). The Commission also demanded that, as soon as negotiations would 
move to sm aller circles, it should represent the EU
alone or with the Presidency. And in the case of questions of EU competence ... the 
Commission speaks. (Commission respondent)
Not everyone was satisfied with the Com m ission's efforts and demands. When the 
Comm ission finally walked the talk and sent someone from its own staff to a meeting 
as the only EU representative, M ember State representatives reacted with dismay.
M any M ember State representatives saw the Com m ission's moves as an act of 
com petence snatching and as a direct affront by the Commission against Member 
States as a whole. One M em ber State respondent remembered the Com m ission's 
agreem ent with the Irish Presidency as an act of 'creeping in'; in the m em ories of 
another, M em ber State representatives accused the head of the EC delegation at the 
time,
to fight against the Member States to increase the competence of the Community 
and the Commission versus the Member States ... we spent most of the [Arhus] 
meeting fighting, Member States against the Commission. (Member State 
respondent)
W hen asked whether this was a perception shared by most M ember State 
representatives, Member State respondents answered in the affirmative:
Oh, everybody was on the same page. Look, this was ... a period where people had 
little confidence in the Commission. The Commission was something of an irritating 
club ... that was the time when the Commission was only perceived as incompetents, 
greedy for power. And they only bothered you (Member State respondent)
I think all [Member State representatives] were concerned. Some voiced their 
concern rather more strongly than others. But I think, yes, all were concerned. 
(Member State respondent)
Hence, as in the case of international climate change politics, meaning making in the 
context of the mandate question in international biosafety politics seem ingly 
corresponded to the assum ptions of conventional EIS. It was yet another competence 
struggle in which Commission and M em ber States confronted one another. In this 
struggle, M ember States, like many tim es before, regarded the Commission as an 
outside intruder in their realm. Some respondents, entirely in that vein, pointed to the 
fact that competence struggles concerning external representation were something 
'com m on' or even 'natural' in mixed negotiations:
The Commission is ... always someone who pushed or does something where 
Member States have to keep an eye on, so that it does not draw too many 
competences to itself (Member State respondent)
You had a lot of suspicion in the beginning of the process ... which is probably quite 
natural as Member States are most of the time and not only for environment matters 
... worried that the Commission may try to expand its competence beyond what is 
strictly necessary from a Community point of view. (Council Secretariat respondent)
It must be said, however, that the discourse underlying contentions in the context of 
biosafety was less black-and-white -  and thus less stable - t h a n  it appears. To give an 
example, when the Commission staff present at the Árhus conference insisted on 
representing the EU in negotiations, this did not only irritate the M ember State 
representatives. According to a Commission respondent, high Commission officials 
back in Brussels were also shocked when they heard of the incident, as previously the 
Comm ission approach in matters of external representation and in the relation with 
M em ber States had been far more cautious.
In addition, identity formation at the tim e was not exclusively dominated by signifiers 
such as statehood and sovereignty. Rather, the divide between the M ember States 
and the Commission was in some way 'double stitched' by other signifiers. As one 
respondent declared in an earlier statement, M ember State representatives tended to 
perceive the Commission in the first phase of the BSWG process as a group of 
'incom petents'. The Com m ission's alleged lack of expertise in the early phase of 
protocol negotiations was a recurring element in biosafety interviews and 
respondents repeatedly identified this lack as something that set the Commission 
apart from  the rest:
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The other element has more to do with expertise, I would say. Most of the people 
from the Member States that are participating in the negotiations, most of them were 
scientists or people pretty close to the development of biotech related frameworks. 
So people with quite a good knowledge of the subject from the scientific or legal, 
whatever the point of view. And collectively, obviously, they represented quite a 
significant amount of knowledge and experience. Which the Commission with all the 
good will in the world cannot match .... So this could always add to the suspicion that 
what is proposed by the Commission maybe was coming on the basis of insufficient 
knowledge or analysis. And the feeling that, well, Member States know best simply 
because again of the collective amount of knowledge (Council Secretariat 
respondent)
It was still the case that in this phase the Member States, or some, eyed the 
Commission rather suspiciously. The more so as the head of the EC delegation was 
not from the same trade so to speak, he was after all not very experienced as far as 
environmental matters were concerned, let alone in the field of biotechnology 
(Commission respondent)
The Member States -  again, many individuals had been around for some time. And 
the experience that the Member States had was considerable. And I thinkthere was a 
lot of feeling that this was an area of mixed competence and the Member States 
should have a voice. (Member State respondent)
Hence, the problem with the Commission was not only that it was not a Member 
State. The problem as perceived by M ember State representatives was also that the 
Comm ission missed the expertise that many of them  had. These two shortcom ings 
aggravated one other. W hat right did the Commission have, as it was neither a 
M em ber State nor did it bring any other qualifications to the table? The dom inant 
impression among M em ber State representatives was that
[t]he Commission have no knowledge in the house, but they want all sorts of power. 
(Member State respondent)
Yet another layer cemented the conflictual relationship between civil servants from 
the EU M ember States and Commission representatives. The Commission, to put it 
bluntly, was simply not a 'part of the gang'. After all, the M ember State experts had 
known each other for years; they had worked together in different contexts. The main 
Comm ission representative, on the contrary, was new in the field. In the words of a 
respondent,
[h]ere was a close working relationship between the Member States, because this 
work had been prepared within a working group of the Council. And so we had 
already worked among Member States and there was also a personal relationship. 
You have to understand that, in this area, it is a very small family of a limited number 
of people. And we know all each other very well. From the OECD, from the Biosafety 
Protocol, from the EU. And so in fact ... we knew each other on a personal basis. 
Which made it very easy between Member States to, you know, organise and 
coordinate. While Christoph [Bail, the head of the EC delegation at the time] was 
coming from outside ... he was not at that time, not part of this biosafety small group 
of people. And so, yes, there was a sort of group against the Commission. But more 
based on the background of the individuals rather than countries' positions. (Member 
State respondent)
The initial position of the Commission was obviously unfavourable. At least three key 
signifiers cast the Commission as the M em ber States' other, as an outside. It was not 
a M em ber State, it allegedly lacked expertise, and its representatives were not part of 
the 'in-crowd'. The aversion of M em ber State representatives to transfer 
com petences of external representation to the Commission was embedded in a m ulti­
layered discourse, in which the Comm ission played the unhappy part of the odd man 
out in more than one respect.
In addition, the relationship between the Commission and the M ember States on the 
international level was affected by biotechnology politics at the EU level. There, the 
main divide was between green biotechnology 'supporters' and 'sceptics' (see chapter 
7). This created a minefield that put Member States at odds with one another. 
However, this conflict did not spare the Commission either as it was generally seen as 
'pro-GM O'. Hence, Member States, in their willingness or reticence to grant more 
com petences to the Commission, were also guided by the underlying logic,
right or wrong, that moving more to the Commission would mean basically giving 
priority to trade. While keeping more in the Presidency's hands, and implicitly 
Member States active behind the Presidency, would mean that the green-related 
concerns would get a higher priority. (Council Secretariat respondent)
In 1997, in an attem pt to decide the issue and to close the ongoing conflict concerning 
external representation, the EU parties compiled a list that took stock of all the 
pertinent issues in the negotiating process and subsequently assigned them  to either 
the Presidency or the Commission. However, this list offered only a basic guideline for 
task distribution. It did not provide any orientation on the finer points:
We agreed to go more or less along subjects that were mentioned as ... topics to be 
covered in the decisions of the parties to the biodiversity convention. But if you say 
something like labelling should be addressed by the Commission ... well, it looks fairly 
precise ... but in fact, it is not. So how far do you go then? Just take an example: 
Should the issue of language to be used when labelling, is that a matter of 
Commission competence or not. (Council Secretariat respondent)
Hence, the list only guaranteed a partial closure of the issue. The basic conflict over 
external representation lingered on. It even became a legal affair when the 
Comm ission asked the ECJ whether the authority to sign and ratify a future protocol 
lay with the M em ber States or with the Commission. Com petence struggles, 
consequently, still occupied and divided the EU actors in the aftermath of the Arhus 
meeting held in 1997:
So you had maybe two years where matters were still pretty tense. And we ... wasted 
quite a lot of time simply solving these practical elements, practical points. (Council 
Secretariat respondent)
Conciliation
After these years, however, a definitive shift can be traced in how the relationship 
between Commission and M ember States was perceived by all sides. To start with, 
the M em ber State representatives gradually 'adm itted' the Commission to the EU 
circle of experts. Not only became M ember State representatives convinced that the 
Comm ission staff did possess expertise after all. In due course the civil servants also 
gained the general impression that the Commission could bring something extra to 
the process:
We had somebody from the Commission who had come up through trade policy. Who 
was extremely good in terms of negotiating the trade-related issues. And probably 
better than anybody from the Member States would have been (Member State 
respondent)
For the Member States, it is an advantage to have somebody [from the Commission] 
who has a relatively good knowledge of legal matters and trade matters (Member 
State respondent)
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The Commission in that case had a strong position ... because of the people who were 
there and the professional qualifications the people had, from other areas where they 
had already led international negotiations of this kind. (Member State respondent)
During the BSWG process, biosafety negotiations progressively became more trade- 
oriented, that is, they de facto  became negotiations on the trade of/with GMOs. The 
Com m ission's contribution was increasingly appreciated, as M ember State 
representatives deemed the Commission to possess specific knowledge and 
experience in the field of international trade politics. The Commission was hence no 
longer seen as an outsider to the group of EU experts. Instead, M em ber State 
representatives found that the Commission brought something to the EU that the 
group had lacked when it was only composed of M em ber State experts. The 
Comm ission was no longer opposed to the M em ber States, but it had become a peer:
There were Member States that tended to take a lead on certain aspects. Of the 
negotiations. And the Commission on other ones. So we did come to a, I think a very 
effective negotiating team. (Member State respondents)
Both Comm ission and M em ber States moved to a new, common inside. Increasingly, 
they shared one identity:
We called it ... biosafety family (Member State respondent)
It did occur to us as, well, a family. And there was something in that. (Member State 
respondent)
In contrast to the days in which the Commission was an outcast, the doors were now 
open for the Commission to enter the EU group. Changes that had occurred in the 
discursive constellation facilitated this development. In the dom inant discourse, 
expertise and being 'part of the gang' remained relevant, but the Commission -  no 
longer new and equipped with sufficient knowledge to convince the other EU actors -  
was now able to meet these criteria. Sovereignty and statehood came to play only a 
marginal role. The M ember State representatives were satisfied with the Commission 
as long as it ticked the other boxes.
During the ExCOPs the Commission came to assume the role of sole EU negotiator 
(Bail et al., 2002: 171). After the Cartagena Protocol was concluded, mandate 
discussions continued, but the Commission firm ly remained part of the EU inside.
In the years that followed 'Cartagena', the Commission had to ask for new mandates 
for the negotiations on labelling provisions as well as on liability and redress. 
Although the Com m ission's position within the group had changed, this did not save 
the Commission from renewed debates as to whether it should represent the EU in 
these negotiations. In principle, external representation remained an undecided 
matter.
Still, the altered discourse did have a decisive impact on these discussions in the sense 
that the overall distribution of loyalties within the EU was altogether different from 
before.
To be sure, the basic constellation remained the same in the sense that, as in the 
mandate discussions before, those that opposed the Commission m andates were not 
unified by sovereignty considerations. There were, to be sure, M ember States which 
rejected such m andates as a matter of principle. Yet, consenting or not consenting to 
Comm ission m andates often was related to the positions M em ber States assumed in 
the internal pro-/anti-GMO debate (see chapter 7). In the words of a Commission 
representative, the opposition consisted largely of those
who in fact were more concerned that the Commission's position on the subject 
would be not as strong as they wanted. Because our position was of course based on 
the existing [EU] legislation, not less, but also not more and we didn't want to put in 
place a system which would be too burdensome, disproportionate, we wanted to try 
and strike the balance. But some Member States held that the balance was not high 
enough for them ... they wanted even stricter rules than what we had already inside 
and so there were substantive reasons, not related to the issue of fight of competence 
between the Member States and the Commission, but rather related to GMOs as 
such. (Commission respondent)
Hence, the mandate question again became partially fraught with the discursive 
divides that dominated the EU's internal biotechnology politics.
Yet, this new round of com petence struggles was far less clear-cut than the first one. 
From the start, there was not only a group of M em ber States which opposed a 
Comm ission mandate. Instead, the countries that rejected such a mandate 
confronted a considerable group of M ember States that supported the Com m ission's 
'cause'. The latter group even assisted the Commission in overcoming opposition to a 
Comm ission mandate:
We [the Commission] had a quite good ... reputation and also the various individuals 
involved from the Commission in the group. So there was a quite substantive group of 
Member States that were in favour of giving us a mandate ... we put forward a 
mandate ... and some Member States tried to I would say sabotage this mandate by 
putting forward a kind of alternative proposal... which was clearly unacceptable to us 
etc.. And the ... Presidency at that time ... was instrumental in leading the discussion 
to a favourable position on the Commission proposal... the issue went to the Coreper 
[the Permanent Representatives Committee] and at the Coreper ... there was no 
agreement. So it was sent to Council. And at Council we had some ministers who 
were quite outspoken against the mandate ... . But the chairman basically said, well, 
we have heard the opposition of some Member States and taken due note. But we 
have a qualified majority in favour. So it's adopted.36 (Commission respondent)
It follows that the Commission by this time could rely on the support of Member 
States that did not mind its alleged stance in EU biotechnology politics. These 
countries were also rather indifferent to the fact that the Commission did not belong 
to the group of M em ber States. Instead, 'supportive' countries, or their 
representatives respectively, valued the Com m ission's expertise and regarded it as a 
full m ember of the 'EU biosafety family'.
The changing position of the Commission within the EU group also was reflected in 
how it was described by the 'new  generation' of M ember State representatives. In the 
interviews, Member State respondents who were new to the biosafety process would 
not refer to the Commission as an outsider or a threat. Instead, they referred to the 
Comm ission as a source of good negotiators:
The Commission ... is really accepted and perceived as a good negotiator (Member 
State respondent)
The Commission ... has very good negotiators. And well, they have been sitting there 
longer than the national people, too ... you have the most experienced people usually 
belonging to the Commission. And the more experience, the more you can achieve. 
And you also get a kind of, well -  if you then say something, it weighs more, because 
they know you are not talking nonsense. (Member State respondent)
36 As Delreux points out, '[t]he decision-m aking rule in the Council on both the authorization [of the 
Commission as negotiator] and the mandate follows the decision-m aking rule for sim ilar issues in 
internal decision-m aking .... So, when an internal policy measure on a particular issue is internally 
decided on by qualified majority voting ... the same rule will apply for the decision on the authorization 
and possible mandate for external action' (Delreux, 2006: 239f).
Although the external representation of the EU still is far from being a closed and 
sedimented issue, the Commission has achieved an impressive record in biosafety 
negotiations. In 1999, when the first ExCOP in Cartagena entered a crucial phase, 
talks were narrowed down to a 'friends of the presidency' circle. This meant that the 
conference presidency negotiated with only one representative per group (Miami 
Group, the Like-Minded Group and the EU). Only three years afterthe M ember States 
and Commission had fallen out at the Arhus meeting, there was no discussion 
necessary in order to determ ine who should represent the EU in this forum. A 
representative of the EU Commission took the EU seat. Even when talks were taken 
to the ministerial level during the resumed ExCOP in Montreal, in 2000, it was this 
Comm ission representative who led negotiations on behalf of the EU, 'surrounded by 
six or seven EU M ember States m inisters' (Com mission respondent. See also Bail et 
al., 2002:171). In the 'post-M ontreal' era, the Commission remained in the lead on the 
most salient issues in international biosafety negotiations. It represented the EU in 
negotiations on both docum entation requirem ents and liability and redress.
Obtaining a mandate was always something the Commission had to work for, and it 
required extra effort. However, the means to which the Commission resorted in this 
respect changed over the years. Only in a very early stage did the Commission run the 
risk of outright confrontation with the Member States. According to M ember State 
respondents, the Commission was far more accom m odating as tim e went on. 
Although in 2000, the Com mission asked the ECJ for an opinion on the proper legal 
basis for the conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol (for more details, see Eeckhout, 
2004: 42-45), tensions between the Member States and the Commission had already 
lessened by that time. In the opinion of one respondent, the Commission deliberately 
kept a low profile during the legal proceedings:
In fact in other instruments it [the Commission] has managed to push it harder and 
have ... a harder line with regard to competence and the relationship between 
Commission and Member States ... they didn't push hard in the pleadings to have 
that. (Member State respondent)
The respondent regarded this reticence as an indication that the Commission did not 
want to damage the quality of the relationship it had developed with the Member 
States after an initial phase of conflict:
At that stage, there was already ... a good team between the Member States and the 
Commission. So nobody had interestto sort of fight this anymore
I don't think it was a renouncement. I think they [the Commission] just found that the 
deal they could have with the Member States was a good deal to conduct these 
negotiations. And they saw session after session that it worked out well and there was 
no need to fight for reasons of formality. Because in substance, the work was done. 
And was well done. (Member State respondent)
According to this account, the Commission had come to prefer a good team spirit and 
a strong EU performance in the negotiations to an expansion of formal com petences 
at all costs.
In many contexts, the Commission seem ingly maximised endeavours to warrant 
harm ony within the EU. One Commission respondent told that when the Commission 
asked for a mandate for the liability and redress negotiations, the Commission 
proposed a text that
was in a way unusual, because normally a mandate contains negotiation directives 
which are very broad. So it gives a lot of leeway to the Commission. And this mandate 
had negotiating directives that were very detailed. Because we tried to reflect into the 
directive a compromise that would satisfy all Member States' positions. (Commission 
respondent)
Comm ission efforts continued during the negotiations them selves:
[W]hat we did was that we went to this [international] meeting ... . We had a whole 
Sunday I remember from the beginning to the end, in which together with the Dutch 
Presidency we developed texts and we met I think the five Member States who had 
problems with this text, we discussed bilaterally, we took on board their comments, 
we developed new texts ... we finally came to agree a number of proposals and 
alternatives and options that the EU could suggest during the negotiations. And that 
brought us back to really a joint position. And then during the negotiations, to make 
sure that everybody was on board ... before accepting any ... texts or final solutions 
etc., we would always refer back to our group ... and get a green light from them 
before it was too late, you know. So this went on for the whole week of the meeting 
of the parties. And that built trust. Cause people felt they were in good hands
We tried to reunite, once we received this negotiating mandate, to reunite the EU 
which had been split in the environment Council where a vote [on the Commission 
mandate] was necessary ... it was a very time consuming process, on which we spent 
a lot of energy. But the EU was united and that was satisfactory
Then because the international negotiations failed, we had to ask for a second 
mandate for the continuation of the negotiations. But this time it was adopted 
without any opposition. Because people were happy the way we handled the 
mandate the first time. They trusted that we had brought everybody on board and 
not followed our own line etc.. (Commission respondent)
It is not the intention of this study to make 'truth claim s' about any of the previous 
statements. Nevertheless, from these accounts it can be concluded that the Member 
States and the Commission came to share a discursive ground. Over time, Member 
State representatives became less likely to interpret Commission actions in term s of 
m alevolent com petence snatching. Commission staff, in turn, hesitated to openly 
criticise M em ber States which opposed a Comm ission mandate. Instead, Commission 
representatives and civil servants gradually came think of each other as well- 
intentioned. They no longer regarded each other as competitors, but as combatants; 
com batants that, in the name of shared goals and a common consensus, were able 
and willing to make concessions.
W hen speaking of the current relationship between the Commission and the Member 
States in international biosafety politics, M em ber State respondents no longer 
resorted to the m etaphor of com petence struggle or to sim ilar expressions. Many of 
the respondents emphasised that countries that rejected Commission m andates as a 
m atter of principle were a m inority within the EU. Some added that this was a UK 
particularity:
There was a small group of Member States and they were reticent for different 
reasons. There are some whom I would c a ll... more the Eurosceptics group. And here 
you have generally the UK, Denmark, Sweden, to some extent Austria that generally 
oppose mandates to the Commission to negotiate in international environmental 
issues by a matter of principle on any matter. It does not matter what, their position 
will just be no, we don't want it (Commission respondent)
There are some Member States which do not want to give up their competence as a 
matter of principle ... England is very restrictive as far as that is concerned. They ... 
actually do not want any mandate for the Commission (Member State respondent)
The only ones systematically trying to push back the Commission are the Brits 
(Commission respondent)
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For instance England ... in general thinks that the Union gives too much away to the 
Commission. The Commission, according to them, is never allowed to do anything. 
So, they are opposing everything. (Member State respondent)
However, many M ember State respondents added that, to them, the mandate 
question was of m inor importance. Likewise, they declared that w hether the 
Presidency or the Commission spoke had little significance in practice and that what 
really counted was the actual output the EU achieved:
Looking at it factually, I would say that it is not such a big problem whether it is now 
the Presidency that speaks or the Commission that speaks ... . As a rule, the players 
know each other... personally. So ... you can estimate quite well who is going how far 
and who has which intention. And when that is well-established, it is working 
(Member State respondent)
It is a matter of principle for quite some Member States. I think that, in practice, it 
does not really matterthat much (Member State respondent)
The Commission mandate actually was of less interest to me. It was not important in 
my opinion ... in practice, there has always been a very sensible, sound and 
cooperative collaboration between Member States and the Commission. And that 
worked. (Member State respondent)
Hence, in the accounts of many respondents the mandate question no longer was 
depicted as a matter of sovereignty or as a prime concern for M ember States. W hat 
had become far more significant to civil servants was that the actual negotiation 
practices seemed to work, that they produced the desired output. As respondents 
judged the cooperation within the EU as very effective, anything else was of minor 
importance.
Union in the making
As has been adumbrated in the last sections, a common EU inside began to develop 
rather rapidly after the initial com petence struggles had been fought. This inside 
included the Commission and it was something of which all respondents were proud. 
In the interviews, respondents put EU unity very much at the forefront. For the crucial 
phase of the BSWG process as well as for the two ExCOPs, respondents not only
referred to the EU as a family, but also as a team, a unit, a block or sim ply -  as 'the
Once people were in a way, not trapped, but in a way used to this division of labour 
[between the Commission and the Member States] ... it helped consolidate the team 
(Council Secretariat respondent)
We did come to a, I think a very effective negotiating team. In the EU (Member State 
respondent)
That was a team work. Because every subject involved everyone. Even if the 
Commission negotiated, the Member States were behind and vice versa (Member 
State respondent)
Somehow I ... felt that the trust was there and that the team was there (Commission 
respondent)
The EU, certainly at the time I can remember, was functioning as a unit ... . I don't 
think we should overstate the difficulties (Member State respondent)
The longer you are together and discuss things, the more you grow together and then 
there somehow was an esprit de corps ... and you say, gee, we have to assert 
ourselves as EU here (Commission respondent)
The EU was negotiating very effectively as a block. (Member State respondent)
Likewise, respondents repeatedly emphasised that the EU had one position and 
pursued one goal despite 'm inor' differences:
We somehow had a common goal and we ... knew, we are only going to achieve it if 
we are at least not at odds with one another (Member State respondent)
Within the EU ... differences of course ... constantly appeared ... but, well, in this case 
you of course always come to the result that you have to act as EU (Member State 
respondent)
What you see in practice is that the EU does ... act very consentaneously. Sometimes 
harder words are spoken in the heat of the moment, but, well, I think that they [the 
EU] did increasingly well. (Member State respondent)
These statements are illuminating in several respects. To start with, they indicate that 
the respondents, regardless of their institutional affiliation, felt a part of a circle
whose goals they shared. The notion of equivalence is prominent in the accounts. 
Secondly, as unity and equivalence became central, respondents considered potential 
differences within the EU to be unim portant and negligible. Lastly, respondents 
perceived them selves not only as representatives of the EU in biosafety negotiations. 
They were the EU in this context. As in the case of international climate change, this 
circum stance found its linguistic expression in the use of the we-pronoun
As EU, we of course have always had a special coordination mechanism (Member 
State respondent)
Despite the fact that we were at the time 15 countries, now 25, we only speak with 
one voice. (Member State respondent)
Several inter-related key signifiers helped to stabilise this notion o f'in sid e '. The EU 
was qualified as not any unit or group, but as a special body of which one could be 
proud. According to the respondents, one of the EU's distinct qualities was its 
effectiveness in the negotiations:
We did come to a, I think a very effective negotiating team. In the EU. Where we were 
using the strengths of the various Member States and the Commission to go for the 
best deal that we could ... it was a very, a very good group that had a lot of 
understanding about its own position. And where I think we were all pulling together 
(Member State respondent)
I mean the EU was negotiating very effectively as a block against some ... players 
from the Miami group or what it was called (Member State respondent)
In international negotiations ... we always have difficulties if we in Europe do not 
agree. And we actually only have a chance ... when we in Europe agree .... If we goto 
an international conference and we cannot agree, and Member State A argues for 
something which Member State B opposes and the Commission tries to mediate and 
in addition has an own position ... that is not understood by wide parts of the world ... 
and then we are not taken seriously, we cannot make our points ... if we ... succeed in, 
let's say, harmonising our opinion beforehand and reach one opinion, then we have a 
good chance to play a very, very good role in the international, global discussion ... we 
also have a good chance of playing a global, interesting leadership role or so. And that 
has precisely been the case in this case. (Member State respondent)
Effectiveness had a crucial position in EU identity formation. It was closely linked to 
unity; in fact, EU actors perceived the EU to be effective because of its cohesion. This
m eant that the liaison between the signifiers of unity and effectiveness had a 
disciplining effect within the EU. As the need for collaboration was deemed to be of 
central im portance, EU actors avoided confrontational behaviour. Moreover, as EU 
actors increasingly had the feeling that they belonged to a group which was effective 
and successful in the negotiations, they developed a sense of pride. The EU's success 
seemed to confirm that acting as a unified whole was a right decision.
Respondents highlighted in particular those qualities of the EU relationship that went 
beyond purely strategic considerations. The EU was depicted as more than a mere 
opportunity for M ember States to reach 'their' goals internationally. On many 
occasions, respondents stressed the role of trust within the EU:
There was -  it's a chemistry which I think there is no recipe for. You find people who 
have a good working relationship ... . I think it's a matter of personal relationship 
more than anything else. And that of course builds up gradually the more you spend 
negotiations together, the more you have trust (Member State respondent)
The trust in the respective person that negotiated was always high, with few 
exceptions (Member State respondent)
I also had the feeling, okay, they trust you .... Somehow I experienced it like that, that 
the trust was there (Commission respondent)
Even when there was a difference of opinion or position because the Commission line 
or the Member States' line was different, what makes a lot of difference is the 
personal interaction and the mutual trust ... saying, well, our position is different, 
these are the political reasons etc.. That's an element that facilitates work 
enormously. (Commission respondent)
The trust signifier reified the sense of equivalence among Commission and Member 
State representatives. As em erges from the last statement in particular, it moreover 
had a smoothing effect on potential cracks or on the appearance of differences in the 
EU. The central position of the trust signifier in these accounts contradicts the 
assum ptions frequently made in principal-agent inspired works about the EU. These 
works assert that distrust is inherent in matters of EU cooperation and that control 
mechanisms are thus inevitable.
Apart from 'trust', 'expertise' was crucial in EU identity formation. W hereas once it 
had drawn an inside-outside demarcation line within the EU, it now stabilised a
common EU inside. Again, this signifier did the 'dirty work' of papering over internal 
fissures. Respondents were convinced of the expertise the EU brought to the 
bargaining table:
The EU was ... a relatively strong, homogeneous, knowledgeable and, up to a certain 
degree, also dominating factor in these negotiations ... . Because we had many 
people and good people (Member State respondent)
A lot of people feel that because the EU has the resources and we discuss a lot, our 
level of preparation for the meeting is much deeper... many other parties have, you 
know, just studied documents superficially etc.. And also our position is more 
balanced ... . Because it's been negotiated for some time. So I have heard quite a 
number of colleagues from third parties saying, you know, we are just waiting for the 
EU position because very often we will just follow it. Because we think it's often the 
one that strikes a right balance (Commission respondent)
And that was the big advance of the EU, that we basically were the only ones that had 
already something ... [EU] regulations ... of which we were after all convinced. And 
still are. That they are sensible (Member State respondent)
[On the relationship with the Like-Minded Group] On biosafety, they were very much 
behind the EU all the time, because they knew that we had developed, well, basically 
the most complex system in the world for our regulation of biotechnology 
(Commission respondent)
Through these new regulations [in the EU] you indeed see th a t... we can now act in a 
much better way. Because we now have legislation where we all are standing behind 
... . There are still differences between us, but there is one piece on which we all 
agreed. (Member State respondent)
As emerges from the statements, respondents were particularly proud of the EU's 
internal coordination mechanism and of the regulatory system that had been 
established within the EU. However, it is striking to see how in these accounts EU 
practices and institutions that are often seen as negative were 'discursively 
remodelled'. To use a more Nietzschean expression, they were tmnsvaluated into 
positive EU attributes that put the EU ahead of others.
To give an example, the EU's internal coordination mechanism during negotiations, 
i.e the meetings in which the EU internally fine-tunes before entering international 
talks, is reputed for its heated discussions. However, in the respondents' accounts
above, these meetings were no longer depicted as arenas of conflict. Instead, they 
were transvaluated into fora where the presence of different opinions enabled the EU 
to reach a better (i.e. a more balanced, a more elaborate) common position.
The EU's legislation was similarly re-interpreted. As is described at length in chapter 7, 
in the field of green biotechnology, decision-making in the EU was and still is a major 
bone of contention. Nevertheless, in the international context, EU respondents 
presented the existing legislation as a trum p in the hands of the EU and as something 
that enhanced the EU's position vis-à-vis other parties. Moreover, the respondents 
stressed the unifying aspect of the legislation, as it was something everyone had 
agreed to and something everyone supported.
In this context, it must be noted that, generally, the fierce contentions on green 
biotechnology within the EU seemed to have no impact on European 'harm ony' on 
the international level. It almost appears as if a clear boundary contained conflicts 
within EU borders and according to respondents 'there wasn't that much interference 
between the two processes' (M em ber State respondent). W hereas supporters and 
sceptics of green biotechnology nowadays still oppose each other on the EU level, EU 
actors on the international level have managed to find a 'precautionary-critical' 
(M em ber State respondent) middle ground for the EU as a whole.
Us and the US
As was pointed out in the preceding sections and chapters, an inside cannot possibly 
emerge without a corresponding outside. By looking closer at the statements quoted 
in the last section, it becomes clear that they were, implicitly or explicitly, pointed 
towards an outside as well, as they depicted the EU as being more knowledgeable, as 
being more coherent, as being better than others.
As in the case of climate change, the US was cast in the role of the EU's 'other'. 
However, the EU officially refrained from positioning itself against the US and the 
US's positions in an outright manner. Instead, the EU presented itself as a 'm ediator 
between the extremes', i.e. between the Like- Minded and the Miami Group:
At some point in time ... it was clear to us that we had to play the honest broker or 
middle man between these various groups (Council Secretariat respondent)
[The EU] agreed on the role of a precautionary-critical mediator. We ... developed a 
self-image and said: We want to mediate between the developing countries ... and 
the agrarian exporters with the strong trade-policy interest ... . We see ourselves in 
the middle (Member State respondent)
The EU often, especially in those matters, tried to take a mediating position (Member 
State respondent)
Especially during the biosafety protocol we had a bit the role of, I think, building 
bridges between the Miami Group and the people that so to speak did not want 
GMOs (Member State respondent)
I think the EU was viewed as a good compromise breaker. (Member State 
respondent)
Officially, the EU presented and perceived itself as an 'honest broker', who sought 
com prom ise and contributed to the process in a constructive manner. Moreover, 
respondents portrayed the EU as a decisive actor, as the sine qua non without which a 
com prom ise could not have been reached and the protocol negotiations would have 
failed:
It's difficult to see ... how there could have been a protocol without the EU. Because 
the other negotiating blocks I don't think could have found the common ground. I 
think the EU did play a major role in bringing the negotiations to a successful 
conclusion (Member State respondent)
The EU played an instrumental role in breaking the compromise ... and a final 
agreement. (Member State respondent)
In claiming the constructive, benevolent part for itself, the EU more or less implicitly 
kept the 'bad guy' image for the US. Respondents accused the US and its Miami 
Group entourage of leading the attem pts to obstruct the EU's noble efforts:
In fact, the EU tried to be a bridge builder between G77 and Miami [the Miami Group], 
even though Miami tried to break that by ... pushing the EU in positions where it 
claimed that it was actually at an extreme. And not in the middle (Member State 
respondent)
I think the EU was ... often trying to help find solutions, which ... in the case of ... the 
producers [the countries producing genetically modified (GM) crops] was quite 
difficult (Member State respondent)
In my experience, they [the US] have been very negative. A big hindrance. And a 
completely unconstructive attitude, particularly from, you know, the State 
Department people who were sent to meetings to disrupt rather than to construct. 
(Commission respondent)
Hence, EU representatives were less neutral than they asserted. They quite explicitly 
took sides against the US. They depicted the US not only as different, but also as a 
threatto  international progress. The EU, on the other hand, was presented as the US's 
opposite, fighting hard to ensure a multilateral agreement.
However, the EU accused the US not only of working against the protocol. EU 
respondents also criticised the trade friendliness of the US and linked this attitude to a 
US lack of com m itm entto consum er and environm ental concerns:
Well, the American position and the Canadian one, that was pure stamocap [state 
monopoly capitalism]. They simply represented the position of the industry 
(Commission respondent)
And they [the US] never actually really changed their policy on biotechnology in the 
sense that you ... do preventive health and consumer protection. I think that is wrong 
... and I actually do think that the approach that has been developed in Europe is a 
very elaborate and good approach (Member State respondent)
You always have the feeling that basically they go there to these international 
meetings to defend their trade interests. And that's what they do, in fact. They 
defend trade interests. And that's very different from how the EU works in 
environmental fora. Because we don't send trade diplomats to negotiations ... 
certainly trade is not a non-issue for us, but environment constituencies and 
departments and ministries are much more influential in Europe than in these big 
agricultural exporting countries (Commission respondent)
I think that they [the US] perceive the EU as ... mainly environmental freaks, so to say. 
That would negotiate things in a sort of very ideological or absolutist way. And that's I 
think how they perceived us. (Member State respondent)
As in international climate change politics, the US fit the 'bad guys' category in the 
context of international negotiations on biosafety. The US was seen to serve financial 
interests where, at the same time, the EU was trying to reach for higher and nobler 
goals.
When respondents spoke of the relationship that the US and the EU had with 
developing countries, they again emphasised the differences between the two 
'W estern powers'. Although the respondents were very open about the contentions 
between the EU and the Like Minded Group, they nonetheless underlined the basic 
goodwill of the EU towards developing countries:
I told them [the other EU representatives] that we are creating this protocol for the 
African countries. We do not need it ... . We want to do something in order to 
implement the convention [on biodiversity], so that developing countries have leeway 
to say, do we want the [GM] seeds or do we not want them (Commission respondent)
We were trying hard to bridge with developing countries and in particular Africa. 
Because you have to see that this whole thing [the protocol] was in fact not needed 
for Europe ... we had legal instruments and, of course, I mean, if there was an 
international treaty that would back up our legislation, th a t... would be good and so 
be it. But it was not needed ... the target of the whole exercise ... was to help those 
countries which had no regulation (Member State respondent)
[On the role of the EU in biosafety negotiations] I think that it was a good and 
progressive role. ... you do not tell developing countries ... [to] eat the genetically 
modified stuff in order not to starve. And in this respect, I see that we [the EU] ... do 
proceed in a mannerthat surely is more sensitive than that o f ... the other big players. 
Notably Asian countries orthe US. (EP respondent)
Respondents thus depicted the EU as working selflessly for the benefit of 'the weak' 
and for those who lacked the power to implement biosafety regulations them selves. 
The EU respected the integrity of DCs. It did not force biotechnology on them, but, on 
the contrary, it enabled them  to make their own choices. Respondents believed that 
this approach set the EU apart from countries such as the US:
During the ratification process, there have been reports of the US blackmailing 
developing countries, telling them, no, you should not ratify the Cartagena Protocol 
o r ... [this will affect] our development aid etc.. Of course there is no written evidence 
of this, but we certainly have heard that. Then there were problems also with the US 
aid ... to some developing countries, because it was grains that contained GMOs and 
some developing countries in Africa did not want it. (Commission respondent)
Respondents regarded the US as disrespecting developing countries and as abusing 
their weakness. In the eyes of the respondents, this attitude resulted in a clear-cut
distribution of roles in international biosafety politics. The good and the weak 
cooperated against the bad:
There were relatively close [EU] relations with the G77 ... as a sort of closing of ranks 
against those who, especially under the guidance of the US, actually did not want any 
biosafety negotiations (Member State respondent)
We had a lot of connections and synergies with the G77, in particular African 
countries. And that crossed a lot the US. And also Canada. Because of course that 
made the EU very strong against them. They were sort of isolated. (Member State 
respondent)
In many ways, the EU portrayed itself as the exact opposite and the better alternative 
to the US in the context of the biosafety negotiations. After all, it sought multilateral 
progress where the US cared only for its own interests; it heeded environmental 
concerns and the concerns of civil society whereas the US represented big business; 
and it supported developing countries in their right of self-determination whereas the 
US tried to undermine this right.
Hence, the US was rendered into a true other to the EU despite the EU's assertions 
that it m erely wanted to act as a m ediator between other countries. The US was not 
only judged as norm atively inferior; to a certain extent, it was also perceived as a 
threat, launching direct attacks against the EU.
However, in the eyes of the respondents, these US attacks had unintended side 
effects. They brought 'the EU 'even closer together:
In Cartagena it was already rather clear that the EU was actually quite unified in 
wanting ... a minimum protocol, and of course [the EU] also wanted it because of the 
attacks against our legislation and even more against the moratoria37 (Commission 
respondent)
And I think there was quite a strong collaborative sphere [within the EU] ... which is I 
suspect not unusual -  No, particularly not given that amount of pressure from 
outside, I think (Dialogue between two Member State respondents on relations within 
the EU)
37 As is explained in chapter 7, the EU decided at the end of the 1990s to stop the authorisations of 
GM Os although the EU's legal framework in this area form ally remained untouched. This de facto  
moratorium was challenged before the W TO by the US, Canada and Argentina (Lee, 2008: 189).
I think that it [EU cooperation] went more smoothly than otherwise. Because you ... 
felt exposed to strong attacks from outside ... . That is maybe also interesting from a 
political science or sociological point of view ... this position of defence which is 
somehow welding [people] together and where you somehow do ... no longer feel 
inclined to ... breakaway. (Member State respondent)
In the light of the hardened fronts between the EU and the US, respondents 
som etim es considered them selves to be part of a veritable fight between the two 
camps:
In Cartagena when we failed to reach agreement, Christoph [Bail] was the lead 
negotiator for the EU ... . We had this extraordinary final session. Where the half 
dozen or so key players were trying, in vain ... to agree on the outstanding issues ... it 
was actually in public, virtually ... it was in the middle of the night. Loads of us 
standing around. It was almost like a boxing match. (Member State respondent)
In the interpretation shared by the respondents, this fight was decided at the COP in 
Montreal, where the EU managed to isolate the US while convincing developing 
countries to join the EU's position. Many respondents stressed how much the final 
protocol matched the EU's expectations. Hence, for many respondents, the history of 
the protocol negotiations was also a story of EU success:
The outcome of this Cartagena Protocol is a pure EU affair ... others with their 
positions are important, but what is in there is practically our position. (Commission 
respondent, emphasis added)
Conclusion
Telling the tale of the role the EU played in international biosafety politics was 
something in which the respondents took obvious pleasure. Their accounts largely 
overlapped and conflated into a story about a brave EU, which was able to surm ount 
internal division and external threat and to achieve its goal through the combined 
strength, team spirit and skill of its members.
A distinct discursive environm ent enabled the em ergence of such a common EU 
narrative. First of all, a common inside developed as M ember State representatives 
came to perceive Commission staff no longer as a threat in the context of biosafety
negotiations, but as their peers and combatants. The Commission turned into an 
established 'm em ber of the gang' which excelled by merit of its expertise. Its 
otherness, i.e. the fact that it was not a M ember State, became a negligible footnote 
in the end.
In the current situation, some M em ber States still express sovereignty concerns and 
others eye the Com m ission's alleged pro-GMO attitude with suspicion. Yet, the EU 
Comm ission and the EU M ember States are no longer sharply divided on the 
international level. Some M ember States even favour a strong Commission 
com m itm ent and advocate Commission m andates in the context of the biosafety 
negotiations.
Moreover, although EU respondents mentioned that there were differences within 
the EU, they judged them  as largely irrelevant. Instead, they stressed the EU's overall 
concord in matters of biosafety.
In the past, several signifiers were crucial in stabilising the EU 'inside' -  varyingly 
termed a team, a family, or a unit. Expertise, effectiveness and trust were central to 
how EU actors perceived them selves as the EU. These signifiers were seen in relation 
to one another, even as necessitating each other. They enabled the EU to paper over 
internal cracks, for instance by transvaluating areas of contention, such as EU 
legislation, into areas of success.
Even more importantly, the inside was stabilised through its relation with the outside. 
In the context of the international negotiations on biosafety, the EU invented itself as 
a selfless and constructive mediator who had to strive against an obstructive USA. 
Although the EU claimed to be neutral, it clearly set itself apart from the US and 
presented itself as the better, norm atively more attractive alternative. The US was 
displayed as everything the EU was not. It was depicted as a threat to both the EU's 
integrity and to international progress. Against such a stark object of dem arcation, an 
'ever closer Union' developed almost as a m atter of course.
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7. THE EU LEVEL
Within the EU, m atters were slightly more complicated. Here, green biotechnology 
politics up until now have mainly revolved around the making and especially the re­
making of legislation in this field. The legislative history of green biotechnology in the 
EU is considerable. Even if one restricts the focus to the large-scale dissemination of 
GM Os38 and derived products in the environm ent39, one is still confronted with two 
directives on the deliberate release of GMOs, one regulation on novel food, one 
regulation on GM food and feed, and a regulation on traceability. Sim ultaneously or 
successively, these legal acts and their making dominated the field during the past 
two decades. Still, it is highly unlikely that the current generation of legislation will be 
conclusive. Nor is it exhaustive: rules are still pending on the thresholds for GM 
presence in conventional seeds and there is an enduring debate on the desirability of 
binding rules for the co-existence of 'conventional' and GM cultivation of crops. The 
first section of this chapter will give a more detailed overview of the past two decades 
of legislative agitation in this field of EU politics.
Since many of the legal acts mentioned above implied decisions concerning the 
distribution of com petences between Com m unity level and national level, between 
EU institutions and M em ber States, the emergence of conflicts as depicted by 
conventional EIS could be or could have been expected. However, the second section 
of this chapter argues that these conflicts were largely absent from EU politics in the 
field of green biotechnology. Neither were there debates on whether there ought to 
be Com m unity-wide legislation on green biotechnology; nor have there been 
structural contentions between EU institutions and M em ber States during the first or 
during the second wave of legislation. As will be elucidated in a subsequent section, 
conflicts erupted alongside other frictions. The field of biotechnology was 
fundam entally undecided and its dynam ics were dominated by the competition 
between an 'anti' and a 'pro' GM discourse. A following section focuses on how EU 
actors, within these discourses, positioned them selves towards others and how the 
discursive dynam ics shaped the actors' preferences regarding the distribution of
38 GM Os are currently defined by EU legislation as organism s 'with the exception of human beings, in 
which the genetic m ateria l. . .  has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or 
natural recombination' (Christoforou, 2004: 640).
39 As this study focuses on the field of EU environmental politics, it only takes into account those 
dim ensions of green biotechnology that directly relate to environmental concerns. Other dimensions of 
green biotechnology such as the contained use of GM Os in laboratories will be omitted.
com petences in the EU. The last analytical section underlines that although 'classical' 
com petence struggles did not dominate EU politics in the field of green 
biotechnology in general, such contentions found a niche in the sub-field of co­
existence. In this context, M ember State joined forces against Commission 'intrusions' 
into what they regarded their territory. The chapter ends with a summarising 
conclusion.
Historical overview
The popularity of biotechnology in the EU has so far undergone a rather erratic 
developm ent. 'Red' and 'w hite' biotechnology -  i.e. the application of genetically 
modified organism s for medical or industrial purposes -  have become accepted with a 
certain matter-of-factness (Hervey, 2001: 327). On the contrary, 'green' biotechnology 
-  the application of GMOs to agricultural processes -  has so far been a topic of 
contention throughout the EU (see also Gaskell et al., 2006: 2).40
However, when green biotechnology first appeared on the national legislative 
agendas within the EU, political sensitivity and response in the individual Member 
States varied. At the end of the 1980s, M em ber States pursued different approaches 
concerning the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment. Denm ark and 
Germ any enacted a general ban that was subject to exception; other countries such as 
the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg opted for a case-by-case 
approach. In a considerable number of Member States (Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal), regulations on the deliberate release of GMOs were sim ply absent 
(Shaffer & Pollack, 2004:17).
Against this backdrop, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a 
general, Com m unity-wide approval procedure. This resulted in the Council directive 
90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the environm ent of genetically modified 
organism s ('deliberate release directive', D R D )41.
40 The labels 'green biotechnology' and 'agricultural biotechnology' have both been criticised for being 
either m isleading or inaccurate. Nevertheless, they are used interchangeably in this work, for reasons of 
sim plicity. For a nuanced elaboration on the concept of 'agricultural biotechnology', see Lee, 2008: I l ­
l s .
41 As is explained in the directive, 'deliberate release' means 'any intentional introduction into the 
environm ent of a GM O or a combination of GM Os without provisions for con ta inm ent... to limit their
As an introduction of 'GM foods' became increasingly likely in the years that followed, 
the question arose as to how and under which conditions these products were 
qualified to be placed on the market. In EU legislation, this issue was first addressed 
by regulation No 258/97 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients. This 
regulation was not GM-specific. Rather, GM foods were treated under this regulation 
as any o ther'n ovel' product in the pipeline.
The second half of the 1990s witnessed agitation on several levels. To start with, the 
first harvest of GM soya in the United States reached EU borders; the respective 
variety had received approval through 90/220/EC. The arrival of GM soya met with 
widespread and fierce criticism by the consum ers and the media alike, even in 
countries where green biotechnology had hardly been an issue before (see, inter alia, 
Shaffer & Pollack, 2004: 25). In Germany, Nestle and Unilever tried to prevent 
consum er boycotts by declaring not to use any GM soya in their products. In France, 
major superm arket chains assured their custom ers that GMOs would not be used in 
their own brands. In 1998, 'Iceland' was the first in a domino-stone row of UK 
superm arkets to ban GM -products from  its shelves.42
On the governmental level, some M ember States made use of the safeguard options 
that the deliberate release directive offered and either banned the cultivation of 
GMOs or their import. In 1998, M ember States and Commission agreed on a de facto  
moratorium  for the approval of new varieties. Previously, several M ember States had 
announced not to approve any GMOs until 90/220/EC was thoroughly revised and 
included com prehensive provisions for the labelling and monitoring of GMOs.
An overhaul of existing legislation was set in motion in the first years of the new 
millennium. In 2001, EP and Council passed the successor of 90/220/EC, directive 
2001/18/EC. It included an extended labelling system; the m andatory monitoring of 
products; authorisations of GMOs that are limited to a period o fte n  years; common 
principles for risk assessm ent; the publication of both the contents of applications as 
well as the results of assessm ents and scientific com mittee opinions; and an 
obligatory consultation of com m ittees on matters of human health, the environm ent 
or the ethical implications of biotechnology. In 2003, this directive was flanked by a
contact with the general population and the environment' (Council of the European Communities, 
1990).
42 David Toke notes that 'by the end of 1999 it was difficult to find labelled GM products on 
superm arket shelves anywhere in the EU' (Toke, 2004: 149).
regulation concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms 
((EC) No 1830/2003) as well as a distinct regulation on genetically modified feed and 
food ((EC) No 1829/2003).
Despite this overhaul, contentions on both the application of green biotechnology 
and on existing EU legislation have persisted to this day. In the second half of the year 
2008, the French Presidency reintroduced green biotechnology as an item of the 
Council agenda. 'N ew ' issues have arisen in this context; especially the problem of co­
existence has attracted increasing attention in recent years. Co-existence refers to the 
question how a parallel cultivation of GM and conventional crops can be warranted. 
Although parts of the EP and of the Council demand Com m unity legislative action in 
this field, the Com mission has so far preferred a decentralised approach.
Areas of contention?
The communitisation of green biotechnology
As mentioned earlier, there was no Com m unity-wide legislative action in the field of 
green biotechnology prior to 1990; the issue was dealt with by national fram eworks.43 
This changed with the first deliberate release directive -  green biotechnology turned 
into a field of Com m unity competence. Respondents depicted a com munitarian 
approach as necessary, sensible and a matter of common assent:
The danger exists that the individual provisions in the Member States diverge from 
the beginning. Afterwards there is the difficulty to ... bring this back to a common 
denominator. And here [in the context of green biotechnology], the thought [of the 
Commission] has surely been ... "we take action from the outset". And that's what 
they did (Member State respondent)
Everybody agreed that regulating this on the EU-level is a good idea (Member State 
respondent)
[On the diversity of Member State legislations previous to the first DRD] Apart from 
the fact that you will possibly get safety problems, it also means a distortion of
43 This notwithstanding, biotechnology had already been on the Com m unity's scientific agenda. For a 
com prehensive historical overview, see Cantley, 1995.
competition. And in such cases, the Commission usually with good cause makes a 
proposal, in this case because of both reasons. (EP respondent)
'M oving' the field of green biotechnology to the Com m unity level did not encounter 
opposition within the EU. Respondents interpreted the Com m ission's efforts in this 
context as an understandable urge to harmonise this policy area and not as an 
attem pt to deprive M ember States of 'their' com petences in this field. Many 
respondents welcomed the com m unitisation of green biotechnology, although their 
opinions on the individual aspects of the first DRD differed considerably. Contentions 
at that tim e -  and in the decades that followed -  mainly emerged between supporters 
and sceptics of the new technology.
A little paradoxically, com munitisation 'fitted' the discursive logic of both groups. The 
sceptics related com m unitisation to the notion that GMOs and their risks do not stop 
at borders (see rapporteur Gerhard Schmid in Europees Parlement, 1989:77). For 
advocates of the new technology, com m unitisation ensured that the internal market 
was cleared from potential trade barriers. Indeed, both of these logics found entry in 
the whereases of 90/220. The directive states that
living organisms, whether released into the environment in large or small amounts for 
experimental purposes or as commercial products, may reproduce in the environment 
and cross national frontiers thereby affecting other Member States; ... the effects of 
such releases on the environment may be irreversible ... the protection of human 
health and the environment requires that due attention be given to controlling risks 
from the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the 
environment
while it argues at the same tim e that
disparity between the rules which are in effect or in preparation in the Member States 
concerning the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs may create unequal 
conditions of competition or barriers to trade in products containing such organisms, 
thus affecting the functioning of the common m arket... it is therefore necessary to 
approximate the laws of the Member States in this respect. (Council of the European 
Communities, 1990:15)
Although supporters and sceptics disagreed substantively on green biotechnology, 
both of these groups regarded it as an inherently transboundary issue. Due to this
partial overlap, Com m unity action was widely seen as a legitimate and sound move 
forward.
The first generation of legislation
The 'heart' of 90/220 -  as well as of most of the subsequent legislative acts on green 
biotechnology -  was the authorisation procedure that it introduced for GMOs. To be 
more precise, 90/220 introduced two such procedures. Part B of the directive 
contained a procedure for the 'deliberate release of GMOs into the environm ent for 
research and developm ent purposes or for any other purpose than for placing on the 
market', whereas part C established a procedure for the 'placing on the market of 
products containing GM O s'.44
Although establishing a Com m unity-wide approval procedure for placing a product on 
the market represented an act of com m unitisation in itself, 90/220 arguably provided 
a considerable role for the M ember States. The directive required producers to submit 
their applications to the com petent authority of one of the Member States. This 
com petent authority subsequently pronounced a judgem ent. If its opinion was 
favourable, the respective Member State forwarded the dossier to the Commission, 
whose only task was to distribute copies among the remaining Member States. If no 
M em ber State raised objections upon receiving the dossier, the application was 
approved.
Hence, when the Member States agreed, there was hardly any provision for the 
Comm ission to take action. Only if one or more Member States objected, would a 
more com plex com itology procedure -  'com m ittee procedure III, variant (a)' -  follow. 
This meant that the Commission put forward an opinion concerning the dossier. In the 
following step, a regulatory com mittee was required to do the same. A decision was 
reached once the committee confirmed the Com m ission's opinion with a qualified 
majority. If not, the Council had to bring out its vote. Although the actual wording of 
the directive states that 'the Council shall act by qualified m ajority' in that case, 'act' in 
this context only implied that the Council could adopt the Commission proposal by a 
qualified majority. However, it had to act unanim ously to reject it (Francescon, 2001:
44 Due to the reasons stated in footnote 37, part B will not be included in the analysis. 
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313; Lee, forthcom ing).45 It could thus be argued that the Commission had more 
potential weight in the com itology procedure -  at least fo rm a lly -th a n  the text of the 
directive suggests.
Nevertheless, the initial design of the 90/220 approval procedure was not mentioned 
as an area of contention in either the interviews or the primary literature (EP debates 
etc.). Apart from scattered incidences, there is no indication that the distribution of 
com petences as laid down in 90/220 provoked conflict.
The few  instances of debate were no exam ples of 'classic' conflicts between EU 
institutions and EU M em ber States. The readiness or reluctance with which the 
players allocated com petences to either EU institutions or M em ber States was 
inspired neither by 'principled' views on sovereignty nor by a structural eagerness to 
extend Com m unity competences. Other considerations were far more crucial. To give 
an example, the EP's environm ent com mittee (ENVI), which has often been regarded 
as the classical ally of the Commission in expanding Com m unity com petences in the 
environm ental field (Toke, 2004: 188), opposed an approval procedure that would 
have given too large a role to the Commission. ENVI argued that it had been 
confronted with the dilemma that
[a] genuine common standard for the European Community could only be based on a 
licensing procedure regulated at Community level. The Treaty provides no proper 
legal basis for this -  unless we are willing to confer the relevant powers upon 
democratically unaccountable committees of experts or upon the Commission, which 
is beyond adequate parliamentary oversight. (European Parliament, 1989: 28)
Hence, ENVI asserted that it welcomed a far-reaching com m unitisation of the issue, 
but that it also expected the regulation of green biotechnology to meet certain 
democratic criteria. The existing procedures provided by the Treaty failed to do so. 
ENVI, in this case, deemed dem ocracy and European integration to be at odds with 
one another and the com mittee made it clearthat its priority lay with democracy.
45 As Tam ara K. Hervey explains, '[t]his interpretation is on the basis of Decision 87/373/EC, [1987] OJ 
L197/33, which provides, in Article 2, for two "variants" on the "regulatory committee procedure" 
(procedure III). The procedure under Directive 90/220 was "Variant a", according to which, if the Council 
has not acted, the proposal is to be adopted by the Commission. "Variant b" provides that this is to be 
the case "save where the Council has decided against the measures by a simple majority". The 
implication is that a unanim ous vote in Council is required to reject or amend the proposal under 
"Variant a"' (Hervey, 2001: 322).
Overall, discussions on the distribution of com petences lacked intensity. This issue 
was regarded as one of many others, in a piece of legislation that was not 
controversial:
I don't think ... at least internally, that there were that many tensions [at the time of 
the first DRD] ... because that was really the beginning [of green biotechnology as a 
political and legal issue]. And people had still to figure what would be the real impact, 
what were the risks and so and so forth ... . So I think the matter was still too new ... 
and very few Member States had an interest in the subject. (Council Secretariat 
respondent)
As mentioned previously, green biotechnology politics only entered their 'hot phase' 
in the second half of the 1990s. This phase partially overlapped with the preparation 
of the regulation on novel food, since it took the EP and the Council five years, from 
1992 to 1997, to agree on this legal act. Central bottlenecks did not include the setup 
of the approval system and there was little discussion on this issue. The 'standard' 
procedure that was adopted was basically an exact replica of its DRD counterpart 
(European Parliam ent and Council of the European Union, 1997: 4, 6).
The novel food regulation received considerable criticism, but not on the grounds that 
the act excluded M em ber States or limited their com petences. Instead, critics 
bemoaned that the regulation's labelling provisions were not strict enough or that it 
provided for a simplified application procedure. Hence, debates were not led in term s 
of com petence struggles, but mostly regarded the strictness of the regulation. 
Conflicts did not oppose Member States and EU institutions, but occurred across the 
various actors. To give an example, different groups within the EP fundam entally 
disagreed on how strict or soft the new regulation needed to be:
My group ... does not support amendments that want to abolish the simplified 
procedure ... in the light of the size of industry and the sometimes small changes in 
products, market approval of all new products by the strict procedure entails 
unnecessary heavy administrative burdens (MEP Eisma, in Europees Parlement, 
1996b)46
46 This is the author's own translation. The Dutch version, as in the document, reads as follows: 'Míjn 
fractie ... s te u n t... geen amendementen die de lichtere procedure willen afschaffen ... gezien de 
om vang van de industrie en de soms kleine veranderingen aan producten, brengt het een onnodige 
zware administratieve last met zich mee om alle producten via de strenge procedure toe te laten op de 
markt'.
With regard to the intended protection and the desired trust of the consumer, an 
authorisation procedure needs to be established whereby as many potential risks as 
possible have to be eliminated. This means that a thorough procedure with adequate 
risk assessments and safety assessments is in any case necessary. A simple 
notification procedure does not fulfil these criteria. (Europees Parlement, 1996a: 23)47
The introduction of a simplified procedure opposed supporters and sceptics of green 
biotechnology, i.e. those that deemed green biotechnology a risk and those that 
deemed it an opportunity. Signifiers such as sovereignty were absent from the 
debate.
Legislation redux
The first generation of legislation had been negotiated at a tim e when public 
attention towards green biotechnology was on the rise, but not an EU-wide 
phenomenon. However, in the years that followed the first attem pted imports of GM 
crops in late 1996, the salience of the issue considerably increased (M urphy & 
Levidow, 2006: 2; Patterson, 2000: 318). Pressure to overhaul existing legislation on 
green biotechnology built up, in particular when six M em ber States announced that 
they would not agree with the authorisation of GMOs or GM products, be it for 
cultivation or import, as long as labelling and traceability provisions had not been 
tightened.
A frequent argum ent in academ ic literature is that EU M ember States have the 
tendency to retain com petences in political areas which are of particular importance. 
In line with this argument, Maria Lee asserts a general 'reluctance of Member States 
to reduce their control over such a politically sensitive issue' as green biotechnology 
(Lee, forthcom ing). However, during the second generation of legislation in this field, 
com petence debates have been virtually absent and Member States have supported a 
further com m unitisation of green biotechnology.
47 This is the author's own translation. The Dutch version, as in the document, reads as follows: 'M et het 
oog op de nagestreefde bescherm ing en het gewenste vertrouwen van de consum ent moet er een 
toelatingsprocedure worden ingesteld, daar potentiële risico's zo veel mogelijk moeten worden 
uitgesloten. Dit betekent dat een nauwgezette procedure met toereikende risicoevaluaties en 
veiligheidsbeoordelingen in ieder geval noodzakelijk is. Een eenvoudige kennisgevingsprocedure 
voldoet niet aan deze eisen'.
At the end of the old and the beginning of the new millennium, the EU witnessed a 
major overhaul of directives and regulations on green biotechnology. Although this 
m eant that the cards were shuffled anew, governments undertook no visible efforts 
to move the approval procedures into a more state-centred or -dominated direction.
Adm ittedly, a shift occurred nevertheless -  the new deliberate release directive, 
2001/18, enabled Member States to reject a Commission draft more easily, with a 
qualified m ajority vote. This, however, was not a change that Member States had 
requested -  at least not in this particular context. Instead, it resulted from a reform of 
com itology procedures that had been agreed independently (Council of the European 
Union, 1999; Grabner, Hampel, Lindsey, & Torgersen, 2001: 29). For M ember State 
respondents, this change in com itology rules seemed to be of minor importance; 
m any of them were even unable to rem em ber the actual alterations. At no time did 
M em ber State respondents refer to the com itology changes as a strengthening of 
M em ber State sovereignty.
W ith the regulation on genetically modified feed and food (Reg. (EC) No 1829/2003), 
approval procedures were further centralised. Germ any had advocated such a 
centralisation already during the preparation of directive 2001/18. The basic idea was 
to take risk assessm ent out of the hands of M ember States and transfer it to the EU 
level -  that is, to the newly founded European Food and Safety Agency (EFSA). This 
m eant that applications were to be scrutinised by EFSA and not, as had previously 
been the case, by M ember State authorities.48 Subsequent to and based on EFSA's 
opinion, the Comm ission had to draft a proposal that, in any case, needed to undergo 
a com itology procedure.
The idea of a centralisation of procedures was widely welcom ed by Member States:
There was quite a consensus about the centralised new procedures, authorisation and 
assessment. Because almost every Member State agreed th a t... the procedures that 
we got before this regulation were not operational every time. Because there were 
some differences between Member States. So everyone agreed that it would be 
better to have a centralised procedure (Member State respondent)
48 Under certain circum stances, EFSA is requested or obliged to consult national authorities (Lee, 2008: 
67).
Only the French ... were actually rather against that central role. But apart from that, 
only we protested a little. The trend [among Member States] was actually that it 
[centralisation] is okay. (Member State respondent)
Respondents interpreted the m otivations for such consent differently. Particularly 
those respondents who had opposed the shift argued that M em ber States opted for 
centralisation only for the sake of convenience:
In X [Member State], there was something of a short-term window, where ministers 
said: We do want centralisation on the EU level. Because then we ourselves won't be 
taking so much flak nationally ... shortly after, it was seen again that this 
centralisation is also a fairish curtailment of Member State scope and meanwhile we 
act again rather critical with regard to centralisation (Member State respondent)
Maybe some ... wanted to push the hot potato off to the Commission and to EFSA.... 
people said ... GM risk assessment, we are actually quite happy when we do not have 
to do it ... many also do not have the resources. (Member State respondent)
These accounts, however, did not correspond with the accounts that were given by 
those respondents who had been in favour of centralisation:
The point... was that the procedures got stuck ... and one consideration at that time 
was ... [that] you have all procedures in one hand and the procedures are not such a 
long haul ... also on the part of the Member States there was consensus that people 
said ... we want such a procedure, because then procedures are not such a long haul. 
(Member State respondent)
Even opponents conceded that the idea to involve a central food authority in the 
approval procedures was promising
EFSA was indeed designed in a way that one could assume th a t... this could work well 
... one was confident that EFSA was going to do a good job. (Member State 
respondent)
Signifiers of effectiveness (connected to centralisation) and expertise (connected to 
EFSA) are dom inant in these accounts and argum ents are linked to the conviction that 
the EU level is better suited to provide both. A sim ilar discursive logic is present in 
official Commission docum ents, for example in the explanatory memorandum to the 
Com m ission's original proposal for 1829/2003:
In order to streamline and improve the efficiency of the current authorisation 
procedure for genetically modified foods ... the Authority should carry out risk 
assessments. As envisaged in the proposal for a European Food Authority, the 
Authority should also carry out risk assessment for genetically modified feed. This will 
... ensure a harmonised approach to scientific assessment of genetically modified 
foods and feed. (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 6, respondent's 
own emphasis)
It can be concluded that even if EU actors were divided on many aspects, managerial 
signifiers managed to create at least a small parcel of common ground in the field of 
green biotechnology politics.
Adm ittedly, parts of the EP and the M em ber States impeded further centralisation. 
They rejected that applicants should send their dossiers directly to EFSA, thereby 
circum venting the national authorities. This course of action had been envisioned by 
the Com m ission's original proposal. In this context, again, a rejection was hardly 
linked to sovereignty considerations. Other concerns and signifiers dominated the 
general discussion:
People concentrated on ... labelling [rules] and we [the respondent's group] ... also 
demanded the labelling of animal products ... . And those were the topics people 
jumped at. And not on the authorisation, which is simply well regulated (EP 
respondent)
The reasons why we were against that [that national authorities were 'passed over'], 
was th a t... we said ... if you know who in the Commission is working on these things, 
you get afraid at the thought [of further centralisation]. Those people cannot decide 
this. Because they simply lack the know-how to do so. Okay? In the section that was 
responsible, six people were sitting around. And they had a load of work. They would 
not have been able to handle the whole thing .... And we said, we have to include the 
know-how of the Member States. (EP respondent)
Several conclusions can be drawn from the last few paragraphs. Firstly, up until today 
green biotechnology has undergone numerous legislative changes. These repeated 
overhauls have been the visible expressions of a general contestedness and a 
discursive undecidedness of the field of green biotechnology. Attem pts to engender a 
certain closure or at least a tem porary fixation through legislation failed.
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Secondly, com petences in this area were distributed m ainly in the context of approval 
procedures. The constant making and remaking of legal acts could have provided a 
forum  for protracted com petence struggles between EU Member States and 
institutions. However, this was not the case. The contentious issues and divides of 
which respondents spoke were neither related to sovereignty considerations nor to 
com petence expansion. Particularly in the context of the regulation on GM food and 
feed, the M ember States, at least in their majority, agreed to a further centralisation 
of green biotechnology at a tim e when the general issue of green biotechnology had 
dram atically increased in what might be termed 'political sensitivity' or 'salience'.
To be sure, the regulation of green biotechnology on the EU level has always been 
contentious and contested. Critical voices argued against simplified approval 
procedures or against the exclusion of Mem ber States from the initial phase of the 
approval procedure. However, this criticism was mostly embedded in discourses in 
which signifiers such as statehood or sovereignty played only a marginal role.
Discursive dynamics, identity formation, competence distribution
Competing discourses
But which signifiers dominated discourses in the field of green biotechnology politics 
instead? A comparison with EU climate change politics can provide a first answer. In 
EU climate change politics, contentions and competing discourses mostly revolved 
around the question of how to tackle climate change. Yet, there was a shared 
understanding that climate change was a problem in the first place. Hence, there was 
a basic discursive fixation of EU climate change politics. Policym akers shared a 
common ground despite the remaining differences.
Even today, such a common ground is absent in EU politics in the field of green 
biotechnology. This is an area where discourses are competing for hegem ony at a 
more fundamental level. An end (read: closure) of this undecidedness is currently not 
in sight.
In the field of green biotechnology, discourses have so far differed on the basic 
question of whether green biotechnology needs to be seen as a problem. In the past,
the answer to this question divided the field into green biotechnology supporters and 
green biotechnology sceptics.
The positions policym akers took on green biotechnology were embedded in 
discursive cobwebs of signifiers. These cobwebs widely structured how actors 
perceived others and them selves. To give an example, in the literature and in the 
interviews, being 'pro-GM ' was often linked to being business friendly, whereas being 
'anti-G M 'w as often associated with being environment-minded.
In their totality and interconnectedness, these signifiers added up to two juxtaposed 
discourses that were fairly stable. These discourses were crucial in providing all actors 
with screens for identification and yardsticks for meaning making.
Although discourses are ever-changing, the following paragraphs try to highlight the 
dom inant signifiers and logics of the discourses competing in the field of EU green 
biotechnology politics. In the case of what will be termed the pro-GM discourse, the 
new biotechnology was seen as an opportunity. 'Risk' had no preponderant position in 
this discourse. GMOs were not deemed to be more dangerous than other organisms, 
nor to be less natural or normal. Risks had not been scientifically proven; hence, the 
organism s were safe and there was no rational reason to forsake the possibilities of 
scientific and economic progress which were linked to green biotechnology. 
O pponents -  the 'outside' -  were unscientific and irrational; their argum ents were 
emotional, political, or outright opportunist. This is echoed by the following 
statements:
We must ... get rid of the whole unscientific mentality surrounding this issue. We 
must not allow fundamentalist political ideas to hide behind the cloak of ethical 
objections (MEP Valverde López, in European Parliament, 1999)
Nevertheless, all unnecessary and disproportionately hard requirements have to be 
avoided ... which could endanger ... the renewal and the economic and social 
development, especially in the area of biotechnology where European science and 
technology are pioneers (MEP Carvalho Cardoso, in Europees Parlement, 1989)49
49 This is the author's own translation. The Dutch version, as in the document, reads as follows: 
'Desalniettem in moeten alle onnodige en overdreven zware eisen ... die de vernieuwing en de 
economische en sociale ontwikkeling, metname op het vlak van de biotechnologie, waarin de Europese 
wetenschap en technologie een voortrekkersrol spelen, in gevaar kunnen brengen ... worden 
vermeden'.
Over recent years ... public discussion has not been about the pros and cons of genetic 
engineering, but has instead been a campaign mounted along ideological lines, aimed 
at obstructing a modern and forward-looking technology (MEP Schnellhardt, in 
European Parliament, 2003a)
Today we are in a situation where, seen from a scientific point of view, protection is 
certainly very much disproportionate (Member State respondent)
It is true that there are ... discussions on the safety of biotechnology, but actually, in 
the light of all objective data, one has to say that it [biotechnology] has proven itself, 
it is under control (Member State respondent)
I think our position essentially was always ... based on evidence and science, that we 
think there should be rules, b u t... that they should be related to safety. If the product 
meets the safety rules then it should be authorised (Member State respondent)
The Netherlands ... have always remained stable on the same path. This [the 
deliberate release directive] is a directive for the approval of products. It is based on 
scientific assessment. If scientific assessment indicates th a t... no risks are expected, 
then simply go ahead. (Member State respondent)
Rationality and science were key signifiers in the pro-GM discourse. Science was 
linked to reliability and certainty; as there had not been any conclusive scientific proof 
that green biotechnology was inherently more risky than conventional methods of 
plant breeding, it followed that green biotechnology did not pose any problems. The 
fact that sceptics disregarded these objective findings placed the latter on the 
outside. This outside was beyond rationality. It was a shadowy area of irrational, 
progress-threatening obscurantism.
Science was also present in the anti-GM discourse. However, in this context, science 
was interpreted very differently:
[S]cientific uncertainty about the nature and extent of the risks is increasing (MEP 
Lannoye, in European Parliament, 2003a)
This is a technology whose risk affliction we do not know yet ... not the internal 
market and its establishment must be in the front, but ... the avoidance of risks (EP 
respondent)
[There is] a certain remaining risk ... and you should not accept this [risk] if the only 
beneficiary is America's big industry. (Member State respondent)
In the anti-GM discourse, science was linked to signifiers such as uncertainty and risk. 
Scientific findings had not been able to eliminate uncertainty. Green biotechnology 
still posed risks -  for consumers, (small) farmers, or the environm ent. Supporters of 
the technology formed a normative outside. They allowed things and persons that 
ought to be protected to be placed in danger, they did not accept the dem ocratically 
legitimate objections of GM critics, and they were driven by either economic profit or 
a naive belief in progress.
The signifiers which dominated the pro-GM discourse and its anti-GM counterpart 
partially overlapped. However, these signifiers were enmeshed in different systems of 
meaning making. Hence, the meaning that was 'attached' to them  varied from one 
discourse to the other. In the anti-GM discourse, science lost the status as a panacea 
and m om ent of closure (which it had in the pro-GM discourse). Business was not 
considered to increase the profit and welfare of all, but instead it was linked to the 
greed of few.
Loyalties and divides
The pro-/anti-GM divide was most visible between M ember States. Entire countries 
were classified as 'pro' or 'anti' GM. M em ber States in the context of green 
biotechnology politics were not seen in term s of equivalence (as one group of 
M em ber States), but in term s of difference (as the group of pro-GM M ember States 
and the group of anti-GM M ember States):
There are simply fundamentally different attitudes in the Member States (Member 
State respondent)
A number of Member States ... were mostly concerned about let's say the green 
dimensions ... a few Member States ... were more concerned with the industry 
dimension, that is, it is industry where the EU could take the lead or at least develop 
significantly (Council Secretariat respondent)
The Member States were totally at odds with one another ... you had moratorium 
countries and non-moratorium countries (Commission respondent)
The Council was divided into two camps (Member State respondent)
You had one group [of Member States] against the other group, you see? You had 
one group which thought that they protected Europe's safety with a moratorium and 
there was another group that found that the five [moratorium] countries50, for 
political reasons, simply made tabula rasa with everything that had scientifically been 
proven to be safe. (Member State respondent)
Respondents described M ember States as two opposing groups, as two antipodes. 
They were usually quite clear about their own position in this division. Linguistically, 
they referred to the rift between the countries in rather drastic term s (totally, 
fundam entally). They employed us-and-them  classifications and som etimes 
interpreted green biotechnology politics in term s of warfare:
In earlier times, we had much more allies ... . The opposite camp has grown much 
bigger. (Member State respondent)
However, the divide was not limited to the M ember States. Rifts also ran through the 
EP, its fractions and its committees. To give an example, during the debate on the 
traceability regulation (which was to com plem ent both 2001/18 and 1829/2003), ENVI 
m em bers complained that the statement made by 'their' rapporteur did not echo the 
opinion of the com mittee, but his own. On the same occasion, the draftsman for the 
Com m ittee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy emphasised that his 
com mittee
was divided into two, with those in the minority able to see, to their immense 
satisfaction, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy 
represent their position more closely than the opinion of their own Committee. 
(European Parliament, 2002)
During the preparation of regulation 1829/2003, the EP was split into the conservative 
group and the rest:
We had one line, representatives of my group with few British exceptions. We had the 
Greens, the Communists, the Liberals on our side in many areas. And then the 
European People's Party was this big block at that time ... [they] accused us of sitting 
in an ivory to w er... of having no clue, of demanding things that are not feasible etc. 
etc. etc...... [They were] against all consumer-friendly claims ... . The biggest victory
50 These five countries were: Greece, France, Denmark, Italy, and Luxemburg.
was to fend off that attack of the ... People's Party in Parliament. Which simply 
wanted to massively weaken the Commission proposal. (EP respondent)
The fact that rifts did not heed the borders of institutional affiliation enabled the 
developm ent of cross-institutional loyalties. Thus, it so happened that parts of 
Parliam ent 'defended' the Commission and its proposal against other MEPs. 
However, it must be mentioned that the collaboration between the Commission and 
the EP -  or rather, between parts of the Commission and parts of the EP -  was not as 
intense as in early phases of EU climate change politics (see chapter 5).
In EU green biotechnology politics, how actors perceived others and how actors 
positioned them selves towards others was structured largely within the dynam ics of 
the two competing discourses. To give an example, respondents frequently referred 
to them selves or to others as 'pro' or 'anti' GM. They clearly indicated who took which 
side, who was 'with them ' and who was not.
Although some actors tried to claim a middle ground between the two discourses, this 
was impossible in practice. Especially Commission respondents tried to present 
them selves as a balancing, mediating element:
I believe ... the position of the Commission is, I would say, rather balanced and this 
balance comes from a balance or an equilibrium of interests. Which are the interests 
of different stakeholders, companies, consumers, Member States and so on ... . I 
would say that there is ... no a priori position in the Commission. (Commission 
respondent)
However, non-Com mission respondents classified the Commission as clearly 'pro- 
GM'. Consequently, GM supporters considered the Commission to be on their side. 
They regarded the Commission as a bastion of ratio against the arbitrariness and 
populism of (anti-GM ) M em ber States and as a warrantor of functioning and effective 
approval procedures:
One ... feels sorry for the Commission. All these political emotions that are latently 
there [on the side of 'GM sceptics'] ... they have to try and balance them, you see? 
This moratorium that allegedly no longer exists, it only no longer exists because the 
Commission holds the company together (Member State respondent)
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I think on food and feed stuff, I think we were fairly close with the Commission ... . I 
think we were fairly close. In saying that you got to do what's practical and what's 
based on science (Member State respondent)
The Commission follows more of a scientific-practical impetus (Member State 
respondent)
We thus saw that the Member States ... were hopelessly at odds with one another and 
were quarrelling and nothing [no approval request] passed any more ... . In earlier 
times I always got very nervous when the Commission started to interfere. Now it is 
good that the Commission does things, because otherwise everything would come to 
a halt. (Member State respondent)
For sim ilar reasons, GM supporters embraced EFSA. In their eyes, EFSA produced 
objective and reliable results based on neutral science:
EFSA is ... doing solid work, okay? EFSA is doing very good, scientific, solid work. 
(Member State respondent)
However, GM sceptics judged both the Commission and EFSA very differently:
I do think that, in principle, the Commission ... would like to see biotechnology as a 
sector in agriculture ... realised to a certain extent ... . I think that ... economic 
interests are still somewhat of a unifying factor, also on the side of the Commission 
(Member State respondent)
The Commission is a liberal, right-wing institution. Had close links with the operators. 
And therefore were pushing for free market... they were certainly pushing for placing 
products on the market and ... they were backed by the industry. Which always 
wanted the Commission to handle these products, not the Member States (Member 
State respondent)
We do have the impression that EFSA is manned by scientists of whom you cannot 
say that they are partisan or that they are under the direct influence of a 
biotechnology company, but that yet they themselves have interests not to amputate 
their own scientific areas. And they are believers in science or in progress (Member 
State respondent)
When one takes a first look from the outside, at who is in there [in EFSA], and at the 
management board, too ... the German representative is basically a representative of 
the German food industry. I don't want to comment on this any further now, b u t...
when it is said that it is ... a concluding scientific verdict that is to be returned on 
certain things, then this is indeed a bit surprising. (Member State respondent)
Hence, in the perception o f'G M  sceptic' respondents, both Commission and EFSA did 
not act on the basis of objective criteria and data. Instead, business or research 
interests drove these institutions. Like all scientists, EFSA scientists could not be 
trusted. They purely served their own advantage.
Competence distribution
The com peting discourses did not only dom inate how actors positioned them selves 
towards others. They also underlay decisions about the distribution of com petences 
in this field. As, for instance, GM supporting countries deemed EFSA and the 
Comm ission to be on their side, they had little difficulty with the centralisation of 
green biotechnology as a policy area. Supporters welcomed a major role for either of 
the two institutions:
[On comitology impasses under the new legislation] The Commission can decide ... .
So now we have again products coming to the m arket... we think it's good. (Member 
State respondent)
Not all M em ber State governm ents were m onolithically pro- or anti-GM. Sometimes, 
the pro-/anti-GM divide ran between or even through ministries. Hence, there were 
disagreem ents within M em ber States on how to allocate com petences in the context 
of approval procedures:
The interesting thing is also that, well, in my impression, today it is rather the 
research and innovation politicians [in the respondent's Member State] who push for 
a further, stronger centralisation of approval procedures ... thinking that this is a bit 
further away from politics (Member State respondent)
The people in X [the research ministry of a Member State] of course, which you could 
subsume under the group of biotechnology proponents ... would prefer that 
everything works on a technical level, because they assume that somehow there 
would be more approvals then and a less critical assessment. And ... biotechnology 
critics say of course, no no no ... this is political and those are crucial decisions, 
because they imagine that when ... there are fewer scientists involved, but more
politicians, that they then have a bigger chance, that is, that the EU in total adopts a 
more critical attitude. (Member State respondent)
It can be concluded that the discursive dynam ics in EU green biotechnology politics 
make it almost impossible to speak of 'the EP' or 'the M ember States' in this context. 
Moreover, with regard to the distribution of com petences, these dynam ics produced 
constellations that drastically differed from what conventional EIS suggests. The most 
obvious example for this mismatch is the issue of co-existence.
From early on, the question of how conventional and GM agriculture could possibly 
co-exist was present in the debates on green biotechnology. How was one to avoid 
the accidental mixing of 'conventional' and 'G M ' in the course of cultivation, harvest, 
transport, storage, and processing? Especially during the second reading of regulation 
1829/2003 in the EP, the issue became more prom inent and manifest. Pushed by 'GM 
sceptic' MEPs in particular, an am endm ent on co-existence was inserted into directive 
2001/18 via Article 43 of regulation 1829/2009.
This am endment, entitled 'M easures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs', 
explicitly enabled M em ber States to 'take appropriate m easures to avoid the 
unintended presence of GMOs in other products'. In addition, it asked the 
Comm ission to
gather and coordinate information based on studies at Community and national level, 
observe the developments regarding co-existence in the Member States and, on the 
basis of the information and observations, develop guidelines on the co-existence of 
genetically modified, conventional and organic crops. (European Parliament and 
Council ofthe European Union, 2003: 20f)
GM-critical parts o fth e  EP were eager to invest the M em ber States with the rights to 
ensure co-existence on 'their' territory. MEPs feared that, without these rights, the 
Comm ission might reject M em ber State m easures to keep conventional and GM 
agriculture separated:
There was a big interest certainly on the side ofthe Greens and the Socialist group 
that ... the Member States get such possibilities ... without Article 26a [the 
amendment in 2001/18], the Commission would have acted much stricter against co­
existence legislation ... it would have said that in this area, an exhaustive scheme of 
regulation has been established. And that therefore there was no space for co­
existence measures on the Member State level ... . With Article 26a ... the leeway of
Member States to become active in the area of co-existence has certainly grown. 
(Member State respondent)
In contrast to what conventional EIS assumes, MEPs ardently advocated additional 
M em ber State com petences in the context of co-existence whereas Member States 
them selves often were lukewarm to the idea at best. Yet, as the statem ent of the 
rapporteur for 1829/2003 underlines, parliamentarians had other goals in mind than to 
safeguard or to restore M ember State 'sovereignty':
At second reading, I have focused on the issue of co-existence, which clearly affects 
how we are going to retain different forms of agriculture in Europe in the future, but 
[which] is also directly related to consumer choice. I wanted European legislation to 
be logical; if genetically modified organisms are authorised centrally then the rules for 
co-existence should also be laid down centrally. There was no majority in favour of 
th is ...
Through this compromise we give the Member States the possibility of taking 
appropriate measures to guarantee co-existence and thus also freedom of choice for 
consumers in the future. As a member ofthe European Parliament, I would obviously 
have liked the Member States to be placed under an obligation to do this. 
Unfortunately, the short time available meant that it was not possible to negotiate 
this. I believe, though, that this compromise does put the onus on the Member States 
not just to sit back and point the finger at Brussels where this important issue is 
concerned, but also to fulfil their own responsibility in this respect and to protect 
consumers' freedom of choice. (MEP Scheele, in European Parliament, 2003a)
Hence, for MEPs that supported the amendment, conferring com petences to Member 
States was only a means to an end. Large parts o fth e  EP would even have preferred 
to bind M em ber States to Com m unity-wide rules for separating GM and conventional 
agriculture.51
The position of DG Agriculture, which 'represents' the Commission in the context of 
co-existence, is equally at odds with assum ptions of conventional EIS. Up until now, 
the DG has worked on the task it was given by Article 43, which is to develop co­
existence guidelines. A respective recommendation was adopted in July 2003. 
However, DG Agriculture has so far decidedly refrained from advocating binding EU
51 To push such binding rules was also the intention of EP resolution 2003/2098(INI). 
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legislation. Instead, the DG has emphasised Member State autonom y and 
subsidiarity:
Regarding the request for uniform and binding rules for co-existence at Community 
level, we are not convinced that this would be a feasible solution . . . .  Scientists have 
repeatedly supported the subsidiarity-based approach ... . Member States also 
increasingly see this as the appropriate way forward ... co-existence cannot be a 
reason to further delay the authorisation of new GMOs. I do not share the opinion ... 
that Member States should be obliged to put in place legislation to ensure co­
existence. On the contrary, we should leave it up to them to explore the use of 
different policy instruments (A representative of DG Agriculture, in European 
Parliament, 2003b)
What is an efficient and cost-effective best practice is specific to national and regional 
or local conditions. This makes an EU-wide 'one-size-fits-all' approach unworkable 
(Franz Fischler, former Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development and 
Fisheries, in European Commission, 2003)
If we hurried into applying a new, harmonised approach ... in the case of co-existence 
problems, the legal implications would be enormous ... . Overall, then: at this stage, 
harmonisation of whatever kind would probably be a blunt instrument. For the time 
being, only Member States can do the detailed and delicate work required to make 
co-existence a reality. (Marianne Fischer Boel, successor of Franz Fischler, in 
European Commission, 2006)
In the context of co-existence, EU actors repeatedly acted in contradiction to what 
would have been expected by conventional EIS. 'The EP' argued for more Member 
State com petences; 'the Com m ission' insisted on M em ber State autonomy. Member 
States them selves, however, remained rem arkably silent.
Signifiers such as 'autonom y' or 'sovereignty' were not absent in the context of co­
existence, yet they were not dom inant either. As emerges from the statem ents 
above, DG Agriculture's main concern was to keep legislation in the area of green 
biotechnology effective. To this end, DG gladly forewent further Com m unity 
competences. Likewise, when MEPs promoted M ember State com petences in 
m atters of co-existence, they had other, 'higher' aims in mind. Hence, in the context 
of co-existence, state autonom y and sovereignty were not ends in them selves, but 
by-passes on the route to other goals.
Defending sovereign territory
Judging from  what has been said so far, EU green biotechnology politics is a curious 
case when seen from the perspective of conventional EIS. In the past, questions of 
com petence distribution and institutional affiliation were of no major concern and 
when they did emerge, they were dominated by the dynam ics o fth e  tw o competing 
discourses in the field. Signifiers such as sovereignty were either absent or sub­
ordinate to signifiers that were more dominant.
This, to be sure, was not the case for EU green biotechnology politics as a whole. Even 
in this field, a parcel existed where M em ber States perceived each other as peers and 
the Commission as an outside intruder; where M ember States swung the flag of 
statehood and sovereignty; where 'pro-GM ' or 'anti-G M ' did not matter. This parcel 
was the domain o fth e  safeguard clauses.
Safeguard clauses enable M ember States to ban a GM organism or a GM product 
nationally from cultivation or import. M ember States invoked these clauses both 
before and after the moratorium. To this end, countries either referred to Article 16 of 
directive 90/220 or, later on, to Article 23 of 2001/18.
Article 23 imposes higher requirem ents on M ember States to justify their bans than its 
predecessor did. Previously, M em ber States 'only' needed to provide 'justifiable 
reasons to consider that a product ... constitutes a risk to human health or the 
environm ent' (Council o fth e  European Com munities, 1990: 20). Since 2001, a ban is 
acceptable when
a Member State, as a result of new or additional information made available since the 
date ofthe consent and affecting the environmental risk assessment or reassessment 
of existing information on the basis of new or additional scientific knowledge, has 
detailed grounds for considering that a GMO as or in a product... constitutes a risk to 
human health orthe environment. (European Parliament and Council ofthe European 
Union, 2001:14)
As M em ber States are obliged under 2001/18 to present information that is either new 
or additional to current knowledge, the hurdle they need to overcom e is arguably 
higher than the one posed by the first DRD.
In the past, EFSA and the Commission in most cases rejected the 'evidence' which 
M em ber States put forward to justify their bans. The Commission asked the
respective M ember States to lift the bans. If a Member State refused, 'the EU' had to 
decide on the ban. This meant that a com itology procedure was initiated which, as far 
as its institutional design was concerned, resembled the procedure for the 
authorisation of a GM organism or a GM product.
In practically all o fth e  authorisation procedures that took place, Member States were 
unable to arrive at a common decision. They never reached a qualified m ajority for or 
against the Commission proposal. Hence, the Commission took the final decisions. 
However, com itology procedures concerning safeguard clauses followed a different 
logic. In all instances, the Commission was confronted with a large majority of 
M em ber States voting 'in favour of' the state that had invoked the clause. Bans, 
therefore, were not lifted.
This meant that, sometimes, M em ber States advocated the EU-wide approval of a 
GM organism or a GM product on the grounds that it was safe, but at the same time 
supported the ban of this organism or product by a M ember State which claimed that 
safety was not given.
W hereas directive 2001/18 provides legal indications as to when a ban is justified, it 
seem s that the com itology decisions of many M ember States were guided by other 
criteria. According to respondents, even Member States that were not opposed to 
green biotechnology, and supported authorisations in principle, felt that other 
M em ber States should be able to invoke bans if they felt inclined to do so:
There was ... a vote on [the authorisation of] this blue carnation and there were ... 
Member States which voted for the authorisation of this carnation, but then ... voted 
against the lift ofthe Hungarian safeguard clause (Member State respondent)
I think th a t... in this case you can bring a whole bunch of Member States on board ... 
which actually have a problem that somehow the autonomy of Member States is 
questioned. And they simply take the position, regardless of whether they ... think 
that what [a Member State] does is correct ... "we don't want the Commission to ... 
bully an individual Member State in that manner and to say, you ... have to take back 
your safeguard clause". And in that case, Member States go along of which you 
otherwise would not expect that. And which otherwise ... in the case of an 
authorisation would not vote against the authorisation (Member State respondent)
[Member States support bans] maybe simply as a matter of principle, because they 
say, Member States should have the right to have their own opinion and to enforce it
... . That is not only an assumption, it is also what I hear ... so this Member States 
solidarity does exist (Member State respondent)
We think it's a right ofthe Member State if he [sic] has concerns about a specific GMO 
to take a safeguard measure. We didn't wantto agree with the Commission to askthe 
Member State to stop this kind of measure. So it was more like an agreement 
between the Member States to say: the regulation allows Member States to take this 
kind of measure ... it was ... at least in X [the respondent's country] not an agreement 
on the specific measure, it was more on the general principle to allow Member States 
to take some measures. (Member State respondent)
As absent as signifiers such as statehood and sovereignty were in wide parts of EU 
green biotechnology politics -  in matters related to the safeguard clause, these 
signifiers still did their work of 'gluing' Member States to a group of peers which 
formed a common inside. It seemed as if the major differences that divided the 
Member States in other contexts of green biotechnology had disappeared.
The Commission was perceived as the threatening outside. The collective imperative 
ofthe Member States was to avert its attacks and attempts to invade their realm. As 
Member States regarded themselves as a tight-knit community in the context of 
safeguard clauses, they interpreted an attack on one of them as an attack on all. 
When the Commission attempted to lift a ban, this was seen as a transgression into 
the collective sphere ofthe Member States:
The Commission proposal [to lift bans] prevails against the explicit will of one 
Member State and that is something that has to give us pause for thought. (The 
Portuguese Environment Minister, Francisco Nunes Correia, cited in Euractiv, 2008a)
Although 'statehood' and 'sovereignty' were dominant in this context, they did not 
structure meaning making entirely. Some Member State representatives expressed 
their strong disapproval for the solidarity most Member States demonstrated when it 
came to safeguard clauses:
[Commenting the Austrian ban, and Germany's decision to support it] Germany has ... 
solidarised with the wrongdoers ... . I think that is wrong. In my opinion, it is not only 
wrong, but also contrary to law ... you are only allowed to do that [invoke the 
safeguard clause], if there are factual reasons for it ... these measures would have had 
to be lifted, just as the Commission proposed (MemberState respondent)
It contradicts, I think ... a bit the European idea ... that you actually want to have 
harmonised regulations in the EU. And so when there is a majority for certain 
regulations, then I as a Member State have to comply, even if that hurts or even if I do 
not want that. (Member State respondent)
Hence, although the statehood/sovereignty discourse became hegemonial in the 
context of safeguard clauses, it failed to integrate all Member States or, rather, all 
Member State representatives. Outright GM supporters in particular opposed this 
manifestation of Member State solidarity.
In this context, consequently, GM 'supporters' almost coincidentally found 
themselves on the Commission or Community side. As a result, the Commission was 
supported in its attempt to lift the bans by EU countries that, under other 
circumstances, were not considered the natural allies ofthe Commission. Maybe the 
least likely 'supporter' was the United Kingdom. It belonged to the small circle of 
countries which repeatedly argued and voted for a lift o fth e  bans and thus, in the 
dominant discursive logic, spoke out against Member State autonomy.
Conclusion
EU green biotechnology exemplifies a policy field that in the past was dominated by 
signifiers and discursive logics different from those that are commonly expected. In 
this field, signifiers that are widely seen as central in EU politics were virtually 
meaningless, in the double sense that they, first, were of little relevance and, second, 
had no capacity to structure meaning.
In this area, state 'autonomy' or 'sovereignty' almost drowned in a discursive field that 
was still fundamentally 'undecided' and therefore was dominated not by a singular 
hegemonic discourse, but by the competition between two discourses which aspired 
to hegemony. As state-related signifiers had no central position in either of these 
discourses, competence struggles either were of minor importance or were structured 
by the dynamics ofthe competing discourses. Institutional affiliation lost its defining 
moment of who was equivalent or different, who was part of the inside and who was 
part ofthe outside. Instead, identity was formed in terms of'pro' or 'anti GM'.
Nevertheless, even in green biotechnology, state-related signifiers managed to find a 
niche. Statehood and sovereignty became the undisputed key signifiers of the 
hegemonic discourse in the context of safeguard clauses. In this discursive enclave, 
Member States still felt that they formed a tight-knit brotherhood, standing as it were 
as a bulwark against Commission intrusion and the endangerment of 'state values' 
(autonomy, self-determination). The differences between GM supporting and GM 
sceptic Member States -  which otherwise were dominant and defining in EU green 
biotechnology politics -  were negated by Member State equivalence and solidarity.
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PART IV Final analysis 
8 . CASES, COMPARISON, CONCLUSION
In 1992, Jacques Derrida contended that '[s]omething unique is afoot in Europe, in 
what is still called Europe, even if we no longer know very well what or who goes by 
this name. Indeed, to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity 
should this name be assigned today?' (Derrida, 1992: 5).
Almost two decades have passed since Derrida made this statement, and many would 
assert that the world today fundamentally differs from the world then. Yet, it can be 
argued that we have hardly grown any wiser as far as the EU is concerned. We are still 
puzzled by 'what or who goes by this name', and the odds are small that this will 
change in the near future. After all, we are still undecided about what goes by the 
name of'The Netherlands' or 'The UK', concepts that have been with us for far longer.
As this research is based on an anti-essentialist ontology, it does not engage in efforts 
to uncover Europe's true nature. Still, it does try to deepen our understanding of how 
the EU presents itself to us today. To do so, discourse theory has been used as a path 
leading out o fth e  seeming cul-de-sac in which research on European integration -  
especially what has been called 'conventional' EIS -  had been stuck in.
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the relations between EU 
institutions and EU Member States, this work focused on an 'everyday' field of EU 
politics: environmental politics. Up until today, environmental politics sometimes has 
and sometimes has not been in the centre of political attention. It is one of many 
domains in which the 'normal' mode of EU decision-making (co-decision) applies. 
Environmental politics, however, does not stop at EU borders; rather, the EU has 
become a party to myriad MEAs on the international level. On both the national and 
international levels, issues have been at times highly neuralgic, and fierce 
controversies between EU actors have been sparked off.
These characteristics surely pertain to both of the cases chosen for analysis: (EU) 
climate change politics and green biotechnology politics. The intention in studying 
these cases was to problematise meaning making and identity formation among EU 
policymakers in these fields, rather than to take them for granted. In the following 
sections, 'findings' for each case will first be briefly summarised. It will then be
discussed to what extent this analysis leaves us with something of an 'added value' -  
or, to refer to the beginning of this chapter—to what extent, if at all, this analysis has 
made us any wiser when it comes to this crazy thing called the EU.
Climate change politics
The international level
In the view of conventional EIS, state-related signifiers -  such as state, statehood, 
sovereignty, state autonomy -  dominate EU politics. Conventional EIS assumes that 
being a state or not is central to both identity forming and meaning making in the EU. 
It divides EU actors into states and non-states, such as the Commission, the EP, or the 
ECJ. The latter's interests are said to necessarily differ from and conflict with state 
interests. 'Consequently', the relationship between states and non-states in the EU is 
overshadowed by struggles over competences that 'used to be those ofthe states'.
In the course of this research, a more nuanced and less monochromatic picture 
emerged. Looking at the last two decades of EU politics on climate change, for 
example, many instances stand out in which the 'statehood' logic has been subjected 
to destabilisation and/or marginalisation by other discursive logics. These offer 
alternative ways of meaning making and identity formation. To trace and understand 
these processes, however, a long term view is needed, as the analysis of singular 
'snapshots' risks jumping to conclusions. International climate change politics is a 
telling example in this respect.
For a long time, 'conventional' interpretations seemed to be able to account for the 
relationship between the Member States and the Community/Commission on the 
international level. The European Community had become a party to the UNFCCC, 
just as singular Member States had. Yet, 'the EU' remained 'states-driven', and 
Member States pursued their own 'state interest' at least as much as any alleged EU 
interest. Coordination and representation were the major task of the rotating 
Presidency. The troika, representing the EU in high-level talks, was composed 
exclusively of Member States until 2001.
Member States seemingly repelled any kind of Commission 'intrusion' into their 
international territory. In short, they were unwilling to renounce competences that
were theirs 'by tradition'. This interpretation is supported by the interviews conducted 
for this research, as Member State respondents both overwhelmingly and 
emphatically rejected a potential Commission mandate. In this context, they also 
regarded the Commission as threatening their integrity. Considering this, it seems 
legitimate to infer that competence struggles between Commission and Member 
States in the field of climate change politics simply expanded to the international 
level and continued to prosper there.
In contrast to this conclusion, this study asserts that by narrowing the focus of 
analysis and by reducing EU climate change politics on the international level to its 
formal-institutional aspects (such as the mandate question), the complete picture is 
missed. Firstly, such an analytical abridgement neglects that some o fth e  Member 
State respondents accepted the legal legitimacy of potential future mandate claims 
by the Commission. Not all Member States respondents linked mandate claims to 
illegitimate and malicious attempts by the Commission to expand its powers to the 
detriment ofthe Member States.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the concentration on the statehood signifier in 
analyses of the EU on the international level suggests solidarity and equivalence 
between the EU countries, but simultaneously diverts attention from the cracks within 
the Member State 'community'. In the case of international climate change politics, 
the fact that Member States more often than not thought of each other in terms of 
differences (between big-small, leader-laggard) considerably impacted 'real politics'. 
The events at COP-6 in The Hague were the most visible eruption ofthe conflicts that 
had smouldered under the surface of Member State concord.
Thirdly, the focus on the formal status-quo tends to conceal changes that have 
occurred not only on a formal, but also on an informal level. In fact, many Member 
States were and are unhappy that the rotating Presidency, as a mechanism for 
coordination and presentation, relies on the principle of statehood, thereby 
neglecting criteria of qualification. In the aftermath of COP-6, a mounting number of 
Member States have put aside their 'own interest' for the benefit of EU prosperity and 
success on the international level, while the rotating Presidency has been increasingly 
criticised for endangering the output ofthe EU as a whole. To improve this situation, 
Member States have agreed to institutional changes that would most likely be seen as 
major sovereignty/autonomy concessions in conventional literature. On a formal 
level, room has been made in the troika for the Commission. On somewhat more
informal terrain, the system of issue leaders and lead negotiators has factually ended 
Presidency primacy in the context of EU coordination and representation.
This new system can be considered illustrative ofthe crucial discursive changes that 
have occurred in EU climate change politics on the international level. 'EU 
performance' has come to dominate the discursive field, and with it, 'managerial' 
signifiers such as effectiveness or expertise have gained key positions. Statehood, in 
contrast, has strikingly 'degenerated', and has lost much of its former structuring 
power. In the system of issue leaders and lead negotiators, for instance, candidates 
are mainly selected regardless of their institutional affiliation. At the same time, the 
'managerial' signifiers have given the new discourse a certain 'apolitical' air. 
Competence distribution is no longer predominantly seen in terms of political 
struggles, but in terms of enhancing efficiency and output. Commission staff are 
regarded as particularly qualified combatants and not as power-obsessed adversaries. 
Consequently, the Commission has been able to assume functions that would, under 
other auspices, have triggered major controversies.
The rise of 'EU performance' to a key signifier in this domain has effectively stabilised 
relations within the EU on the international level. Firstly, 'EU performance' 
presupposes a common goal, thereby creating concord ('equivalence') between EU 
actors. It is also supported by signifiers that are central in dominant discourses 
beyond the field of EU politics. Efficiency, output, or skills, for instance, are prominent 
signifiers of 'grand' discourses or collective imaginaries that commonly go by names 
such as New Public Management or Neoliberalism. The acceptance of these signifiers 
in the context of climate change politics is intrinsically linked to their success within 
these wider systems of meaning. Often, these signifiers create acceptance by their 
pure naming regardless ofthe definite policy measures that are adopted in the end.
That said, it is most striking that 'EU' and 'performance' have increasingly been 
thought of as symbiotic. As Louise van Schaik notes 'only a small number of case 
studies have systematically analysed the EU's effectiveness or performance in 
international negotiations and have related it back to its institutional setup' (Van 
Schaik, 2009). Nonetheless, the common assumption in both policy-making and 
academic circles is that a definite commitment to unity is obligatory if the EU as an 
actor is to achieve anything in international climate change negotiations:
The fragmentation ofthe EC institutions ... has apparently ... negatively affected EC
foreign policy and negotiating behavior in the international arena. More precisely, the
EC has been unable to negotiate as a "fully" unitary actor and has been less effective 
in climate negotiations than in, for example, international trade negotiations. 
(Ringius, 1999: 6)
This is true even beyond the field of environmental politics. Katie Verlin Laatikainen 
and Karen E. Smith, for instance, depict EU effectiveness in general as depending on 
two conditions:
Do the Member States want to act collectively ... can they reach agreement on 
positions, policies, statements, etc., and is there therefore EU "output"? We label this 
dimension "internal effectiveness" ... does it [the EU] achieve its objectives, does it 
influence other actors ... is it seen to be a unitary and influential actor? We label this 
dimension "external effectiveness", and argue that it depends in the first place on 
internal effectiveness. (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006:10)
As emerges from the interviews, the commitment to unity for the sake of 
effectiveness is something that most EU actors in international climate change 
politics have internalised. 'EU performance' has managed to appeal to the sense of 
responsibility of the majority of EU actors. Thinking of unity and performance in 
relation to one another has had a disciplining effect within the EU or, at least, within 
its group of negotiators. Furthermore, the dominant assumption among EU actors 
has increasingly been that they are not alone in working for the 'collective good' of 
the EU, but that everybody within the Union is doing their share. Goodwill and a sense 
of collaboration have widely and clearly replaced the earlier distrust.
However, the EU could never have integrated as radically as it has had it lacked the 
stark 'outside' from which it was able to demarcate itself in the past. The last eight 
years have provided the EU with the unique possibility of forming an identity against 
and in juxtaposition to the US. Previously, the EU's identification process was 
confronted with many more complexities, especially under the Clinton 
administration. During that period, it was hard to create a shared EU inside opposed to 
the US because many saw the US as a liberal partner and not as an adversary.
Whereas the Clinton years had a destabilising influence on the EU inside, the Bush Jr. 
administration and its decision to withdraw the US from the UN process created the 
perfect 'other'. The EU joined ranks, and with it the UK, which was previously 
considered an 'outside within the inside', and a country that leaned towards 'the 
Americans' more than it did towards 'Europe'. During the Bush Jr. administration,
however, the UK increasingly considered itself -  and came to be considered -  part of 
an EU that was unified in defying the US and in saving the Kyoto Protocol (read: the 
planet?). More than ever, the EU during this phase appeared to be the 'leader' in 
international climate change politics.
With regard to leadership, Markus Jachtenfuchs claims that, from the outset, the 
leadership role that the EU designed for itself in international climate change politics 
worked as a bracket that held the EU together (Jachtenfuchs, 1996: 124). This can 
broadly be subscribed to, but with important qualifications.
In the beginning, the EU notion of leadership was arguably a top-down slogan, coined 
by parts of the EU regardless of whether the rest of their EU peers or third countries 
agreed. It was, in discursive terms, the partially strategic attempt by some EU actors 
to set the dominant discourse in the field. However, discourse is a slippery affair, and 
these deliberate attempts failed. The leadership notion was only temporarily effective 
in aligning the EU; by the mid-nineties, symptoms of fatigue had become visible.
Currently, however, this notion of the EU as leader seems to be more popular than 
ever. Interviews for this study indicate that it is widely embraced by EU actors. Still, 
the development ofthe outside again has been crucial in this respect. As a leader can 
only be thought of in relation to both 'followers' and 'those that are not leading', the 
actions ofthe Bush Jr. administration have assisted the EU in reviving the spirit to be 
'on top' of international negotiations in the climate change field.
Overall, the developments ofthe last years have enabled the EU to create a common 
narrative for its actors in the field of international climate change politics. 
Respondents seemed to draw on the same plot, one that depicts an EU that had to 
fight both internal divisions and an 'evil' external antagonist. In the accounts of 
respondents, the EU succeeded in both and is now at the forefront of global efforts to 
save the planet. This narrative is invaluable as a means of identification, as glue 
between EU actors.
The EU level
In the light of what has been said, it can be claimed that conflicts as 'predicted' by 
conventional EIS occupied only a small part of (EU) international climate politics.
However, how can or should this 'result' be interpreted in the wider context? One 
option is to assert that the international level is structurally different from the EU level 
and that conventional EIS pertains only to the former. A more radical alternative 
consists of questioning 'conventional' interpretations of politics on the EU level as
Findings from this research support the second option. They suggest that the 
'statehood' signifier, also on the EU level, has neither fully dominated meaning 
making and identity formation nor been able to uphold its key position in recent 
years. Even in the case of the carbon tax, statehood was only one of the many 
signifiers structuring the debate, although the tax project is widely seen as the 
example of how sovereignty concerns trumped ecological concerns in the making of 
EU climate change legislation. To give but one example, Ute Collier argued with 
hindsight that
the lack of EU competence in the energy area has been a major obstacle to the 
agreement of effective measures in the energy efficiency and renewable energy 
fields. Furthermore, one of the proposed instruments, the carbon/energy tax, 
suffered as fiscal measures have been notoriously difficult to agree at the EU level, 
with the Member States keen to guard their sovereignty in such matters. (Collier, 
1997: 43)
As emerged from this study's interviews, the tax proposal was not exclusively thought 
of in terms of potential sovereignty loss. The tax opposition did not concentrate solely 
on this issue but on a variety of aspects (e.g. that taxes were a blunt instrument or 
potentially harming industries). Moreover, rejecting the tax for fear of 'losing 
sovereignty' was denounced as ideological by many Commission and Member State 
respondents.
That the sovereignty signifier was decisive in the 'downfall' o fth e  tax nevertheless 
(the proposal never managed to pass the unanimity hurdle for tax matters) underlines 
a significant structural feature of the EU level. Here, far more than on the 
international level, the statehood signifier is anchored in 'frozen discourses'that are 
embedded in formal institutions or procedures. Because of their legal entrenchment 
and 'sedimentation', these frozen discourses can, so-to-speak, 'suspend' new 
dynamics and suppress new alternative discourses in the respective field. In the case 
ofthe carbon tax, the fact that the proposal at one time enjoyed the support of all but 
a small minority of Member States (Peterson & Bomberg, 1999: 182) was irrelevant.
Their support was nullified by the legal condition that the proposal had to be 
unanimously accepted under the consultation procedure -  a legal condition that, 
somewhat paradoxically, in former times had been introduced to explicitly safeguard 
Member State sovereignty in this domain.
This incongruence, however, was hardly reflected by scholarly accounts o fth e  tax, 
which focused on signs of Member State resistance. Instances of loyalty -  or even 
identity formation -  across institutional borders were disregarded, although they had 
emerged during the legislative process. Such 'cross-identities' or 'cross-loyalties' 
developed, in particular, between those that regarded themselves as the EU's 
'environmental avant-garde', not least between 'progressive' parts ofthe EP and their 
Commission counterparts. Their declared common aim was to enhance EU progress 
by interlinking ecology and economy and advancing 'smart' new measures for that 
matter.
Although the carbon tax failed, it may have heralded a broader shift in discourse, not 
unlike the discursive shift on the international level. On both levels, discourse was 
increasingly dominated by 'managerial' signifiers. The specific quality of this shift on 
the EU level was that environmental politics, and especially climate change politics, 
were increasingly thought of in economic terms (e.g. as a product of a malfunctioning 
market or similar). Consequently, climate change was progressively seen as a 
technical problem to be addressed by technical means, and its 'political' dimension 
moved to the background. Already at the outset of this development, Angela 
Liberatore pointed out that for the carbon tax
economic arguments have been crucial in "legitimizing" -  providing a 
sound/convincing basis for -  an instrument mainly decided at the political level. In this 
respect, economic arguments had been interwoven with and reinforced by technical 
arguments and evidence. (Liberatore, 1995: 67)
With the mounting support for introducing what was to become the EU-ETS in the 
second half of the nineties, this new kind of 'managerial' discourse experienced a 
breakthrough, and it has continued to rise ever since. The ETS, which from its 
beginning was associated with 'unpolitical' notions such as 'market' and '(cost) 
effectiveness', never had to confront any serious political resistance, and the few 
remaining concerns have since faded.
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Sovereignty considerations have been remarkably absent in ETS discussions. In the 
name of 'output', the main priority was to create a functioning ETS market. During 
this process, Member States and their 'particular interests' came to be seen as 
irrational and as threatening the whole project and EU progress. In contrast, the 
Community, and especially the Commission, were increasingly perceived as 
guarantors of a working system in defiance o f  the Achilles heel that was the Member 
States. Consequently, Member States were increasingly willing to transfer 
competences to the Community level. Moreover, many of them not only tolerated but 
also actively demanded Commission participation and intervention. Accordingly, 
Member States did not interpret the considerable extension of 
Community/Commission rights envisaged by the proposal for a revised ETS, 
contained in the 2008 energy and climate package, in terms of competence snatching 
or sovereignty loss. Instead, they welcomed this development as a means to ensure 
the future efficiency ofthe scheme. Consequently, discussions and 'bottlenecks'that 
developed around the ETS revolved around other issues than competence 
distribution.
A similar picture emerged for other parts ofthe energy and climate package, such as 
target setting. In the future, the Commission will not only decide on the ETS 
allowances for each specific EU country, but it will also set individual targets for 
emissions not covered by the ETS. The matter-of-factness with which the Member 
States agreed on this devolution of competence sharply contrasts with how 'burden 
sharing' was approached in the mid-nineties. At that time, Member States declared 
target setting a matter of sovereignty, and Commission and EP were 'naturally' 
excluded from the actual negotiations. In recent years, however, target-setting has 
followed a general trend, whereby Member States have strongly supported and 
positively welcomed intensive Commission contribution in preparing 'the EU' for the 
next phase of climate change politics on both levels.
Green biotechnology politics
The international level
At first sight, the field of green biotechnology politics differs from that of climate 
change politics in crucial aspects. Notably, whereas there is a general consensus
within the EU that climate change poses grave problems, the same is not true for 
green biotechnology; the extent to which the genetic modification of food, feed, or 
seeds is related to risks is still undecided and heavily debated in the EU. Against this 
backdrop, the EU eschewed a leadership role on the international level in early phases 
ofthe biosafety negotiations. After all, a clear EU pronouncement on this level would 
have concurred with taking sides on the general question of whether green 
biotechnology was indeed risky business.
In these early phases, the EU was less dominated by equivalence, and EU esprit de 
corps was altogether low. EU actors rather thought of each other in terms of 
differences. These differences were predominantly 'taken over' from the EU level, 
where supporters and sceptics of green biotechnology opposed each other. 
Nonetheless, Member States did seem to agree on one issue: that o fth e  mandate 
question. In dealing with this, Member States found and discovered their 'sameness' 
in opposing the Commission and its 'intrusion' of state territory (in a figurative sense).
The mandate question, however, was not uniquely dominated by state-related 
signifiers. Member States did not oppose a mandate exclusively because they 
associated it with sovereignty loss. Rather, they saw the Commission as an outside in 
several respects. The Commission was not part ofthe gang, as Commission staff had 
not been around as long as many o fth e  Member State representatives had. It also 
lacked the expertise on which many of its Member State counterparts prided 
themselves. Hence, the Member States viewed the Commission not as their equal but 
as their inferior.
Despite this initial situation, crucial changes in the relation between EU actors 
occurred over the years. In time, a distinct sense of belonging grew between the 
different EU actors and this EU 'inside' explicitly included the Commission. The 
Commission was no longer seen as a 'greenhorn' in matters of biotechnology and 
biosafety, but as a definite asset, as an additional source of expertise for 'the' EU. This 
altered setting of meaning making and identity formation meant that, even in the 
context of the mandate question, the sovereignty signifier forfeited much of its 
dominant role and structuring function over the years. In recent decisions on 
Commission mandates, the group of Member States opposing such a mandate has 
shrunk considerably. Opponents now confront not only the Commission, but also a 
remarkable number of Member States that are convinced of Commission 
(negotiating) expertise and thus support Commission mandates. In short, 'expertise'
has managed to largely outplay state-related signifiers, even in crucial aspects of 
competence distribution.
Also in this context, the formation of a distinct EU identity has emerged in reference 
to a 'threatening' outside. This outside against which the EU demarcated itself has 
again been the US. The distinct 'advantage' of biosafety negotiations is that the US 
has proven to be a stable other in this context. Changes in administration had no 
perceptible influence either on the overall US policy in this domain or on how it was 
seen by the EU or by third parties for that matter.
After an initial period of internal struggle, the confrontation with a solid outside 
helped the EU to form a stable inside in which 'dissenting' was virtually non-existent. 
For EU players, there was no conceivable alternative but to act as EU. In interviews, 
the intensity of the respondents' sense of belonging was apparent. Acting as EU was 
not depicted as a strategic affair but as a heartfelt necessity. Consequently, upholding 
unity was only partially seen as something that was needed to enhance the overall 
goal of EU performance. More generally, there was no longer a demand to 'rationally' 
argue why the EU had to stay united, as unity became something that was self­
understood, that came from  within, that almost seemed the natural thing to do. One 
was part of a family where trust prevailed and where commonalities were cherished.
The identity the EU had created for itself in international biotechnology politics surely 
helped to uphold this unity. In the context of biosafety, the EU varyingly presented 
itself as a constructive mediator, an advocate of the developing countries/civil 
society/the environment, and as an insightful leader who in the end was decisive in 
'making' outcomes. In international biosafety negotiations, 'being' the EU was 
something to be proud of.
TheEU level
Being the EU, however, proved to be much more difficult at home. As previously 
mentioned, the extent to which green biotechnology poses problems or is a problem 
has remained undecided within the EU to this very day, and the dividing line between 
supporters and sceptics of green biotechnology runs across and through all Member 
States and EU institutions. Institutional affiliation in the green biotechnology issue 
has been important only to the extent that Member States or institutions in their
entirety were perceived by others as either 'pro' or 'anti' green biotechnology. The 
Commission, for instance, was predominantly seen as part of the 'pro', trade-friendly 
camp (Toke, 2004: 188); Austria, on the other hand, was known as an 'anti' Member 
State.
Overall, the discursive field of EU green biotechnology politics has been dominated by 
the competition of two discourses: one relating green biotechnology to risk and one 
relating it to opportunities. The dynamics between the two have been decisive for 
meaning making and identity forming; to give an example, these dynamics 
dominated how policymakers' preferences concerning competence distribution were 
shaped. State-related signifiers played only a subordinate role.
Green biotechnology is a prime example of a field whose discursive structuration 
precludes any attempt of analytical appropriation through conventional EU thinking. 
The most visible example in this respect is the 'co-existence' debate. Here, 'the 
Commission' (under the aegis of DG Agriculture) repeatedly advocated the principles 
of subsidiarity and 'Member State autonomy'. It firmly rejected binding EU legislation 
(and, hence, Community competences) in this area. The Member States, on the other 
hand, were lukewarm at best about retaining competences in this area.
In other contexts, both GM supporters and sceptics advanced a further 
communitisation and ostensive 'de-politicisation' of green biotechnology in the hope 
of a sedation and consequent sedimentation ofthe field. For example, most Member 
States opted for a further centralisation of authorisation procedures for GM food and 
feed even at a time when green biotechnology had become a highly salient political 
issue. In a move to 'depoliticise' the issue, risk assessment was transferred to the 
newly created EFSA, from which both sides expected objective and definite decisions. 
Even EFSA, however, could not bring about the desired closure, as it was drawn into 
the discursive dynamics ofthe overall field. Sceptics soon regarded it as yet another 
part ofthe 'pro' GM coalition.
In the roughly two decades that green biotechnology has been a field of EU 
legislation, signifiers such as statehood and sovereignty have played a marginal role. 
As the example of competence distribution shows, sovereignty considerations have 
been virtually absent in this respect. The same appears to apply to identity formation. 
States hardly conceive of themselves as forming one group; instead, they see two 
opposing camps of GM supporters and sceptics.
However, even in EU green biotechnology politics, state-related signifiers have 
asserted themselves in one specific area ofthe overall territory: the safeguard clause. 
In the past, every time Member States had to vote on national bans of GMOs, they 
voted against the will o fth e  Commission and in favour o fth e  respective Member 
State. In this context, the divides between Member States lost their significance. The 
majority of Member States felt compelled to guarantee the autonomy of their peers in 
matters of green biotechnology, despite communitisation ofthe issue (which many of 
them advocated in principle). Increasingly, Member States regarded votes on the 
'rightfulness' of safeguard clauses as instances where they could and had to save 
'peers' from Commission force. However, this Member State solidarity has never been 
all-encompassing, as some countries still vote 'against' their fellow Member States. A 
regular in this group is, strikingly enough, the UK. Nevertheless, it has to be said that 
the overall number of such Member State 'secessionists' is almost invariably low.
To date, green biotechnology on the EU level has remained a largely undecided field. 
Recent developments further strengthen this impression. Since Stavros Dimas has 
assumed the office of Commissioner, for instance, DG Environment has seemingly 
adopted a far more 'sceptic' attitude towards green biotechnology, in contrast to the 
openly 'GM supportive' DG Agriculture (Euractiv, 2006a). Hence, discursive dynamics 
in this domain indicate that 'the' Commission cannot be regarded a priori as a 
bounded entity with a monolithic interest. In this sense, green biotechnology politics 
challenges what John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg have termed '[o]ne of the 
most enduring myths surrounding EU decision-making ... that the Commission is a 
purposive, single-minded institution' (Peterson & Bomberg, 1999: 39). As the story of 
green biotechnology tells us, this applies neither to the Commission nor to any other 
EU 'actor' for that matter.
A new view on EU environmental politics? Discourse theory revisited
Analysing the cases of climate change and green biotechnology politics with the help 
of DT/DA in lieu of conventional approaches has been fruitful in several respects. First, 
DT/DA has highlighted the shortcomings of this strand of EIS, especially its tendency 
to provide a rather black-and-white account ofthe relations between EU institutions 
and Member States. DT/DA offers alternative readings and, in a way, prevents us 
from scientifically reifying everyday discourses. In the analysis of both cases, state-
related signifiers dominate meaning making and identity formation only in singular, 
specific instances. Moreover, in recent discursive developments, these signifiers have 
increasingly been pushed to the margins. Likewise and consequently, 'conventional' 
assumptions on EU politics only partially pertain to the cases researched.
Considering what has been said so far, conventional EIS can be considered first and 
foremost a product of its time. Research that focused on the 'opposition' between EU 
Member States and EU institutions thrived especially during the 1990s; many of its 
assumptions seem to echo the general political atmosphere in the EU after 1992 when 
the 'debacles' ofthe Danish and the French referenda set the tone for renewed and 
reinvigorated euroscepticism. By relying on analytical instruments that were designed 
in this era, however, conventional EIS misses many o fth e  developments that have 
occurred ever since.
DT/DA has been beneficial in drawing attention to alternative ways of meaning 
making and identity formation that have emerged and 'prospered' among EU 
policymakers in recent years. One ofthe most striking 'findings' in this context has 
been an ever more manifest EU identity on the international level. In both climate 
change and green biotechnology politics, a discursive shift can be traced; statehood 
and state interest are no longer dominant, as key signifiers such as EU performance 
have widely come to set the tone. In the course of this development, Member States 
have become significantly more willing to give up 'prerogatives' if it serves the overall 
EU 'cause'. In climate change politics, this is most visible in the new system of issue 
leaders and lead negotiators. In biosafety negotiations, Member States even support 
Commission mandates to maximise the likelihood of a positive outcome for 'the EU'. 
Particularly on the international level, working united and as EU  have reached an 
almost unquestioned status. To most EU actors, thinking in EU terms has come to 
present itself as the only feasible option.
In the context of identity formation, the international level has had a distinct 
'advantage' over the EU level. On the international level, 'true' outsides can be found, 
that is, outsides outside of the EU. These have been crucial in developing an EU 
identity. Admittedly, demarcation from the US has been a vital factor in the EU's 
identification process and this has not been overlooked by the scientific community. 
In his 2005 article, John Vogler emphasised that the issue of climate change 'has been 
allowed to acquire a defining character for the EU in opposition to the United States' 
(Vogler, 2005: 849). In more general terms, he argues, together with Charlotte
Bretherton, that '[constructions of a “power" identity for the EU [i.e. that of a 
“normative power E U "]... conceptualize the USA as the Union's other', and that
particular significance should be attributed to attempts to distance the EU from the 
USA on the basis of superior commitment to core values -  precisely because these are 
claimed to be shared Western values. To construct the Union as morally superior 
asserts its independent identity. (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 43)52
Another crucial difference between the levels is their degree of discursive 
structuration. On the international level, EU discourses are still rather fluid because 
only part of them have been legally fixed. On the EU level, however, meaning making 
and identity forming are re-enacted daily by discourses frozen in EU internal legal 
provisions and procedures.
These frozen discourses, however, are mostly reifying 'traditional' ways of thinking 
the EU. A piece of legislation will define, for instance, the share of competences 
accorded to 'the' Commission or 'the' Parliament. During legislation itself, 
parliamentary groups or MEPs may differ greatly. Nevertheless, after the vote in the 
EP, the result is seen as the will of'the' Parliament and, as such, juxtaposed to the will 
of, for instance, 'the' Council. Consequently, although cross-coalitions or cross­
loyalties emerge and exist, they are continuously 'flooded' by older and more settled 
discursive logics embedded in the EU's formal-institutional setting.
Moreover, on the EU level, Member States are generally expected to act just like that: 
as states representing their alleged state interests. This is different from the 
international level, where acting as the EU nowadays has often become the mantra. In 
the words of a Member State respondent, international negotiations had a certain 
solidarising effect within the EU, as, on this level, 'to push through your own position 
[sic] within the EU was not the priority'.
Discursive structuration on the international level, on the contrary, is particularly low 
in the case of environmental politics. Behind the label of mixed competence, a vast
52 This research has repeatedly highlighted the EU's attempts to present itself as a 'better' alternative to 
the US. Hence, this study could easily be associated with literature depicting EU as a 'normative power' 
(see Manners, 2002). However, there are clear differences between the two. W hereas in this research, 
the process o fth e  construction of an EU identity is analysed and problematised, this is decidedly not the 
case in 'norm ative power' literature. In the literature, 'norm ativity' is presented as an essential feature 
o fth e  EU, and originates in the EU's 'special' history, formal setup, and other EU characteristics (for a 
critical discussion of 'norm ative power Europe', see T. Diez, 2005).
'grey' area of contingency opens up. Decisions on who is going to speak for the EU so 
far have often been made in an ad hoc, pragmatic fashion and to a lesser extent have 
been based on 'hard' legislation. Hence, 'creating'the institutional setup ofthe EU on 
the international level has above all been a trial-and-error process widely undisturbed 
by 'frozen' or 'defrosted' discourses. This has provided the platform for the 
development of 'modus vivendi' forms of coordination and representation, depicted 
in this work and elsewhere (see Delreux, 2008). These informal practices coexist with 
and flourish in the shadow of formal settings, as the EU's system of issue leaders and 
lead negotiators in international climate change politics illustrates. It is here that 
discourses beyond the state-related signifiers have been able to find both their 
expression and future breeding ground.
Given the differences between the EU level and the international level, it is intriguing 
to investigate when the two converge or interfere with each other. A telling example 
of this interaction is the 2008 energy and climate package. The package basically 
concerned future policies on the EU level, but it was also linked to the 'fate' ofthe EU 
internationally. Internal success (ofthe package) and international success (ofthe EU) 
were tied together. Although the package contained sensitive and far-reaching 
proposals, they passed through parliament at an amazing speed because MEPs did 
not want to endanger EU leadership on the international level by hampering progress 
'at home'.
In the case of green biotechnology, no legal act raised as little attention as the 
regulation that 'transposed' the Cartagena Protocol into EU legislation (Regulation 
(EC) No 1946/2003 on transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms). 
Similar to the energy and climate package, internal discussions on issues of green 
biotechnology came to a halt when an international EU cause needed to be 
buttressed. In the words of an EP respondent, the general argument for not starting 
or engaging in debates at the time was 'that is only the Cartagena Protocol and that is 
what we all support and that is that'. In short, when the EU and international level 
touched, their respective discursive settings touched as well. In the examples, this 
meant that the outside of the international level was inserted into the EU level. 
Passing legislation was seen in relation to promoting 'the EU' against others. Hence, 
even on this level inserting a veritable outside had a unifying effect.
DT/DA also alerts us to the fact that discourses follow trends and adopt 'successful' 
signifiers from discourses and imaginaries in other fields. In our cases, the extent to
which signifiers such as effectiveness and expertise enjoyed increasing popularity was 
striking. Discursively, both the field of climate change and the field of green 
biotechnology politics have endorsed the same 'managerial' signifiers that are 
predominant in other, wider meaning systems. There has been an ever-growing 
conviction of EU actors that knowledge, expertise, and other 'skills' are a prerequisite 
for 'sound' policies within the EU and for EU leadership in international negotiations 
('knowledge is power'). In addition, as both climate change and biotechnology have 
come to be seen as scientific and complex, policymakers in these fields seem to prefer 
an approach ofthe same kind.
The turn towards managerial signifiers has largely had a depoliticising effect. Giving 
up what once would have been termed Member State 'autonomy' or 'sovereignty' has 
arguably been facilitated by the rise of these ostensibly 'apolitical' signifiers. 
Increasingly, who does the job (in terms of institutional affiliation) is no longer crucial 
as long as the job is done and done well. In this respect, the Commission need no 
longer be the outsider, opposing the Member States. Instead, what could be observed 
in the cases analysed is that Member States repeatedly endorsed Commission opinion 
and participation. The Commission, in these contexts, was no longer predominantly 
the states' 'institutional other', but a valuable source of, for instance, expertise, 
continuity, or negotiating experience.
If anything, states and state-related signifiers are increasingly considered to be a 
hindrance to EU performance, progress and effectiveness. Over the last two decades, 
many competences in the field of climate change politics and green biotechnology 
politics have been willingly transferred by Member States to the Community level, 
rather than being 'snatched' by the Commission. Above all, this transfer has been 
enabled by discursive environments in which the common EU good has become an 
overall imperative, but in which Member States and 'their' interests have also been 
linked to irrationalism and failure. Strikingly, the latter thought seems to have 
become internalised even by Member State representatives themselves. That these 
representatives adjust their behaviour accordingly and advocate far-reaching 
communitisation is one of the most stupefying findings in the framework of this 
research.
So far, the 'traditional' discourses in place have managed to domesticate these new 
managerial signifiers and to make them part o fth e  inside. In most ofthe dominant 
discourses in our cases, state-centred signifiers coexist with the new generation of key
signifiers. In exchange for this expansion or stretching of discourses, the discourses' 
internal inconsistencies have increased considerably. However, these inconsistencies 
have so far largely gone unnoticed. A case in point is the system of lead negotiators 
and issue leaders. This system has largely reduced the role ofthe rotating Presidency 
with the explicit approval of Member States. At the same time, its selection criteria 
match many ofthe 'features' with which the Commission is commonly associated. On 
the informal level, Member State representatives have hence created a system that 
clearly accommodates the Commission. However, when the Member States are 
confronted with the mandate question, they vehemently reject more Commission 
influence.
Member States display a similar 'split personality' when it comes to the EU-ETS. They 
have been keen to vest the Commission with all the principal competences for future 
phases o fth e  EU-ETS, a scheme that decides on the future emission reductions of 
over 10,000 installations in the energy and industrial sectors. These installations are 
collectively responsible for forty percent ofthe EU's total GHG emissions, and their 
operating parameters will be tremendously impacted by the EU-ETS in the coming 
decades. That Member States agree on expanding Community competences in this 
context is puzzling, given their staunch refusal to accept Community 'intrusions' into 
their realm of energy policy as soon as interventions are officially linked to this policy 
field and labelled as such.
As long as these seemingly contradictory constellations work -  and this still is the case 
-  we can only guess whether state-related signifiers will lose their importance over 
time, or whether 'when push comes to shove', they will be rediscovered and revived 
by Member States.
In this respect, coming developments could give the first indications of how this 
question will be decided in the context of international climate change politics. Here, 
signs that the Commission could ask for a negotiating mandate in the short term are 
growing stronger. Oberthur argues that this move will provoke a fierce reaction by the 
Member States, as
this option goes beyond incremental change of informal practice and may come 
closerto a system change. Determined opposition by several Member States eagerto 
preserve their influence on an increasingly important area of foreign policy and to 
avoid giving ground on a matter of principle may be expected. (Oberthur, 
forthcoming)
On the other hand, it is questionable whether 'the' Member States would be willing to 
relinquish the current system of coordination and representation and to return to a 
state of more 'sovereignty' under the rotating Presidency. Whatever the answer will 
be, future developments in this area are eagerly being awaited.

Epilogue
So that's it, then, is it? Can we now simply conclude that the EU is on its way to an 
ever closer, ever 'greener' Union, and thank discourse theory for this 'new' insight?
In the hope that this is not the main, let alone the only message of the book, I would 
like to take this final opportunity to insert some nuances and caveats.
The first concerns the scientific status and self-conception of this research and is an 
attempt to revivify one of the most important statements that have been made in 
that respect. What I have put down in written form here is how I read the 'snippet' of 
reality that I have been investigating for the last four years. It is how I have made 
meaning of meaning making in this context.
I still embrace the idea of a science that does not work on an authoritarian basis, with 
scientists claiming authority because of their alleged access to objective knowledge 
through 'right' theories and methodologies. Hence, I strongly invite everyone to 
disagree with this research. The grounds on which you could do so are numerous. You 
may not like my selection of respondents, or that of cases, or that of citations. More 
fundamentally, you could doubt whether my depiction of conventional EIS is 
appropriate, whether what I have called key signifiers are really key, or whether I have 
been able to cope with the well-known problem of 'defining' the limits of discourses. 
My biggest concern in this respect is not whether these points can or will be raised, 
but whether I have been open enough not to stifle them, while still making clear why I 
proceeded the way I did. That said, one ofthe fun bits of science is just that — initiating 
and leading a scientific discussion.
As far as the more empirical side of my work is concerned, I would like to add some 
further comments. Some concern the EU level, some concern the international level, 
and all of them could be called somewhat personal.
With regard to the EU level, I hope that scholars, myself included, can find a way to 
eschew cliche-painting EU politics, reifying — although admittedly on a far more 
sophisticated level — commonplace notions of 'Brussels' and the Member States. 
Maybe attempts in this direction would allow EU conflicts to be re-evaluated and 
downsize their symbolic charge. In the end, most of these 'squabbles' do not seem so 
different from political struggles on the national level, where, however, they are
commonly regarded as an expression of pluralism rather than as a symptom 
indicating the malaise of a whole system. Still, the fact that struggles on the EU level 
are often seen in the terms ofthe latter hints at the fragility ofthe 'European project', 
especially when contrasted with the success story that the notion of 'nation states' 
has had in the last centuries. As Louise Phillips and Marianne J0rgensen put it, 
national identity has come to be
taken for granted as natural and is therefore not questioned. As opposed to this, the 
question of European identity belongs to the domain ofthe political... it is something 
that is explicitly discussed and thought over, and consequently it is easier to imagine 
how it could be changed. (Phillips & J0rgensen, 2006: 57)
In the cases that I have researched, a distinctly 'European' identity seems to have 
formed on the international level. This research, however, focused on elites only, and 
any statements about identity are limited to this context. Against this backdrop, two 
aspects are worth further investigation: firstly, whether similar processes of identity 
formation have occurred in other areas, and, secondly, whether these processes 
extended beyond political elites to include 'the public' or 'the people'.
In this research, 'the people' have not merely been absent because ofthe analytical 
focus. Rather, signifiers such as 'citizens' or 'democracy' have hardly been mentioned 
in the 'texts' that have been analysed. This absence pertained to climate change 
politics more than to green biotechnology politics. In interviews on green 
biotechnology, citizens were 'present', albeit reduced to their role as 'consumers'.
The absence of 'democratic signifiers' may certainly be a mere coincidence. In the 
light o fth e  abundance of 'managerial' signifiers, however, this absence could also 
support Jenny Edkins's assertion that 'what we call “politics" is an area of activity that 
in modern Western society is “depoliticized" or “technologized"' (Edkins, 1999: 1). It 
can be argued that both climate change and green biotechnology politics have largely 
become what Chantal Mouffe calls 'post-political politics' (see Mouffe, 2007). In these 
fields, the antagonisms and conflicts of 'real politics' have made way for pragmatic 
problem-solving, for finding a good solution. Here, 'the people' are only present 
inasmuch as their implicit consensus is assumed.53
53 It goes without saying that the absence of 'real politics' in the EU becomes increasingly problematic. 
Both in the context o fth e  European Union as well as in national contexts, populist parties and 
politicians are increasingly successful in winning votes by promising to support 'the citizen' against elite 
technocracy.
Barring the question whether a united and green Europe ultimately includes 'the 
people', the notion of an EU identity needs to be critically challenged from other 
angles as well. First, having a green identity does not necessarily mean acting green. 
In fact, only a few EU Member States will be able to meet their Kyoto commitments. 
In past years, this circumstance seemed to be of little importance because the EU was 
commonly regarded as the only international actor at least doing something to tackle 
the emissions problem. Needless to say, the EU's green identity on the international 
level has, at times, deflected its shortcomings in 'walking the talk'.
Moreover, how lasting will a 'green Europe' be, especially in the context of climate 
change politics? This question is now more pertinent than ever, given that the 'United 
States is no longer absent without leave' in this context, but 'ready to lead and 
determined to make up for lost time' (U.S. Department of State, 2009). An 'America' 
under President Obama could most likely deprive the EU of the stable outside it 
enjoyed in the past years (see also Van Schaik, 2009), and it remains to be seen what 
the 'EU' reaction will be, apart from generously offering the US 'co-leadership' in 
climate matters (Euractiv, 2009b). In recent years, the demarcation against the US 
has been both crucial and fruitful for the EU. It was, to put it in Heideggerian terms, 
the boundary with 'others' from which the EU began its presencing (cf. Bhabha, 1994). 
If these boundaries crumble, to what extent will this destabilise 'the EU'?
Last of all, how can we possibly judge the emergence of an EU identity in general? 
After all, it would be fallacious to assume that having a common EU identity (just as 
'being united') is desirable. Likewise, it would be foolish to think that any EU identity 
is necessarily 'good'. This aspect needs to be emphasised in this context, as, in recent 
years, many Europeans seem to have found the idea of a good 'David' Europe against 
a ruthless 'Goliath' America extremely appealing. This arguably pertained to 
environmental politics. However, even more visibly, it pertained to 'foreign affairs' 
such as the waron Iraq.
These black-and-white categorisations and 'normative' EU notions come at a price: 
they largely obscure the less attractive sides of the EU in us-versus-them 
relationships. After all, as 'others' are often depicted as inferior, they are treated 
accordingly. In this respect, it must not be forgotten that anti-American chauvinism 
has soared to new heights in the EU over the last years.
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Beyond the US-EU relationship, more blatant examples of a not-so-normative EU can 
be found, but they usually attract little attention. A prime case in point is the EU's 
common immigration policy. This is a field in which the us-versus-them relation finds 
its most physical and probably most cruel expression in the miserable conditions and 
incidents on what are now EU  borders. Accounts of the circumstances on the Isle of 
Lampedusa (Italy) or around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Morocco) are 
hard to match with the image of a normative, green and human-rights-embracing EU.
However, the EU is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad. It is, to use one of 
the most abused clichés in EIS and IR, 'what we make of it'. The EU has often been 
described as a moving target, and this study may confirm this impression. For the 
academic and the 'real' world, the EU has been and still is a source of both frustration 
and fascination. It is full of contradictions and inconsistencies, and its development 
has always defied reliable predictions. It belongs to the sites where, to speak with 
Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, 'identity is never sure, community is always 
uncertain, meaning is always in doubt' (Ashley & Walker, 1990: 261). In short, in what 
we commonly call Western politics, there is hardly any construction which embodies 
post-structuralism more vividly than the European Union.
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Summary
The rationale of this research was to question crucial commonplaces in the field of 
European Integration Studies (EIS). To be certain, EIS is a vast field and is composed 
of different approaches and schools of thought. The common denominator of EIS 
research is merely its object, the European Union in the widest sense. Yet, when 
considering the overall diversity of subjects found in the field, it is puzzling to find that 
many EIS publications share certain 'conventional' assumptions about the EU's 'inner 
life'. These assumptions revolve around the notion that EU Member States, on the 
one hand, and EU institutions (such as the European Commission or the European 
Parliament), on the other hand, naturally conflict. The general impression that has 
been conveyed is that, throughout the past decades of European integration, EU 
Member States and EU institutions have incessantly fought over -  to put it in the 
words of Harold Dwight Lasswell -  'who gets what, when, how'. The distribution of 
competences between the actors is depicted as a continuous bone of contention, 
opposing EU institutions (which strive to gain a maximum of power) and Member 
States (which try to defend their sovereignty).
Although this is a view that is widespread in EIS, it triggers several questions. When 
scholars, for instance, interpret something as a competence struggle between 
'Brussels' and the Member States -  where does this interpretation derive from? To 
what extent is it an interpretation shared by policymakers involved in the conflict? In 
what terms should policymakers themselves depict what is transpiring?
The answers to these questions are highly relevant, regardless of their material 
outcome. To arrive at these answers, the basic and very simple idea of this research 
was to trace the patterns of meaning making and identity formation of policymakers 
involved in EU decision-making. These patterns were compared to the patterns of 
interpretation suggested by 'conventional' EIS, i.e., those parts of EIS which 
presuppose an intrinsic conflict between EU institutions and EU Member States and 
regard this conflict as all-pervasive in EU politics.
As EU policy-making was too extensive to be analysed in its entirety for these 
purposes, the research was limited to EU environmental politics and specifically to 
two cases: climate change politics and green biotechnology politics. What 
predisposes EU environmental politics as a field, and climate change and green 
biotechnology as cases, is that they are 'normal, yet salient'. Environmental politics is
an everyday field of EU politics. The attention it has so far attracted has varied over 
time. It belongs to the large bulk of fields in which what has become the 'normal' 
mode of EU decision-making (co-decision) applies. Environmental politics has not 
stopped at the EU borders; instead, the EU has become party to the myriad of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) that exist on the international level. 
On both levels and in both cases, issues have at times been highly neuralgic, and 
fierce controversies have resulted. To what extent do these controversies fit into the 
pattern depicted by conventional EIS? What other patterns can be detected? To what 
extent do patterns of interaction vary as we advance from one level to the other?
To answer these questions, 51 interviews have been conducted with policymakers 
who have been central in either climate change or green biotechnology politics during 
the past 25 years, which is when both fields emerged in EU politics. To trace the 
patterns of meaning making and identity formation, these interviews have been the 
object of discourse analysis.
For this analysis, the choice was made to use concepts offered by the so-called Essex 
School, and especially the work of Ernesto Laclau, both as a theoretical background 
and as a 'conceptual toolkit'. For the purposes of the research -  which were 
exploratory rather than explanatory -  these concepts were open enough to ensure 
that the analysis of the interviews was not overshadowed by antecedent research 
hypotheses formulated by the executing scientist.
During the analysis, patterns of meaning making and identity formation emerged 
which were different from the ones depicted by conventional EIS. This pertained to 
both cases.
CONCLUSIONS PER CASE: CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS
In international climate change politics, contentions as depicted by 'conventional' EIS 
can be found with regard to specific issues only (e.g. the question of who speaks in the 
name of the EU during international negotiations). They are not, however, all- 
pervasive. These conflicts are more often related to the form al questions of EU 
coordination and representation than to the actual practices in this area. Moreover, in 
recent years the EU's internal 'schisms' considerably lessened in the process of 
common demarcation against the US as an opponent. Instead, a distinctly 'European'
identity developed as well as a sense of urgency to enhance the EU's performance on 
the international level. Against this backdrop, a new coordination and representation 
system was created that reduced the Presidency to an almost managerial task and 
rendered the difference between Commission and Member State staff largely 
irrelevant. In addition, EU unity was increasingly put upfront on this level, as EU actors 
came to regard dividedness as a threat to the common cause.
For the EU level, discourse analysis indicates that in the majority of instances, 
controversies and schisms between actors were discursively structured in a way that 
did not follow institutional borders. This opened up the possibility of 'cross-loyalties', 
i.e., loyalties between parts ofthe Commission, parts ofthe Parliament and parts of 
the Member States. This was the case even in areas which are commonly seen in EU 
institutions vs. Member States terms (e.g. the carbon tax). In addition, on this level 
individual Member States and their specific interests have come to be associated with 
hampering overall progress in recent years. As a consequence, many Member States 
have become more willing to both transfer more competences to the Community 
level and accord more scrutiny to EU institutions, especially to the Commission. 
Examples are the changes agreed for the third phase o fth e  EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme and the sharing out of targets included in the energy and climate package.
CONCLUSIONS PER CASE: GREEN BIOTECHNOLOGY POLITICS
Just as in the case of climate change politics, a common EU spirit has very visibly 
emerged on the international level of green biotechnology politics -  after a period of 
contentions both between the Member States and the Commission (about a 
Commission negotiating mandate) and between Member States themselves. Despite 
this initial situation, a distinct sense of belonging grew between the different EU 
actors. In recent decisions on Commission mandates, the group of Member States 
opposing such a mandate has shrunk considerably. Also in this context, the formation 
of a distinct EU identity has emerged in reference to the US as opposition. The 
confrontation with the US helped the EU to become a quasi-monolithic actor. 
'Dissenting' within the EU was virtually non-existent.
'At home', on the EU level, the main dividing line did not run between EU Member 
States and EU institutions but between supporters and sceptics of green 
biotechnology. Institutional affiliation in the green biotechnology issue has been
important only to the extent that Member States or institutions in their entirety were 
perceived by others as either 'pro' or 'anti' green biotechnology. This basic conflict 
dominated how policymakers' preferences concerning competence distribution were 
shaped. Up until now, controversies between an 'anti' and a 'pro' GMO camp have 
largely moved potential contentions between EU institutions and EU Member States 
to the background, even in instances of competence distribution. Conflicts as 
assumed by 'conventional' EIS only appeared in one specific issue area (i.e. the 
'safeguard clause').
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In this research, discourse analysis helped to problematise meaning making and 
identity formation among EU policymakers in the cases of climate change politics and 
green biotechnology politics. The patterns which emerged during the analysis 
differed from those presupposed by 'conventional' EIS, and should induce us to 
reconsider our everyday assumptions about the relationship between EU institutions 
and EU Member States. In both case studies, a collective European identity developed 
on the international level. On the EU level, loyalties and identities often formed across 
EU institutions and Member States. Thinking, acting and competing in terms of 
'Brussels' vs. 'the Member States' still exists, but it is by no means the dominant way 
of meaning making and identity formation.
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Samenvatting
De grondgedachte van dit onderzoek was, belangrijke gemeenplaatsen van de studie 
van de Europese Integratie (European Integration Studies, kortweg EIS) in een kritisch 
daglicht te stellen. Het terrein van de EIS bestrijkt een breed gebied en omvat 
verschillende benaderingen en richtingen. De gemeenschappelijke noemer is in feite 
niets meer dan het onderzoeksobject: de Europese Unie (EU) in de ruimste zin van het 
woord. Gezien de grote diversiteit van onderwerpen die binnen de EIS worden 
aangesneden is het verbazingwekkend dat veel publicaties niettemin bepaalde 
'conventionele' aannames over het 'innerlijk leven' van de EU delen. Deze aannames 
draaien om het vermoeden dat de lidstaten van de EU als vanzelfsprekend in conflict 
zijn met de EU-instituties, zoals de Europese Commissie of het Europese Parlement. 
De indruk wordt gewekt dat de lidstaten en de EU-instituties gedurende de afgelopen 
decennia onophoudelijk hebben gevochten om -  in de woorden van Harold Dwight 
Lasswell -  'who gets what, when, how'. De verdeling van bevoegdheden tussen de 
actoren wordt afgeschilderd als een voortdurende steen des aanstoots, als gevolg 
waarvan EU-instituties (die streven naar meer macht) en lidstaten (die hun 
soevereiniteit willen verdedigen) lijnrecht tegenover elkaar staan.
Hoewel deze zienswijze binnen de EIS wijd verbreid is, komen toch vragen op. 
Wanneer onderzoekers bijvoorbeeld iets als een competentiestrijd tussen 'Brussel' en 
de lidstaten interpreteren -  waaraan is deze interpretatie dan ontleend? In hoeverre 
wordt deze kijk op de zaak door beleidsmakers die bij het conflict betrokken zijn 
gedeeld? In welke termen zouden beleidsmakers zelfde gebeurtenissen omschrijven?
Het fundamentele en eigenlijk zeer eenvoudige idee van dit onderzoek was, beter 
zicht op het probleem te krijgen door te kijken naar de patronen van betekenisgeving 
en identiteitsvorming van beleidsmakers bij het nemen van beslissingen binnen de 
EU. Deze patronen werden vervolgens vergeleken met de interpretatiepatronen die 
door de 'conventionele' EIS gesuggereerd worden, dat wil zeggen door die delen van 
de EIS die uitgaan van een intrinsiek en alomtegenwoordig conflict tussen EU- 
instituties en lidstaten.
Omdat het maken van beleid binnen de EU te breed is om in zijn geheel te analyseren, 
is het onderzoek beperkt tot EU-milieubeleid en -  binnen dat terrein - t o t  twee casus: 
klimaatbeleid en het beleid met betrekking tot genetisch gemodificeerde organismen 
(ggo's). Wat EU-milieubeleid als onderzoeksgebied en klimaatbeleid en ggo-beleid als
casus geschikt maakt is dat deze 'gewoon, maar prominent' zijn. Milieubeleid is een 
alledaags gebied van EU-beleid. De aandacht die het tot nu toe heeft getrokken is 
niet altijd even hoog geweest. Milieubeleid is één van de vele gebieden waarop de 
'gewone' manier van EU-besluitvorming, de zogenaamde co-decisie procedure, van 
toepassing is. Milieubeleid stopt daarnaast niet aan de Europese grenzen. De EU is als 
partij betrokken bij diverse multilaterale milieuverdragen. In beide casus heeft zowel 
EU-intern als internationaal een aantal soms zeer heikele kwesties gespeeld. Deze 
hebben geleid tot heftige discussies. In hoeverre komen deze conflicten overeen met 
de patronen die door de 'conventionele' EIS geschetst worden? Of kunnen ook andere 
patronen aangetoond worden? En in hoeverre veranderen deze patronen wanneer we 
onze blik verplaatsen van het Europese naar het internationale niveau?
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden zijn 51 interviews gehouden met beleidsmakers die 
in de afgelopen 25 jaar (dus sinds het bestaan van deze beleidsvelden op EU-niveau) 
nauw betrokken zijn geweest bij het klimaatbeleid of het ggo-beleid. Om patronen 
van betekenisgeving en identiteitsvorming te kunnen achterhalen werden deze 
interviews onderzocht met behulp van discours analyse.
Voor deze analyse werden concepten ontleend aan de 'Essex School', met name aan 
het werk van Ernesto Laclau. Deze concepten werden niet alleen als theoretische 
achtergrond maar ook als 'conceptuele gereedschappen' gebruikt. Gezien de 
doelstelling van het onderzoek -  die eerder explorerend dan verklarend is -  waren 
deze concepten open genoeg om te waarborgen dat de analyse niet gedomineerd zou 
worden door onderzoekshypothesen die vooraf door de uitvoerende wetenschapper 
geformuleerd waren.
Tijdens de analyse kwamen patronen van betekenisgeving en identiteitsvorming naar 
voren die anders waren dan de patronen die door de 'conventionele' EIS beschreven 
worden. Dit gold voor beide casus.
CONCLUSIES PER CASUS: KLIMAATBELEID
In het internationale klimaatbeleid konden geschillen zoals beschreven door de 
'conventionele' EIS alleen gevonden worden als het ging om specifieke onderwerpen, 
bijvoorbeeld bij de vraag wie spreekt namens de EU tijdens internationale 
bijeenkomsten. Dergelijke conflicten waren echter niet alles bepalend. Ze bleken vaak
gerelateerd aan form ele vragen van coördinatie en vertegenwoordiging en zelden of 
nooit aan beleidsinhoudelijke kwesties. Bovendien namen de controverses binnen de 
EU in de afgelopen jaren aanzienlijk af naarmate de EU zich meer begon af te zetten 
tegen de Verenigde Staten (VS). In plaats daarvan ontwikkelde zich een goed 
waarneembare 'Europese' identiteit en een gevoel van urgentie om de prestaties van 
de EU op het internationale niveau te verbeteren. Tegen deze achtergrond werd een 
nieuw stelsel voor coördinatie en vertegenwoordiging in het leven geroepen. Dit 
stelsel reduceerde het voorzitterschap tot een bijna bestuurlijke taak en maakte het 
verschil tussen Commissie en lidstaten grotendeels irrelevant. Ook werd op het 
internationale niveau de eenheid binnen de EU steeds meer benadrukt. Verdeeldheid 
werd in toenemende mate beschouwd als iets wat de gemeenschappelijke zaak in 
gevaar bracht.
Voor het EU-niveau gaf de discours analyse aan dat controverses en scheuringen 
tussen de actoren discursief meestal zo gestructureerd waren dat zij de institutionele 
grenzen niet volgden. Dit maakte de weg vrij voor het ontstaan van cross-loyalties, dat 
wil zeggen loyaliteiten tussen delen van de Commissie, het Parlement en de lidstaten. 
Dit was zelfs het geval bij onderwerpen die doorgaans in termen van 'EU-instituties 
versus EU-lidstaten' worden beschreven, zoals de fel omstreden CO2-heffing. 
Bovendien werden op dit niveau de individuele lidstaten en hun eigen belangen 
steeds meer gezien als een belemmering voor de algemene vooruitgang. 
Dientengevolge groeide bij veel lidstaten de bereidheid meer competenties naar het 
Gemeenschapsniveau, en vooral naar de Commissie, te verplaatsen. Voorbeelden 
waren het Europese systeem voor emissiehandel en de onderlinge verdeling van de 
doelstellingen uit het energie/klimaat-pakket.
CONCLUSIES PER CASUS: GGO-BELEID
Net als in het klimaatbeleid ontwikkelde zich ook ten aanzien van het internationale 
ggo-beleid een zeer zichtbare, gezamenlijke Europese 'geest'. Dit gebeurde na een 
periode van twisten tussen de EU-lidstaten en de Commissie, onder meer over een 
onderhandelingsmandaat voor de Commissie, en tussen de lidstaten onderling. Deze 
uitgangspositie ten spijt groeide in de loop van de tijd een waarneembaar 
saamhorigheidsgevoel tussen de verschillende Europese actoren. In recente 
onderhandelingen was de groep lidstaten die zich tegen een
onderhandelingsmandaat voor de Commissie verzette aanzienlijk kleiner dan 
voorheen. Ook in de context van het ggo-beleid bleek een afzonderlijke Europese 
identiteit zich vooral te hebben gevormd in referentie tot de VS als tegenstrever. De 
confrontatie met de VS hielp de EU om een bijna monolithische actor te worden. Het 
innemen van een afwijkende positie binnen de EU was vrijwel geen optie meer.
'Thuis', op EU niveau, verliep de belangrijkste scheidslijn niet tussen de lidstaten 
enerzijds en de EU-instituties anderzijds, maar tussen de voor- en de tegenstanders 
van biotechnologie. Institutionele verbindingen waren alleen relevant in de zin dat 
lidstaten of instituties in hun totaliteit als 'voor' of 'tegen' biotechnologie 
waargenomen werden. Dit basisconflict domineerde het debat. Controverses tussen 
de fracties 'voor' en 'tegen' biotechnologie overheersten mogelijke twisten tussen EU- 
instituties en de lidstaten, zelfs in gevallen waar competentieverdeling centraal stond. 
Conflicten zoals voorzien door de 'conventionele' EIS ontstonden slechts op één 
specifiek terrein, namelijk in verband met de zogenoemde 'vrijwaringsprocedures'.
ALGEMENE CONCLUSIES
In dit onderzoek heeft discours analyse geholpen om betekenisgeving en 
identiteitsvorming onder EU-beleidsmakers op het gebied van klimaatbeleid en ggo- 
beleid te problematiseren. De gevonden patronen zijn anders dan de patronen die de 
'conventionele' EIS veronderstelt en geven aanleiding, gangbare aannames over de 
verhouding tussen EU-instituties en EU-lidstaten opnieuw tegen het licht te houden. 
In beide beleidscasus heeft zich op het internationale niveau een gezamenlijke 
Europese identiteit tussen de beleidsmakers ontwikkeld. Op EU-niveau constateren 
we in veel gevallen een ontwikkeling van loyaliteiten en identiteiten die over de 
grenzen tussen EU-lidstaten en EU-instituties heenreiken. Het gebeurt nog steeds dat 
actoren in termen van 'Brussel tegen de lidstaten' denken, handelen en concurreren, 
maar dit is geenszins de overheersende manier van betekenisgeving en 
identiteitsvorming.
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